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 No childhood passes without being reprimanded by parents for things done 
wrong. We all know what it felt like when one of our parents was angry about something 
we did. Also, hardly anyone is a stranger to what a disappointed parent feels like. Often 
people feel worse after their parents say they are disappointed in them, than after they 
express anger. You might remember the thought of sitting across the kitchen table from 
your parents, hearing your parents say that they are not angry with you, but “just” 
disappointed. That they expected more from you and that you are capable of so much 
more. Indeed, the expression “I am not angry with you, I’m just disappointed” is often used 
to make people feel bad about what they have done, in hopes of changing their behavior. 
 But is it true that communicating disappointment is better than communicating 
anger when you desire behavioral change in others? And if so, why is this the case? This 
dissertation answers these questions, by pitting the interpersonal effects of anger against 
the interpersonal effects of disappointment. Anger and disappointment may on the one 
hand elicit behavioral change in others in favor of the expresser of the emotion. On the 
other hand, anger and disappointment may also elicit a tendency in others to act in a self-
interested manner, which may lead them to continue their current course of action. This 
dissertation will demonstrate why and under what conditions the communication of anger 
and disappointment is advantageous or detrimental. The studies are situated within 
competitive bargaining contexts, because such contexts are ideal for investigating how and 
why communicating anger and disappointment affect interpersonal outcomes. 
 
The social functions of emotions 
 Although the purpose of the present dissertation is to investigate the effects of 
communicated emotions, it may first be relevant to understand what constitutes an 
emotion. Unfortunately, there is no conclusive answer to this question. Although research 
has made progress in trying to conceptualize emotions, there is still no definition that 
every emotion researcher would agree on. Most theorists hold that emotions are the result 
of an evaluation (an appraisal) of some event relevant to a particular concern or goal 
(Frijda, 1986). These evaluations can be positive or negative. Emotional phenomena are 
often described in terms of affect, mood, and/or emotion. The general label affect is used to 




describe evaluative feelings, such as feeling good or bad (Parkinson, Totterdell, Briner, & 
Reynolds, 1996). These subjective feelings may include moods or emotions. Emotions differ 
from moods in that they are always about something, whereas moods “simply are” (Frijda, 
1994). Emotions are directed toward a specific person, object or event, whereas moods are 
less specific. Moods are also often less intense and longer lasting than emotions are 
(Ekman, 1984). Furthermore, emotions are characterized by distinct subjective 
experiences, physiological reactions, and action tendencies (Ekman, 1993; Levenson, 
Ekman, & Friesen, 1990; Parkinson, Fischer & Manstead, 2005). Discrete emotions are 
therefore often more informative than diffuse moods, both to the individual experiencing 
them and to observers. 
 Until recently, emotions were regarded as detrimental or disruptive forces that 
interfere with rational decision-making, instead of as social tools that facilitate decision-
making. It was better to suppress your emotions, and keep a poker face during social 
interactions with others than to let your emotions influence your own or others’ behavior. 
Increasingly, however, this thought has made way for a functional approach to emotions 
(Frijda, 1986). This approach emphasizes that emotions are not just distractions, but 
instrumental means that help prioritize goals and prepare individuals to respond to 
changes in the environment (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 
2010). 
 Most emotion research has focused on the intrapersonal effects of emotions. This 
research has focused on the functions of emotions for one’s own thoughts, behavior and 
intentions. Examples of questions that have been answered in this area of research are 
how one’s feelings of envy affect product evaluation (Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 
2010), whether angry bargainers are more competitive in negotiations than happy 
bargainers (Forgas, 1998), and how fear influences judgments of certainty and risk (Lerner 
& Keltner, 2001). Many of these intrapersonal effects of emotions may involve social 
situations. 
 In this dissertation, I take a different approach by not only considering the effects 
of emotions in a social context, but actually investigating how emotions affect other people. 
In this dissertation, I investigate the social functions of emotions. According to social-
functional analyses of emotions (Elfenbein, 2007; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Morris & Keltner, 
2000; Parkinson, 1996; Van Kleef et al., 2010), emotions contain valuable information 
about the feelings and intentions of the sender of the emotion. This information, in turn, 
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can have consequences for the behavior of the receiver of the emotion. Besides having an 
impact on one’s own behavior, thoughts, and feelings, emotions may thus also have 
interpersonal effects, such that the communication of emotions may affect others’ 
behavior, thoughts, intentions, and/or feelings. 
 To enhance understanding of these interpersonal effects of emotions, I draw on 
the Emotion as Social Information (EASI) model by Van Kleef et al. (2010) (see also Van 
Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef, Van Doorn, Heerdink, & Koning, 2011). The EASI model extends the 
general notion that emotions affect others’ behavior and intentions, by specifying two 
processes through which emotions may influence the behavior of others. Emotions affect 
others not only by providing relevant information about the intentions and/or feelings of 
the sender (the inferential path of the model), but also by affecting the emotions of others 
(the affective path of the model). 
 First, as noted above, expressed emotions may have informational value. Different 
emotions arise in response to different situations and different behaviors of others (Frijda, 
1986; Lazarus, 1991). Discrete emotions thus communicate different information to 
observers. Happiness, for instance, may signal that one is happy with the current situation, 
which may lead others to continue their current course of action. Similarly, sadness signals 
a loss, which may lead others to offer help. In a classic demonstration of these inferential 
processes (Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985), infants had to decide whether or not to 
cross a visual cliff to reach a toy. On the other side of the cliff, their mother either 
expressed fear or anger, or joy or interest. Results revealed that infants were more likely to 
cross the visual cliff when their mother was showing a positive emotion (joy or interest), 
compared to when their mother showed a negative emotion (fear or anger).  
 Besides this informational value of emotions, emotions may also wield 
interpersonal influence by eliciting affective reactions in others (Barsade, 2002; Dimberg & 
Öhman, 1996; Friedman et al., 2004; Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef, 2012; Van 
Kleef et al., 2010), which can influence subsequent behavior. Displays of contempt, for 
instance, evoke shame in others (Gilbert & Andrews, 1998), which may elicit withdraw or 
avoidance behavior. Similarly, anger has been shown to evoke fear in others (Dimberg & 
Öhman, 1996), which may elicit a tendency to avoid the angry person. One way emotions 
can affect the emotions of others, is via emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 
1994; see also Anderson, Keltner, & John, 2003; Hess & Blairy, 2001; Neumann & Strack, 
2000; Wild, Erb, & Bartels, 2001). Emotional contagion refers to the process whereby 




emotions spread directly from expresser to observer via processes of mimicry and afferent 
feedback. A person’s happiness, for instance, can be “caught”, which leads others to 
become happy themselves. Emotions can also influence others’ behavior by eliciting 
complementary emotions in them, which may influence subsequent behavior (Van Kleef et 
al., 2008). In this situation a person’s emotions evoke different but corresponding 
emotions in others (Van Kleef et al., 2008). Displays of anger, for instance, can elicit fear-
related responses (Dimberg & Öhman, 1996). In Chapter 2, I will return to this issue by 
explaining how and when emotions (i.e., anger and disappointment) may affect others’ 
behavior via emotional reciprocity and how and when emotions may affect others’ 
behavior via emotional complementarity. 
 The EASI model converges with other social functional approaches to emotion 
when it comes to the notion that the interpersonal effects of emotions cannot be explained 
simply in terms of their valence (i.e., whether the emotional expression is positive or 
negative). They should instead be understood in terms of the unique social information 
that they convey. The findings in this dissertation are in correspondence with the EASI 
model, because I focus on inferential as well as affective reactions to emotions of others, 
and I show that anger and disappointment (two negative emotions) have specific and 
distinct effects on others. The findings in this dissertation can, however, also be seen as an 
extension of the EASI model, by 1) showing that this difference between inferential and 
affective processes is not always that clear (Chapter 2 and 4), by 2) focusing on the 
underlying neural mechanisms of the interpersonal effects of emotions (Chapter 3), and by 
3) solving an apparent inconsistency that exists in social functional analyses of emotions 
(Chapter 5). 
 As noted above, I situate my studies within bargaining contexts. These contexts 
are perfect to study the interpersonal effects of emotions, because they lend themselves to 
different responses to different emotions. That is, negotiation settings are mixed-motive, 
such that people in these situations can cooperate to receive high joint outcomes, but also 
compete to satisfy personal concerns (Schelling, 1960). Emotion displays can play an 
important role in bargainers’ decisions to either cooperate or compete. Secondly, in 
negotiations both parties are highly dependent on one another for their outcomes. Specific 
information (e.g., via communicated emotions) from or about one’s opponent is thus very 
valuable. Previous research has indeed shown that in negotiations individuals are highly 
motivated to process emotions of others, and that they adjust their behavior accordingly 
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(Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, b). Finally, negotiation settings are perfect 
settings to vary relational and situational aspects that may influence how emotional 
expressions affect others. The interpersonal effects of emotions may be dependent on the 
relation between the expresser and the observer of the emotion. For instance, an 
emotional expression from an in-group member may have different effects on one’s 
behavior than an emotional expression from an out-group member (see Chapter 5). 
Situational aspects may also determine how a communicated emotion affects others. For 
instance, whether the target of an emotional expression negotiates for his/herself or for a 
constituency may determine whether an emotional expression elicits positive or negative 
outcomes (see Chapter 5). Negotiation settings allow researchers to vary those relational 
and situational aspects quite easily, while at the same time keeping experimental control. 
For these reasons, the studies reported in this dissertation are situated in bargaining 
contexts. Now, I will first review relevant literature on the effects of emotions in 
negotiations. 
 
Emotions in negotiations 
 A negotiation is “a discussion between two or more parties with the apparent aim 
of resolving a divergence of interests” (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993, p. 2). It is often a heated 
and highly emotional process. In the last decades, researchers have indeed shown that 
emotions play a significant role in negotiations. 
 
Intrapersonal effects of emotions 
 Initially, research in this area focused on the intrapersonal effects of emotions. 
Most of these studies found that bargainers experiencing negative emotions tend to act 
more competitively (with exceptions, see Ketelaar & Au, 2003), whereas bargainers 
experiencing positive emotions tend to act more cooperatively. 
 One of the first studies on the role of affect in negotiations focused on the effects of 
positive affect (Carnevale & Isen, 1986). Subjects in this study negotiated as buyers and 
sellers of appliances, and positive affect was either induced or not. Positive affect was 
induced by instructing participants to sort funny cartoons in two piles. The findings 
showed that positive affect reduced contentious tactics and increased joint benefit. 
Accordingly, other work has also shown that positive affect increases concession making 




(Baron, 1990) and cooperative negotiation strategies (Baron, Fortin, Frei, Hauver, & Shack, 
1990). 
 Later work on the effects of negative affect has shown different yet compatible 
results regarding the effects of negative emotions. Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, and Raia (1997) 
examined the effects of feeling angry and feeling compassion. Their participants performed 
a computer-mediated negotiation and negotiated about four different issues. Results 
showed that experiencing high levels of anger and low levels of compassion posed several 
disadvantages. Angry participants had less desire to work with their opponent in the 
future, achieved fewer joint gains and were more competitive. Other work also showed 
that negative affect decreases initial offers (Baron et al., 1990) and increases rejection of 
ultimatum offers (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). 
 One set of studies directly compared the experience of positive and negative affect 
in negotiations, and showed compatible results (Forgas, 1998). Subjects either learned that 
they had performed well on a test (which induced positive affect), or poorly (which 
induced negative affect). In both interpersonal and intergroup negotiations, negative affect 
led people to become more competitive, whereas positive affect led people to adopt a more 
cooperative bargaining strategy. 
 Positive emotions thus seem to have a more beneficial influence on the bargaining 
process than negative emotions. However, as noted above, it is also important to look 
beyond valence and study the effects of discrete emotions in negotiations. Recently, 
research has started to compare the effects of different negative emotions in negotiations. 
Nelissen, Leliveld, Van Dijk, and Zeelenberg (2011) compared the effects of the experience 
of fear and guilt. They found that both emotions led people to offer more, but for different 
reasons. Fearful bargainers made higher offers to avoid rejection, whereas guilty people 
made higher offers because they were concerned with their opponent’s outcomes (see also 
De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2007; Ketelaar & Au, 2003). 
 Another set of recent studies compared the effects of disappointment and regret in 
a bargaining game. Regret and disappointment were either induced by autobiographical 
recall or by imagined scenarios. Results showed that regret increased offers in a bargaining 
game, whereas disappointment caused bargainers to make less generous offers (Martinez, 
Zeelenberg, & Rijsman, 2011). 
 As is clear from all these studies focusing on the intrapersonal effects of emotions 
in bargaining, there is now a considerable body of literature that has addressed how the 
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experience of specific emotions differentially affects one’s bargaining behavior. Although 
initial evidence showed that negative emotions lead bargainers to act more competitively, 
later research investigating discrete emotions showed that not all negative emotions have 
similar effects on people. As we shall see below, there has only recently been a shift in the 
literature from only addressing the intrapersonal effects of emotions in negotiations, to 
also studying the interpersonal effects of emotions. 
 
Interpersonal effects of emotions 
 Research on the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiation began with a 
series of studies by Van Kleef et al. (2004a). Participants in their studies bargained with 
simulated opponents in a computer mediated negotiation. In several rounds of offers and 
counteroffers, participants received either angry or happy emotional expressions from 
their opponent. Negotiators with a happy opponent inferred that their opponent was 
lenient and easy to get. This led participants to make little concessions. Angry emotional 
expressions, however, signaled toughness and high limits. When a bargainer is perceived 
to have high limits, opponents do not expect that he/she will give in much during the 
negotiation. This may lead opponents to give in themselves, to not let the negotiation end 
in impasse. Indeed, Van Kleef et al. (2004a) showed that participants who were faced with 
angry bargainers made higher concessions than participants who were faced with a 
neutral or happy bargainer. This first study thus showed that it is better to express anger 
than to express happiness in a negotiation. In line with the inferential path of the EASI 
model, bargainers used the information that anger and happiness conveyed as input for 
their decisions. 
 Later, the same authors (Van Kleef et al., 2004b) provided more direct support for 
this notion. In three studies they showed that participants were only affected by the 
information that anger and happiness conveyed if they were motivated to consider the 
information. Participants negotiated in the same negotiation paradigm as in Van Kleef et al. 
(2004a). The authors showed that when participants had a low need for cognitive closure, 
a lot of time to make their decisions, and low power (all indicators of a high 
motivation/ability to process information), they used the information that anger and 
happiness conveyed as input for their decisions. This led participants to concede more to 
angry than to happy bargainers. However, when participants had a high need for cognitive 
closure, little time to make their decision, and high power (all indicators of a low 




motivation/ability to process information), they were less affected by the information that 
the emotions conveyed. 
 In line with findings by Van Kleef et al (2004a, b), Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) 
showed that communicating anger elicited higher offers than not communicating any 
emotion. In a scenario study and a face-to-face negotiation study where one participant 
was trained to communicate anger, the authors manipulated whether participants had 
poor alternatives or good alternatives. They showed that participants gave in more to 
angry opponents than to opponents not communicating any emotion, but only when they 
had poor alternatives. This was explained by the finding that anger signals toughness. 
When bargainers have poor alternatives, they have to give in to their tough negotiator, to 
avoid impasse. 
 This first line of studies thus showed that communicating emotions may affect the 
bargaining behavior of opponents. However, as I have stressed before, it is important to 
consider the effects of specific emotions and to not only investigate emotions that differ in 
valence, such as anger and happiness. Few studies have considered the interpersonal 
effects of different negative or different positive emotions in negotiations. One study that 
did investigate the interpersonal effects of different negative emotions, compared the 
effects of the appeasement emotions guilt and regret with the effects of the supplication 
emotions disappointment and worry (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006a). 
Appeasement emotions may arise when bargainers claim too much in a negotiation, and 
are subsequently willing to compensate for that. This may lead opponents to stand firm 
and act competitively. Supplication emotions, on the other hand, serve as a call for help, 
which may elicit support. The authors indeed showed that when participants faced an 
opponent that communicated appeasement emotions, they made low offers. However, 
when participants faced an opponent that communicated supplication emotions, 
participants made more generous offers. 
 This work was an important first step in investigating the interpersonal effects of 
different negative emotions in negotiations. It showed that it is important to look beyond 
the valence of an emotion to see how it affects others, and treat each emotion as a distinct 
predictor of behavior in negotiations. Based on this work and previous work that also 
emphasized that it is important to acknowledge that specific emotions have differential 
effects (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Van Kleef et al., 2010), this 
16    |    Chapter 1 




dissertation focuses on comparing the interpersonal effects of discrete negative emotions. 
More specifically, I focus on the two negative emotions anger and disappointment. 
 
Anger and disappointment 
 This dissertation specifically focuses on anger and disappointment, because they 
are two of the most often communicated emotions (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b). From a 
practical perspective it is thus highly relevant to study the effects of the communication of 
these emotions. From a theoretical perspective it is also relevant to study the interpersonal 
effects of these two emotions. Anger and disappointment are both emotions that are 
reactions to undesirable behavior of others, and at the same time desire behavioral change 
of others (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b). The goal of communicating both emotions is 
thus to change the behavior of others. Because anger and disappointment have the goal to 
influence others and change others’ behavior, it is important to investigate how these two 
emotions operate and under which conditions they achieve that goal. At first site, anger 
and disappointment are two very similar emotions. Both emotions are negative and are 
reactions to undesirable outcomes (Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989). However, when 
taking a closer look, both emotions are very distinct in terms of their underlying appraisal 
patterns (Frijda et al., 1989). Below I will review previous literature that shows how these 
two negative emotions differ from each other. First, I will discuss the emotion anger, 
including its intra- and interpersonal effects and then the emotion disappointment with its 
intra- and interpersonal effects. 
 
What do we know about anger? 
 Anger arises when a person’s goals are frustrated (Berkowitz, 1993; Carver & 
Harmon-Jones, 2009; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939; Lewis, Alessandri, & 
Sullivan, 1990). It can be caused by the absence of a positive outcome, as well as by the 
presence of a negative outcome (Van Dijk, Zeelenberg, & Van der Pligt, 1999). Anger mostly 
arises when others are blamed for the goal blockage (Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996). It 
may, for instance, arise in an individual when he/she is intentionally hurt by another 
person. 
 With regard to the intrapersonal effects of anger, research has shown that it is 
associated with a tendency to aggress against the person (or object) seen as responsible 
for the goal blockage (Averill, 1982; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Van Kleef et al., 2010). It is 




an emotion that elicits approach tendencies (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, 
2004) and feelings of control (Roseman et al., 1996). As I noted above, in negotiations 
feelings of anger fuel competitiveness. Moreover, anger has been shown to increase the 
rejection of offers (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996) and to decrease joint gains and the desire 
to work together in the future (Allred et al., 1997). 
 Research on the interpersonal effects of anger, has shown that anger 
communicates power (Tiedens, 2001). Angry individuals are perceived to have a higher 
status and a higher salary than individuals expressing other negative emotions, such as 
sadness. Furthermore, whereas the first series of studies by Van Kleef and colleagues on 
the interpersonal effects of anger showed that communicating anger pays in negotiations, 
because it signals toughness and high limits, later research has shown that anger may also 
backfire. When anger is communicated by a low-power negotiator (Van Dijk, Van Kleef, 
Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008; Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006b), anger elicits 
less generous offers. Similarly, Van Kleef and Côté (2007) showed that when anger is 
communicated in an inappropriate manner, it may backfire. The authors showed that when 
there is no norm prohibiting the expression of anger (i.e., when anger is communicated 
appropriately), anger elicits high offers from others. However, when there is a norm 
prohibiting expressions of anger (i.e., when it is communicated inappropriately), anger 
elicits low offers because inappropriate expressions of anger elicit negative affective 
reactions and retaliatory tendencies. Moreover, a study on multiparty negotiations showed 
that angry bargainers are often excluded from coalitions because expressions of anger 
undermine liking (Van Beest, Van Kleef, & Van Dijk, 2008). The authors showed that 
communicating anger only elicited high offers in targets in the rare occasion that targets 
chose to form a coalition with the angry bargainer or when they had no other choice than 
to form a coalition with the angry opponent. In short, expressions of anger can have 
positive effects in bargaining situations because they signal power, toughness, and 
ambitious limits, but they may also backfire because they elicit negative affective reactions 
and retaliatory responses from targets. 
 
What do we know about disappointment? 
 Disappointment arises when progress towards a goal is below expectations 
(Carver & Scheier, 1990; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008) and/or when a desired outcome is 
not achieved (Bell, 1985; Frijda, 1986; Van Dijk & Van der Pligt, 1997). It is less caused by 
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the presence of a negative outcome, and more by an absence of a positive outcome (Van 
Dijk et al., 1999). It involves feelings of powerlessness, a tendency to turn away from an 
event, and wanting to do nothing (Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, Manstead, & Van der Pligt, 1998a). 
Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2002a, b) also showed that disappointment is associated with 
appraisals of unexpectedness, wanting something pleasurable, and thinking that one was 
morally right. According to disappointment theory (Loomes & Sugden, 1986), before 
people make a decision, they are able to anticipate their post-decisional disappointment. 
This anticipated disappointment is taken into account when people make decisions (see 
also Zeelenberg et al., 1998b). Disappointment is thus associated with the process of 
counterfactual thinking (i.e., people compare the actual situation to the “what could have 
been” situation; Roese, 1997). 
 With regard to the intrapersonal effects of disappointment, research has focused 
on the effect of the experience of disappointment on people’s behavior in the trust game 
(Tzieropoulos, Grave de Peralta, Bossaerts, & Gonzalez Andino, 2011). The results showed 
that the experience of disappointment led individuals to trust the other person less and to 
expect less from the other person. Also, as noted above, one study investigating the effects 
of disappointment in negotiations showed that the experience of disappointment 
decreases prosocial behavior and increases competitiveness (Martinez et al., 2011). In line 
with disappointment theory, Van Dijk, Zeelenberg, and Van der Pligt (2003) demonstrated 
that people’s behavior is also affected by the anticipation of disappointment. They showed 
that, to regulate disappointment, people lowered their expectations about obtaining a 
certain outcome on a test. However, people only did this when the test was self-relevant 
(and not when it was only relevant for other people) and when they received feedback on 
the test immediately (instead of after a delay). 
 It is disappointing how little is known about the interpersonal effects of 
disappointment. Research on the interpersonal effects of disappointment in social 
dilemma’s has shown that communicating disappointment increases cooperation in others 
(Wubben, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2009). Disappointed individuals were perceived as 
forgiving, and the targets of disappointment were not only cooperative in the first 
interaction, but this also carried over to future cooperative decisions with the same 
interaction partner. In line with these results, Van Doorn, Heerdink, and Van Kleef (2012) 
showed that expressions of disappointment also lead observers to perceive the situation as 
more cooperative, instead of the person. Finally, as described earlier, in negotiations 




supplication emotions (including disappointment) elicit generous offers from opponents 
(Van Kleef et al., 2006a). Van Kleef and Van Lange (2008) demonstrated that people do so 
to satisfy the disappointed person’s needs. 
 There are thus indications that, although anger and disappointment have some 
similarities, these two emotions have distinct effects. Little, however, is known about the 
underlying mechanisms responsible for the differential effects of anger and 
disappointment. In this dissertation, I compare the interpersonal effects of anger and 
disappointment in negotiations, and show that in certain situations they affect the 
behavior of opponents in the same way - but via different mechanisms - and in certain 
situations they affect the behavior of opponents in different or even opposite ways. I 
investigate the underlying mechanisms in terms of behavior (Chapters 2, 4, and 5), but also 
in terms of brain activation (Chapter 3). That is, besides showing that expressions of anger 
and disappointment influence others by providing information and/or evoking emotions 
in others, I also show that they activate different brain regions in others. 
 
fMRI research on emotions and negotiation 
 Research on the interpersonal effects of emotions has focused primarily on the 
affective, cognitive, and behavioral effects of communicated emotions. Moreover, 
investigations of the underlying mechanisms that explain why targets of communicated 
emotions show certain behavior have relied only on self-reported perceptions, thoughts, 
emotions, and/or motivations. Although such self-report measures are good predictors of 
behavior, they are only a proxy of how people really experience emotions of others. First of 
all, self-report measures may sometimes suffer from social desirability issues, so that 
participants may not report their true thoughts, emotions, and/or motivations correctly 
because they give socially desirable answers. Second, self-reports are not assessed during 
emotional expressions of others, but instead afterwards. 
 To reduce social desirability and to measure people’s responses during the 
emotional expressions, I turn to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). fMRI is a 
procedure that looks at blood flow in the brain to detect areas of activity. When there is 
more activation in a certain part of the brain, this region uses more oxygen. fMRI detects 
which regions use high levels of oxygen, thus identifying which brain regions are activated 
during a certain task. In this way, fMRI can be used to assess emotion (and cognitive) 
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processing as it unfolds over time, and it enables researchers to investigate the underlying 
neural mechanisms that are associated with observable behavior. 
 Another important contribution of fMRI is that it can show that there are 
processes that rely on the same underlying neural systems, which cannot be identified 
based on behavioral data. Eisenberger, Lieberman, and Williams (2003), for instance, 
showed that the social pain associated with being socially excluded produces activity in a 
similar network of brain regions as the experience of physical pain (see also DeWall et al., 
2010; Lelieveld, Gunther Moor, Crone, Karremans, & Van Beest, 2012; Peyron, Laurent, & 
Garcia-Larrea, 2000). In this dissertation I did not only use fMRI to investigate differences 
between the interpersonal effects of anger and disappointment, I also used the technique 
to investigate whether the effects of the two emotions also rely on similar underlying 
processes. The latter was done by comparing the effects of anger and disappointment to 
the effects of a positive emotion: happiness. For these reasons, in Chapter 3, I use fMRI to 
investigate the underlying neural mechanisms of the interpersonal effects of anger and 
disappointment. 
 In this dissertation, I focus on the communication of anger and disappointment 
within a social context. Although previous work does focus on how the emotions of other 
people activate different brain regions, they tend to lack social context (Fischer & Van 
Kleef, 2010). Prior neuroimaging studies on emotion communication have mainly focused 
on the understanding of the neural mechanisms that support the processing of emotional 
faces (for an overview see Fusar-Poli et al., 2009; Sabatinelli et al., 2011; Vuilleumier, & 
Pourtois, 2007; Wager, Luan Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003). These studies have reported 
activation of the amygdala when individuals view emotional facial expressions, mostly in 
the case of negative emotions such as fear and anger (Breiter et al., 1996; Hariri, Tessitore, 
Mattay, Fera, & Weinberger, 2002; Morris et al., 1996; Sato, Yoshikawa, Kochiyama, & 
Matsumura, 2004). These findings are very interesting and add to the literature of the 
interpersonal effects of emotions. However, to discover how our brains and our behavior 
are affected by others it is important to create a social context, where emotions are 
communicated based on earlier behavior within that social context. 
 Emotions play a pivotal role in negotiations, but few neuroimaging studies have 
taken emotions into account while studying motivated bargaining behavior. Previous 
neuroimaging studies on negotiation behavior only focused on behavior in simple 
bargaining games, without having information about the feelings and emotions of others. 




These studies, for instance, showed that receiving unfair proposals is associated with 
increased activation in the insula, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (see Rilling & Sanfey, 2011; Sanfey, 2007 for reviews). It is 
unclear, however, how this relates to specific emotions like anger and disappointment. 
 Taken together, previous neuroimaging studies have either focused on the 
communication of emotions without taking the social context into account, or on 
negotiation behavior in economic games, without taking communicated emotions into 
account. In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I aim to fill this gap in the literature by 
investigating how the communication of anger and disappointment differentially affects 
opponent’s behavior and whether this is associated with activation in different brain 
networks in a bargaining setting. 
 
Overview of the present dissertation 
 In the present dissertation, studies are reported that were designed to investigate 
the interpersonal behavioral and neural effects of anger and disappointment in negotiation 
settings. The four chapters are based on individual papers that have been published or 
have been submitted for publication. Each chapter can therefore be read separately. The 
consequence is that there may exist some overlap between the chapters. 
 The first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) focuses on the affective reactions to anger 
and disappointment in negotiations. Whereas previous research focused mainly on the 
information that anger and disappointment communicate to others, the studies reported in 
Chapter 2 investigate which emotions are evoked by anger and disappointment and how 
these evoked emotions predict subsequent behavior. Anger and disappointment can evoke 
reciprocal emotions (i.e., anger can evoke anger in others, and disappointment can evoke 
disappointment), but they can also evoke different, but corresponding emotions (i.e., 
complementary emotions) in others (see Van Kleef et al., 2008). In Chapter 2, the findings 
show that power is a key determinant of whether reciprocal or complementary emotions 
are evoked. As described earlier, previous research has shown that anger may backfire 
when it is communicated by a low-power bargainer (Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 
2006b). In Chapter 2, the power position of the person expressing anger or 
disappointment is manipulated in an ultimatum bargaining setting. The findings indeed 
show that power is a crucial determinant of whether the communication of anger pays or 
backfires. The findings indicate that anger evokes a complementary emotion (fear) in 
22    |    Chapter 1 




targets when it is communicated by a high-power bargainer, but it evokes a reciprocal 
emotion (anger) when communicated by a low-power bargainer. The reciprocal anger 
leads targets to offer less, whereas the complementary fear leads targets to offer more. The 
effects of disappointment, on the other hand, are not dependent on the expresser’s power 
position. The findings show that disappointment evokes guilt in opponents, which leads 
these opponents to offer more. Communicating disappointment may thus be more 
advisable than communicating anger, because anger only elicits high offers when it is 
communicated by high-power bargainers, whereas disappointment elicits high offers when 
communicated by high- as well as low-power bargainers. 
 In line with the findings of Chapter 2, the results of Chapter 3 show that it is better 
to communicate disappointment than to communicate anger in a negotiation setting. In 
Chapter 3, the neural mechanisms involved in the interpersonal effects of anger and 
disappointment are investigated and compared to the interpersonal effects of happiness. 
Whereas previous research focused only on the neural mechanisms associated with 
emotions without a social context, or on bargaining settings without having any 
information about opponents or their emotions, Chapter 3 combines these lines of 
research and focuses on the effects of communicated emotions in a bargaining setting. 
First, the effects of valence are investigated by comparing the neural regions associated 
with receiving negative emotional reactions (i.e., anger and disappointment) to neural 
regions associated with a receiving positive emotional reactions (happiness). Furthermore, 
Chapter 3 zooms in on the different negative emotions, to see whether anger and 
disappointment affect other’s brain regions differently. The results show that anger elicits 
more self-serving offers in opponents than happiness or disappointment. When comparing 
the positive emotion happiness to the negative emotions anger and disappointment, 
results show increased activation in regions associated with perspective taking (the 
temporoparietal junction). When zooming in on the two negative emotions, findings show 
that compared to disappointment, expressions of anger increase activation in regions 
associated with self-referential thinking (i.e., thinking about others’ actions in terms of 
how these can affect the self) and (emotional) conflict. These regions are the anterior 
medial prefrontal cortex and the ACC. 
 So, is it always better to communicate disappointment than to communicate anger 
in negotiations? Chapter 4 aims to answer this question, and shows that disappointment 
does not always pay. As described earlier, whether the communication of certain emotions 




pays or not, may critically depend on how the emotion is communicated. Previous 
behavior has, for instance, shown that communicating anger inappropriately may backfire 
and result in lower offers (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). In Chapter 4, it is proposed that 
behavioral effects are dependent on the target of the emotion, that is, whether emotions 
are directed at the offer or the person. Results show that the two negative emotions anger 
and disappointment have opposing effects in negotiations: anger pays when it is directed 
at the offer, but disappointment pays when it is directed at the person. Offer-directed 
anger elicits higher offers than person-directed anger, because people infer higher limits 
from opponents who communicate offer-directed anger. Person-directed disappointment 
elicits higher offers in others than offer-directed disappointment, because it evokes higher 
feelings of guilt. 
 Finally, Chapter 5 combines the research of the first three empirical chapters, by 
showing why and under what conditions communicating disappointment pays and 
backfires. One of the most striking differences between the intrapersonal effects of anger 
and disappointment is the level of experienced power associated with each emotion. As 
noted above, previous research has shown that whereas anger is associated with feelings 
of power (e.g., Roseman et al., 1996), disappointment is associated with feelings of 
weakness and powerlessness (Van Dijk and Zeelenberg, 2002a, b; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, 
Manstead, & Van der Pligt, 1998a). The findings of Chapter 5 show that disappointment 
also communicates weakness to others. The results of three experiments demonstrate that 
the interpersonal effects of disappointment depend highly on 1) whether the expresser is 
an in- or an out-group member, and 2) the type of negotiation (i.e., whether it is an 
individual versus a representative negotiation), because these factors determine whether 
expressions of disappointment elicit feelings of guilt in targets. When disappointment does 
not evoke guilt (i.e., when the expresser is an out-group member or in representative 
negotiations), the communicated weakness elicits a tendency to act in a self-interested 
way. When disappointment does evoke guilt (i.e., when the expresser is an in-group 
member or in individual negotiations), the weakness that disappointment communicates 
elicits a tendency to act pro-socially. These findings resolve the question of why and under 
what conditions communicating disappointment backfires and extend the literature on 
communicated power/weakness. 
 Finally, Chapter 6 integrates the empirical results discussed in this dissertation. I 
will discuss how the findings presented in this dissertation contribute to, but also extend 
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social functional accounts of emotions. Furthermore, I discuss the general implications of 



















This chapter is based on: Lelieveld, G. -J., Van Dijk, E., Van Beest, I., & Van Kleef, G. A. 
(2012). Why anger and disappointment affect other’s bargaining behavior differently: The 
moderating role of power and the mediating role of reciprocal and complementary 
emotions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 1209-1221.
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When making decisions we are often dependent on others. Conflicts that arise in 
such situations are often resolved by negotiation, “a discussion between two or more 
parties with the apparent aim of resolving a divergence of interests” (Pruitt & Carnevale, 
1993, p.2). This definition, however, does not capture the fact that negotiations are often 
highly emotional. In this article, we examine how negotiators respond to their opponent’s 
emotions. We focus on the effects of two common emotions in negotiation, anger and 
disappointment (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b), and examine how angry versus 
disappointed reactions shape a target’s negotiation behavior by eliciting reciprocal and/or 
complementary emotions. 
 
The social functions of emotions 
Emotions have long been regarded as disruptive forces that interfere with rational 
decision-making. Increasingly, researchers have come to acknowledge the functional 
aspects of emotions (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010). According to social-functional 
perspectives (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Parkinson, 1996; Van Kleef et 
al., 2010), emotions contain crucial information about feelings and intentions of the 
expresser, which can have behavioral consequences for observers. Moreover, emotion 
displays can evoke complementary or reciprocal emotions in others that help to respond to 
social events (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a). Emotions 
may thus affect others via two processes: by providing information that others may use as 
input to their decisions and by eliciting affective reactions (Van Kleef et al., 2010). 
Previous research on negotiations has focused mainly on how bargainers make 
informational inferences following opponents’ emotions. Although anger and 
disappointment are both reactions to undesirable outcomes, they communicate different 
information (Bell, 1985; Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989; Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 
2002b). Earlier findings showed that because angry bargainers are seen as tough 
negotiators who do not want to give in (e.g., Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996; Sinaceur & 
Tiedens, 2006, Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b), their limits (i.e., their minimal 
acceptable offer) are perceived to be high. Anger may therefore alert opponents to 




negative consequences (e.g., conflict escalation), which may lead them to concede to avoid 
impasse. 
Disappointment, on the other hand, is thought to have a “supplication” function 
(Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006a). Supplication emotions serve as a call for help 
(Clark et al., 1996; Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead, 1998). Previous research found that 
negotiators with disappointed opponents inferred that the other had received too little 
(Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008) and was hoping for more (Thompson, Valley, & Kramer, 
1995). Consequently, disappointment led opponents to make concessions to satisfy the 
other’s needs. 
 
Affective reactions towards anger and disappointment 
In addition to the informational value of anger and disappointment, emotional 
expressions can also wield interpersonal influence by eliciting affective reactions in 
observers (Barsade, 2002; Dimberg & Öhman, 1996; Friedman et al., 2004; Van Kleef et al., 
2010). The anger or disappointment communicated by opponents may elicit emotions in 
negotiators that subsequently influence their negotiation behavior. In the current article, 
we set out to investigate this affective link. We argue that emotional reactions may 
influence negotiators’ emotions and subsequent behavior in two ways: via emotional 
reciprocity and/or via emotional complementarity. 
Emotional reciprocity refers to the process by which one individual comes to feel 
the emotions of another (e.g., via emotional convergence or emotional contagion; see 
Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; Hess & Blairy, 2001). In the current context emotional 
reciprocity means that if one negotiator is angry, the other negotiator comes to experience 
anger as well. Likewise, if one negotiator is disappointed, the other also feels disappointed. 
A second way by which one person’s emotions influence others’ emotions has 
been termed emotional complementarity. Emotional complementarity refers to “the 
situation where one person’s emotions evoke different but corresponding emotions in 
others” (Van Kleef et al., 2008, p.1315). One of the presumed social functions of 
complementary emotional responses is to reduce the intensity of others’ emotions and to 
promote well-adjusted personal relationships (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). For instance, 
displays of contempt evoke shame in others (Gilbert & Andrews, 1998), which in turn may 
reduce the intensity of the contempt and thereby improve the interpersonal relation. By 
reducing the intensity of other’s emotions, complementary emotions thus regulate social 
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interaction and create social stability (Morris & Keltner, 2000; see also Tiedens & Fragale, 
2003). 
The complementary emotion that is most consistently associated with anger is 
fear (Dimberg & Öhman, 1996; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), which makes sense considering 
that anger is typically associated with aggression (Averill, 1982) and thus poses a threat to 
observers (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). Indeed, empirical work has demonstrated that both 
verbal and nonverbal expressions of anger can evoke fear in observers (e.g., Dimberg & 
Öhman, 1996; Moody, McIntosh, Mann, & Weisser, 2007; Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van 
Beest, 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). 
Unlike anger, disappointment does not evoke fear in others. Instead, we argue that 
disappointment evokes the complementary emotion of guilt. Previous work has associated 
disappointment with feelings of weakness (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b). It therefore 
does not communicate a potential threat, which makes it unlikely to evoke fear in others. 
Previous research showed that disappointment communicates that one has received too 
little and was hoping for more (Thompson et al., 1995; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008). This 
may evoke a sense of social responsibility in others, which is a key antecedent of guilt 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Mallett & Swim, 2007). Guilt arises when 
individuals feel they have violated some expectation or norm (Leith & Baumeister, 1998). 
Expressions of guilt can help repair relationships because they signal that the “victim” is 
important to the “transgressor”. Guilt may thus hold a promise of better treatment in the 
future (Baumeister et al., 1994; Van Kleef et al., 2006a). In accordance with this reasoning, 
Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, Steinel and Van Kleef (2011) showed that expressions of 
disappointment may evoke guilt in others, which elicits a concern for the other. 
In short, in this article, we study how affective reactions to other’s emotions 
subsequently affect behavior. This complements prior approaches that concentrated on 
the informational inferences (e.g., the inference that anger may communicate high limits). 
By doing so, we do not claim that affective reactions are not based on inferences. Our 
analysis acknowledges that other’s emotions may instigate a direct emotional reaction, but 
may also partly be based on inferential processes (e.g., when we infer from other’s 
disappointment that he/she had expected more from us, and consequently feel guilty). 
Based on prior theorizing and research, anger and disappointment can be expected to have 
differential effects on observers’ reciprocal and complementary emotional reactions. 
Whereas anger may evoke the reciprocal emotion anger and the complementary emotion 




fear, disappointment may evoke the reciprocal emotion disappointment and the 
complementary emotion guilt. 
 
Behavioral consequences and the role of power 
So what determines whether people reciprocate or complement opponents’ 
emotions? We propose that one key determinant is the relative power of the bargainers. 
Social power reflects the relative capacity to modify and/or influence other’s outcomes 
(Fiske, 1993; Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008). We argue that the relative power of 
the bargainers is more essential for the interpersonal effects of anger and less for 
disappointment. 
When anger is expressed by a person in a relatively high-power position, it entails 
a threat (Van Dijk et al., 2008). The potential consequences of expressed anger for low-
power individuals are severe, because they have limited control over their outcomes. As a 
result, angry reactions by powerful opponents lead negotiators to fear that their outcomes 
will be reduced (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 
2006b). Fear has been shown to render bargainers risk averse (Lerner & Keltner, 2001) 
and to make them more likely to avoid conflict (Bell & Song, 2005), which leads them to 
make higher offers. 
When a negotiator receives an angry reaction from an opponent in a low-power 
position, the potential consequences are less likely to be severe. When the opponent has 
little control over the outcomes, anger poses less of a threat. As a result, bargainers who 
are confronted with angry reactions of a low-power opponent experience less fear 
compared to those confronted with the anger of a high-power opponent. In such situations, 
anger is more likely to evoke reciprocal anger (e.g., Barsade, 2002; Friedman et al., 2004; 
Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). 
Angry reactions by low-power negotiators are thus more likely to backfire. The experience 
of (reciprocal) anger has been shown to elicit competitiveness (Forgas, 1998; Pillutla & 
Murnighan, 1996) and a desire for retaliation (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007), which is typically 
reflected in lower offers. Power may therefore be a key factor that determines whether 
anger is complemented or reciprocated and thus successful or not. If the consequences for 
own outcomes are severe (i.e., when anger is reported by a high-power person), anger may 
pay, and when consequences are mild (i.e., when anger is reported by a low-power 
person), anger may backfire (see also Van Dijk et al., 2008). 
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We reasoned that these effects of anger do not generalize to disappointment. 
Previous research has shown that disappointment evokes a concern for others by evoking 
guilt, even in competitive settings (Lelieveld et al., 2011). Reactions to disappointment are 
thus less based on the immediate consequences for own outcomes, and more on a concern 
for the outcomes of the disappointed other. When the concern about own outcomes is 
reduced and social responsibility increases, the relative power position of the other person 
may become less important. Indeed, bargainers can feel a concern for high-power 
opponents, but research has shown that bargainers also feel social responsibility for low-
power opponents (Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, & De Dreu, 2008). Therefore, we 
hypothesize that disappointed reactions evoke the complementary emotion guilt in others, 
in high- as well as low-power positions. Guilt triggers a tendency to improve relationship 
quality and reduce competition (Baumeister et al., 1994; Leith & Baumeister, 1998). In 
addition, guilt has been shown to motivate people to make amends (Baumeister et al., 
1994) and stimulate concessions (Ketelaar & Au, 2003). Disappointed reactions should 
therefore elicit generous offers from targets, regardless of the disappointed bargainer’s 
power position. 
We investigated our hypotheses in two experiments in which we manipulated the 
relative power position of the bargainers. To examine the effects of power distributions, 
we used a bargaining context that is commonly used to investigate motivated bargaining 
behavior; the ultimatum bargaining context. The ultimatum bargaining game (UBG, 
developed by Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) models the final phase of 
bargaining, where bargainers make a “take it or leave it” offer. With its simple structure, 
the UBG is very suited to studying motivated bargaining behavior and the structural effects 
of power as well as effects of emotional reactions (see Van Dijk et al., 2008). 
 
Experiment 2.1 
In Experiment 2.1 we manipulated the relative power position of the opponent. 
Half of the participants negotiated with high-power opponents and half with low-power 
opponents. Both groups received an angry reaction, a disappointed reaction or no reaction 
(which was the control condition). We propose that anger reported by a high-power 
opponent elicits higher offers than anger reported by a low-power opponent (see also Van 
Dijk et al., 2008). We expect this moderating effect of power in the anger conditions to be 




mediated by fear. When anger does not pose a threat (in the low-power condition), anger 
may thus likely backfire because it may not evoke fear. We propose that reporting anger in 
a low-power position elicits lower offers, in comparison to reporting no emotion. We 
expect this effect of opponent’s emotion in the low-power anger and control conditions to 
be mediated by reciprocal anger. 
We predict that the effects of disappointment are not moderated by power. 
Regardless of power, we expect participants to report more guilt in the disappointment 
condition than in the anger and control conditions (see also Lelieveld et al., 2011). 
Consequently, we do not expect a difference in offers between the high- and low-power 
disappointment conditions. Feelings of guilt lead participants to offer more to 
disappointed opponents than to angry or neutral opponents. First, we will focus on the 
participants with high-power disappointed opponents and test whether they make higher 
offers because they feel guilty. To do so, we will compare the high-power disappointment 
condition to the high-power control condition and expect the effect of opponent’s emotion 
to be mediated by guilt. Second, we will investigate whether disappointment reported by a 
low-power opponent also elicits high offers. We will compare the low-power 
disappointment condition to the low-power angry and control conditions, to see whether 
the effect of opponent’s emotion in these conditions is mediated by guilt. 
 In addition, we measured the perceived limits to see whether, in addition to the 
emotional effects of anger and disappointment, informational inferences also play a role in 
participant’s behavioral reactions. Previous research has shown that anger influences 
opponents via perceived limits (see Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b), but such effects have not 
been demonstrated for disappointment. In particular, one might wonder whether people 
offer more to high-power opponents (reporting anger or disappointment) than to low-





Design and participants 
We used a 3 (opponent’s emotion: anger vs. disappointment vs. control) × 2 
(opponent’s power: high vs. low) between-participants design. Participants were 114 
students from Leiden University (72 females, 42 males, Mage = 21.15, SD = 2.93). 
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Upon arrival, participants were informed that they would participate in a study on 
bargaining, and that they would be paired with another participant. They learned that 
members of each dyad were referred to as person X and person Y and that they were 
assigned the letter X. The rest of the procedure can be divided into four phases. 
In phase one, before they received information about the bargaining situation (see 
phase two), participants produced behavior which supposedly caused the opponent’s 
emotional reaction. Participants read six general statements about bargaining behavior. 
Participants indicated to what extent they agreed with these statements (cf. Van Dijk et al., 
2008). Example statements were “During negotiations strategy plays an important role” 
and “During negotiations my own outcomes are important”. Subsequently, participants 
learned that their ratings on the statements were sent to Y, so that Y could form an opinion 
about the person they were dealing with. This was explained by pointing out that in reality 
people often have some information about the other party. 
In phase two, participants received information about the bargaining situation. All 
participants learned that they, X, would bargain with Y over the distribution of 100 chips. 
Participants learned that they were assigned the role of allocator and that the chips had 
different values for the allocator and the recipient. One chip was worth 10 eurocents to 
them, but only 5 cents to the recipient. Introducing this asymmetry (see also Van Dijk et al., 
2008; Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000) creates some ambiguity about what should be 
considered a fair allocation, which reduces bargainers’ tendency to just propose a 50-50 
split of the money (which often happens in ultimatum bargaining; see Camerer & Thaler, 
1995). Participants learned that they would make an offer to Y by indicating how they 
wanted to allocate the chips. If Y agreed, the chips were distributed accordingly. 
Next, we manipulated power. In the high-power opponent conditions, participants 
learned that if the recipient turned down the division, both X and Y would not receive 
anything. In the low-power opponent conditions, participants learned that if the recipient 
rejected the division, it would be reduced by 10%. For example, if the allocator proposes 
an 80-20 distribution and the recipient rejects the offer, both still receive 90% of the chips 
they would have received (in this case the allocator would receive 72 chips and the 
recipient 18). It is apparent that in the latter situation, the consequences of rejection are 
less severe and thus that the relative power of the recipient is weakened (see also 
Suleiman, 1996; Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000). 




 In phase three the manipulation of the recipient’s emotion was induced. 
Participants were led to believe that meanwhile (during the time they received 
instructions about the bargaining game) the recipient had typed a reaction after reading 
the participant’s answers to the bargaining statements. Participants read that the recipient 
did not know that the reaction would be sent back to the participant. This was done to 
ensure that participants believed that the emotional reactions reflected the emotions as 
experienced by the opponent, and not emotions that were altered for self-presentational or 
strategic reasons (see Van Kleef et al., 2004a). In the angry opponent condition, 
participants read: “Now that I’ve read what X typed, it makes me quite angry. This is 
unpleasant. I am really annoyed”. In the disappointment conditions participants read “Now 
that I’ve read what X typed, I feel quite disappointed. This is unpleasant. I am really 
disappointed”. The angry and disappointed emotional statements were adapted from 
previous research on the effects of emotional communication in negotiations (e.g., Sinaceur 
& Tiedens, 2006; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b, 2006a). In the control 
condition participants were not told anything about Y’s opportunity to give a reaction and 
also did not receive one (although in phase one, they did learn that their opponent was 
forming an opinion). 
In phase four, participants made their ultimatum offer. Subsequently, they 
completed a post-negotiation questionnaire with manipulation checks and items designed 
to measure participants’ emotions and the perception of the opponent’s limits. All items 
were answered on 7-point scales. 
To check the emotion manipulation, participants were asked to indicate how 
angry/disappointed they thought their opponent was. The manipulation of recipient’s 
relative power was checked by asking participants about the relative power of X and Y (1 = 
X had more power; 7 = Y had more power).  
We assessed participant’s emotions by asking them how 
angry/disappointed/guilty/fearful they felt during the negotiation. We measured the 
perception of the opponent’s limits by asking what they thought the opponent’s lowest 
acceptable number of chips would be. In addition, to rule out that a difference in intensity 
or appropriateness was driving the effects, we asked participants how negative they 
thought their opponent was and to what extent they thought the emotional reaction was 
appropriate in the current situation (1 = not at all negative/appropriate; 7 = very 
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negative/appropriate). Perceived appropriateness was not assessed in the control 





Recipient’s emotion. A 3 (opponent’s emotion) × 2 (opponent’s power) ANOVA on 
the anger ratings yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, F(2, 108) = 63.33, p < 
.001, η2 = .54. Tukey’s tests (ps < .001) showed that participants in the angry opponent 
condition rated their opponent as more angry (M = 6.16, SD = 1.26) than did participants in 
the disappointed opponent condition (M = 3.84, SD = 1.93), who in turn rated their 
opponent as more angry than did participants in the control condition (M = 2.08, SD = 
1.46). 
The 3 × 2 ANOVA on the disappointment ratings only revealed a main effect of 
opponent’s emotion, F(2, 108) = 61.92, p < .001, η2 = .53. Tukey’s tests (ps < .001) showed 
that participants in the disappointed opponent condition judged the opponent as more 
disappointed (M = 6.16, SD = 1.35) than did participants in the angry opponent condition 
(M = 4.63, SD = 1.57), who in turn judged the opponent as more disappointed than 
participants in the control condition (M = 2.42, SD = 1.50). 
Recipient’s power. A 3 × 2 ANOVA revealed only a main effect of opponent’s 
power, F(1, 108) = 42.60, p < .001, η2 = .28, indicating that high-power opponents were 
perceived to be more powerful (M = 4.20, SD = 1.93) than low-power opponents (M = 1.98, 
SD = 1.66). 
These findings suggest that the manipulations of opponent’s emotion and 
opponent’s power were successful. 
 
Offer 
A 3 × 2 ANOVA yielded main effects of opponent’s emotion, F(2, 108) = 7.47, p < 
.005, η2 = .12, and opponent’s power, F(1, 108) = 13.58, p < .001, η2 = .11. More importantly, 
these main effects were qualified by an interaction, F(2, 108) = 4.76, p < .05, η2 = .08 (see 
Table 2.1). 
 




Table 2.1. Number of chips offered to the opponent as a function of opponent’s emotion 
and opponent’s power (Experiment 2.1) 
 Anger  Disappointment  Control 
 M SD  M SD  M SD 
High-power opponent 58.05 ab 6.64  65.11 b 6.09  51.11 a 12.19 
Low-power opponent 36.26 c 22.43  55.68 ab 15.55  50.80 a 20.01 




As expected, in the anger condition offers to high-power opponents were higher 
(M = 58.05, SD = 6.64) than offers to low-power opponents (M = 36.26, SD = 22.43), F(1, 
108) = 19.48, p < .001, η2 = .15. This difference between offers to high- and low-power 
opponents was not significant in the disappointment (p = .06) and control conditions (p = 
.95). 
Moreover, in the low-power opponent conditions, participants offered fewer chips 
to angry opponents (M = 36.26, SD = 22.43) than to disappointed opponents (M = 55.68, SD 
= 15.55, p < .001) or opponents from the control condition (M = 50.80, SD = 20.01, p < 
.005). In the high-power opponent conditions participants offered more chips to 
disappointed opponents (M = 65.11, SD = 6.09) than to opponents from the control 
condition (M = 51.11, SD = 12.19, p < .01), and they offered somewhat more chips to angry 
opponents (M = 58.05, SD = 6.64) than to opponents from the control condition, although 
this difference was not significant (p = .17). 
 
Participants’ emotions 
Anger. A 3 × 2 ANOVA yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, F(2, 108) 
= 16.66, p < .001, η2 = .24 (see Table 2.2). As predicted, Tukey’s tests (ps < .05) showed that 
participants in the anger conditions were angrier than participants in the disappointment 
conditions, who in turn were angrier than the participants in the control condition. 
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Disappointment. A 3 × 2 ANOVA yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, 
F(2, 108) = 31.93, p < .001, η2 = .37 (see Table 2.2). Tukey’s tests showed that participants 
in the anger and disappointment conditions were more disappointed than participants in 
the control condition. The disappointment ratings from participants in the anger and 
disappointment conditions did not differ significantly (p = .73). 
Fear. A 3 × 2 ANOVA revealed a main effect of opponent’s power, F(1, 108) = 4.81, 
p < .05, η2 = .04 (see Table 2.2). More importantly, this main effect was qualified by an 
interaction effect, F(2, 108) = 4.28, p < .05, η2 = .07. Simple main effects showed that 
participants were more fearful when they dealt with high-power angry opponents than 
when they dealt with low-power angry opponents, F(1, 108) = 13.30, p < .001, η2 = .11). 
This difference between fear ratings in high- and low-power conditions was not found in 
the disappointment and control conditions (p = .91). 
Guilt. A 3 × 2 ANOVA yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, F(2, 108) = 
52.17, p < .001, η2 = .49 (see Table 2.2). As predicted, Tukey’s tests (ps < .001) showed that 
participants in the disappointment conditions felt more guilty (M = 4.16, SD = 1.59) than 
participants in the anger (M = 1.47, SD = .73) and control condition (M = 1.84, SD = 1.24). 
 
 
Table 2.2. Participant’s emotions as a function of opponent’s emotion and opponent’s 
power (Experiment 2.1) 
 
 Anger  Disappointment  Control 
 High Power 
 
 
Low Power  High Power  Low Power  High Power  Low Power 
 M SD 
 


















































































































A 3 × 2 ANOVA yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, F(2, 108) = 4.89, 
p < .01, η2 = .08. Tukey’s tests showed that participants in the anger conditions judged the 
limits of opponents to be higher (M = 58.37, SD = 9.17) than participants in the control 
condition (M = 51.18, SD = 12.63). Perceived limits in the disappointment condition (M = 
54.11, SD = 7.47) fell in-between and did not differ from the perceived limits in the anger 
or control conditions (ps > 16). 
 
Mediation analyses 
We performed four mediation analyses to investigate how the emotions evoked by 
anger and disappointment mediated their effects on participants’ offers using 
bootstrapping (Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2008). A bootstrapped mediation analysis uses re-
sampling of raw data to estimate the confidence intervals (CI) of the indirect effects, of 
which the mediation model  consists.1 
In our first mediation analysis we tested whether the effect of opponent’s power 
on offers in the anger conditions would be mediated by participant’s fear, while controlling 
for the other emotions (we included anger, guilt, and disappointment as covariates). Using 
10000 bootstrap re-samples and bias corrected and accelerated intervals (see Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008), we obtained confidence intervals that did not contain zero at the 99% level 
(i.e., lower CI = -25.21; upper CI = -1.62), indicating significant mediation. 
In our second mediation analysis, we tested whether the effect of opponent’s 
emotion on offers in the low-power anger and control conditions was mediated by 
participant’s anger. While controlling for fear, guilt, disappointment, and also for the 
appraisal of the opponent’s limits, the confidence interval did not contain zero at the 95% 
level (i.e., lower CI = .80; upper CI = 13.53). 
Our third mediation analysis was aimed to investigate whether the effect of 
opponent’s emotion on offers in the high-power disappointment and control conditions 
was mediated by guilt. While controlling for fear, anger and disappointment, the 
                                                 
1 We used bootstrapping because our sample size is relatively small. Under such circumstances, bootstrapping 
offers a good test of mediation effects (cf. Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2008). Testing for mediation with the 
procedure described by Baron and Kenny (1986) yielded similar findings: When controlling for the mediators, all 
eight mediation analyses in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 showed a significant reduction of the direct effect, as 
confirmed by Sobel tests (all ps < .05). 
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confidence interval did not contain zero at the 99% level (i.e., lower CI = -15.31; upper CI = 
-.68). 
Participant’s offers to disappointed and neutral low-power opponents did not 
differ significantly. Therefore, in our fourth mediation analysis we could only test whether 
the effect of opponent’s emotion on offers in the low-power disappointed and anger 
conditions was mediated by guilt. While controlling for fear, anger and disappointment, the 




Intensity of the emotion. A 3 × 2 ANOVA showed a main effect of opponent’s 
emotion, F(2, 108) = 50.06, p < .001, η2 = .48. Tukey’s tests (ps < .001) showed that 
participants perceived disappointed (M = 5.37, SD = 1.67) and angry opponents (M = 5.53, 
SD = 1.37) to be more negative than opponents from the control condition (M = 2.42, SD = 
1.48). More importantly, we did not detect any differences in intensity between anger and 
disappointment (p = .89). 
Appropriateness of the emotion. A 2 (opponent’s emotion: anger vs. 
disappointment) × 2 (opponent’s power) ANOVA showed no significant main effects of 
opponent’s emotion (p = .20) or power (p = .80) and no interaction effect (p = .52; overall 
M = 5.03, SD = 1.77), indicating that the conditions did not differ with regard to the 
perceived appropriateness of the emotion. 
 
Discussion 
These results indicate that power moderated the effects of anger, but not the 
effects of disappointment. Anger elicited high offers when it was reported by a high-power 
bargainer, but low offers when it was reported by a low-power bargainer. Our mediation 
analyses showed that this difference can be explained by evoked fear. Participants offered 
more to high-power than to low-power angry opponents, because they were more fearful. 
Disappointment, on the other hand, resulted in higher offers, regardless of power. In fact, 
when reported by low-power bargainers, disappointment resulted in higher offers than 
anger. When reported by high-power bargainers, disappointment evoked higher offers 
than no emotion. As our mediation analyses showed, evoked guilt can explain these 
advantageous effects of disappointment. 




Based on our findings concerning the perceived intensity and appropriateness of 
the emotions, we can rule out the possibility that the intensity or appropriateness of the 
emotion produced our effects. Participants did not perceive the angry reaction to be more 
intense than the disappointed reaction. Reported anger was also not perceived to be more 
or less appropriate than reported disappointment (which is in line with research on the 
appraisal patterns of both emotions; Bell, 1985; Frijda, 1986; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 
2001; Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b). Finally, the appraisal of the opponent’s limits also 
cannot explain the differences between the effects of anger and disappointment. Limits of 
bargainers in high- as well as low-power positions were not judged differently. Controlling 
for these inferential effects in our second mediation analysis also did not change our 
results. Because we only found a difference between the perceived limits of participants in 
the anger and control conditions, we decided to only control for perceived limits in the 
second mediation analysis, which focused on these specific conditions. 
 
Experiment 2.2 
In Experiment 2.2, participants played the same bargaining game as in Experiment 
2.1. The main difference was that we changed the cause of the emotion. In bargaining 
people predominantly get emotional because of concrete (bargaining) behavior during the 
negotiation, and not so much because of their opponent’s general view on bargaining (as 
was the case in Experiment 2.1, following Van Dijk et al., 2008). For this reason, we 
performed a second experiment, where the emotional reaction was based on concrete 
bargaining behavior. Participants played a repeated offer UBG and the reported emotion 
was based on the initial offer. We also ran the same four mediation analyses as we did in 




Design and participants 
The study used a similar design as in Experiment 2.1. Participants were 143 
students from Leiden University (96 females, 47 males, Mage = 21.51, SD = 2.93). 
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All instructions and tasks were similar to the ones used in Experiment 2.1, except 
for the task performed in phase one. Participants in Experiment 2.2 made an initial offer in 
the UBG. Participants were asked how they would distribute 100 chips between 
themselves and person Y. Participants had the choice between two distributions of 100 
chips. The first option represented a 70-30 distribution in favor of the participant and the 
second a 30-70 distribution in favor of the other person. We expected most of the 
participants to choose the option that was in their favor. The altruistic participants that did 
not (N = 18), were excluded from further analyses, to ensure the credibility of the 
angry/disappointed reaction (However, retaining these participants yielded a similar 
pattern of results). 
Note that whereas participants in Experiment 2.1 played a single offer UBG, 
participants in Experiment 2.2 played a repeated offer UBG. In phase one they played the 
first game where they made a decision between two offers, and in phase four they were 
free to propose any distribution ranging from 0 to 100 chips. Both parties were made 
aware of the fact that it was a repeated offer UBG. 
After participants made their offer participants completed a similar post-
negotiation questionnaire as in Experiment 2.1.2 Participant’s guilt was now measured 
with four items (e.g., “While making the offer, to what extent did you feel guilty for treating 
Y unfairly”), which were combined into an index of guilt (α = .92). Participant’s fear was 
measured with three items (e.g., “While making the offer, to what extent were you afraid”), 





Recipient’s emotion. A 3 × 2 ANOVA on the anger ratings yielded only a main 
effect of opponent’s emotion, F(2, 119) = 62.01, p < .001, η2 = .51. Tukey’s tests (ps < .001) 
showed that participants in the anger condition rated their opponent as more angry (M = 
5.81, SD = 1.67) than did participants in the disappointment condition (M = 4.42, SD = 
                                                 
2 Participant’s perceived limits ratings were similar to the ratings of Experiment 2.1. Because they also did not 
have any effects on our mediation analyses, we did not include these results in Experiment 2.2. 




1.50), who in turn rated their opponent as more angry than did participants in the control 
condition (M = 2.23, SD = 1.31). 
The 3 × 2 ANOVA on the disappointment ratings only revealed a main effect of 
opponent’s emotion, F(2, 119) = 62.88, p < .001, η2 = .51. Tukey’s tests (ps < .001) showed 
that participants in the disappointment condition judged their opponents to be more 
disappointed (M = 6.35, SD = 1.12) than did participants in the anger condition (M = 4.88, 
SD = 1.67). They, in turn, judged their opponents as more disappointed than did 
participants in the control condition (M = 2.70, SD = 1.64). 
Recipient’s power. A 3 × 2 ANOVA only revealed a main effect of opponent’s 
power, F(1, 119) = 91.69, p < .001, η2 = .44, indicating that participants in the high-power 
opponent condition perceived their opponents to be more powerful (M = 4.43, SD = 1.60) 
than did participants in the low-power opponent condition (M = 1.91, SD = 1.34). 
 
Offer 
A 3 × 2 ANOVA yielded main effects of opponent’s emotion, F(2, 119) = 5.07, p < 
.01, η2 = .08, and opponent’s power, F(1, 119) = 12.43, p < .005, η2 = .10. More importantly, 




Table 2.3. Number of chips offered to the opponent as a function of opponent’s emotion 
and opponent’s power (Experiment 2.2) 
 Anger  Disappointment  Control 
 M SD  M SD  M SD 
High-power opponent 58.85 ab 10.02  62.67 b 8.24  50.50 a 9.45 
Low-power opponent 39.05 c 22.90  54.58 ab 18.47  50.48 a 15.85 
Note. Means with different superscripts differ significantly (ps <.05, analyzed with simple-
effect analyses). 
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In the anger condition offers to high-power opponents were higher (M = 58.85, SD 
= 10.02) than offers to low-power opponents (M = 39.05, SD = 20.90). There were no 
significant differences in the disappointment (p = .10) and control conditions (p = 1.00).3 
In the low-power opponent conditions, participants in the anger condition offered 
fewer chips (M = 39.05, SD = 20.90) than participants in the disappointment (M = 54.58, SD 
= 18.47, p < .01) or control condition (M = 50.48, SD = 15.85, p < .05). In line with the 
results from Experiment 2.1, in the high-power opponent conditions participants offered 
more chips to disappointed opponents (M = 62.67, SD = 8.24) than to opponents in the 
control condition (M = 50.50, SD = 9.45, p < .05). Also, participants offered more chips to 
high-power angry opponents (M = 58.85, SD = 10.02) than to high-power opponents in the 
control condition, although the latter difference was only marginally significant (p = .08). 
 
Participants’ emotions 
Anger. A 3 × 2 ANOVA yielded only a main effect for opponent’s emotion, F(2, 119) 
= 60.16, p < .001, η2 = .50 (see Table 2.4). Tukey’s tests (ps < .001) revealed that 
participants in the anger condition were angrier than participants in the disappointment 
condition, who in turn were angrier than the participants in the control condition. 
Disappointment. A 3 × 2 ANOVA yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, 
F(2, 119) = 33.53, p < .001, η2 = .36 (see Table 2.4). Tukey’s tests (ps <.001) showed that 
participants in the anger and disappointment conditions were more disappointed than 
participants in the control condition. Participants in the anger and disappointment 
condition did not differ significantly (p = .99). 
Fear. The 3 × 2 ANOVA showed main effects for opponent’s emotion, F(2, 119) = 
4.95, p < .01, η2 = .08, and opponent’s power, F(1, 119) = 17.93, p < .001, η2 = .13. More 
importantly, these main effects were qualified by an interaction effect, F(2, 119) = 8.80, p < 
.001, η2 = .13 (see Table 2.4). Simple main effects showed that participants were more 
fearful when they dealt with high-power angry opponents than when they dealt with low-
                                                 
3 Suleiman (1996) found that allocators offer less to recipients who have low power. We did not find such a 
difference in our control condition. In our experiment we emphasized that when offers were sent to the opponent, 
opponents were forming an opinion of participants. In accordance with research on impression management 
(Baumeister, 1982; Leary, 1995), participants may have tried to establish and maintain positive impressions, 
because they were aware that they were being evaluated by others. We ran two extra control conditions, where 
we did not emphasize that the opponent was forming an opinion. As expected, these results showed a significant 
difference between the offers in the high- and low-power conditions, such that participants offered significantly 
more chips to high-power opponents (M = 51.50, SD = 13.29) than to low-power opponents (M = 41.59, SD = 
14.42; p < .05). 




power angry opponents, F(1, 119) = 34.01, p < .001, η2 = .22). This difference between fear 
ratings in high- and low-power conditions was not found in the disappointment and 
control conditions (p = .78). 
Guilt. We found a significant main effect for opponent’s emotion on participant’s 
guilt, F(2, 119) = 31.25, p < .001, η2 = .34 (see Table 2.4). Tukey’s tests (ps < .001) showed 
that participants who were confronted with a disappointed opponent felt guiltier than 




Table 2.4. Participant’s emotions as a function of opponent’s emotion and opponent’s 





First, as in Experiment 2.1, we tested whether the effect of opponent’s power on 
offers in the anger conditions was mediated by participant’s fear. While controlling for 
anger, guilt and disappointment, the confidence interval did not contain zero at the 99% 
level (i.e., lower CI = -30.68; upper CI = -4.50), indicating significant mediation. 
In the second mediation analysis we investigated whether the effect of opponent’s 
emotion on offers in the low-power anger and control conditions was mediated by 
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participant’s anger. While controlling for fear, guilt and disappointment, the confidence 
interval did not contain zero at the 95% level (i.e., lower CI = .02; upper CI = 8.75). 
In the third mediation analysis we investigated whether the effect of opponent’s 
emotion on offers in the high-power disappointment and control conditions was mediated 
by guilt. While, controlling for fear, anger and disappointment, the confidence interval did 
not contain zero at the 99% level (i.e., lower CI = -10.66; upper CI = -.08). 
In the final mediation analysis we investigated whether the effect of opponent’s 
emotion on offers in the low-power disappointment and anger conditions was mediated by 
guilt. While controlling for fear, anger and disappointment, the confidence interval did not 
contain zero at the 99% level (i.e., lower CI = 1.49; upper CI = 20.68). 
 
Additional measures 
Intensity of the emotion. A 3 × 2 ANOVA showed only a main effect of opponent’s 
emotion, F(2, 119) = 105.72, p < .001, η2 = .64. Tukey’s tests (ps < .001) showed that 
participants perceived disappointed (M = 5.35, SD = .86) and angry opponents (M = 5.38, 
SD = 1.13) to be more negative than opponents from the control condition (M = 2.14, SD = 
1.42). Again, there were no differences in intensity between anger and disappointment (p = 
.99). 
Appropriateness of the emotion. A 2 × 2 ANOVA showed no significant main 
effects of opponent’s emotion (p = .29) or opponent’s power (p = .54) and no interaction 
effect (p = .64; overall M = 3.68, SD = 1.53), indicating that the conditions did not differ 
with regard to the perceived appropriateness of the opponent’s reaction. 
 
Discussion 
 Although we changed the procedure of the study, in terms of the apparent cause of 
the emotion, Experiment 2.2 replicated the results obtained in Experiment 2.1. Power 
moderated the effects of anger, but not the effects of disappointment. As expected, 
disappointed reactions evoked guilt in participants. These feelings of guilt led participants 
with low-power opponents to offer more chips to disappointed than to angry opponents, 
and participants with high-power opponents to offer more to disappointed opponents than 
to opponents from the control condition. Moreover, anger elicited higher offers when it 
was reported by high-power bargainers than when it was reported by low-power 




bargainers, because it evoked fear. Because angry reactions on the part of low-power 
opponents evoked anger, participant’s offered fewer chips. 
 
General Discussion 
In line with social-functional analyses of emotions (e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van 
Kleef et al., 2010) our findings show that emotional reactions shape both affective and 
behavioral aspects of the bargaining process. Whereas previous studies primarily focused 
on the inferences people make when they process opponents’ emotions in bargaining, we 
emphasize the importance of affective reactions to others’ emotions and their 
consequences for behavior. As expected, although they are both negative emotions, our 
findings demonstrate that anger and disappointment affect counterparts differently. We 
investigated the moderating influence of power and found that reporting disappointment 
might be a better alternative than reporting anger. 
As our findings indicated, anger and disappointment not only share a negative 
valence, they also were rated as possessing similar levels of intensity and appropriateness. 
With these similarities in mind, one might wonder whether both emotions are truly 
independent, i.e., whether reporting anger may to some extent also communicate that you 
are disappointed, and vice versa. Our manipulation checks indeed suggest that this may 
partly be the case. Some overlap may occur, because anger and disappointment are both 
reactions to undesirable outcomes (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989). It should be noted, however, 
that in all studies, the most extreme judgments were obtained for the emotions we 
intended to manipulate. In the anger conditions judgments of anger were higher than 
judgments of disappointment. Correspondingly, ratings of perceived disappointment 
exceeded those of perceived anger in the disappointment conditions. More importantly, 
our results showed that the effects of both reported emotions did not simply differ in 
terms of extremity. In agreement with previous insights linking anger and disappointment 
to different appraisals and behaviors (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989), both emotions elicited 
distinct behaviors, under different circumstances and for different reasons. We showed 
that reporting anger in high-power positions pays, because the anger is complemented 
(i.e., it evokes fear). Fear leads bargainers to be more risk averse and focus more on 
preventing impasse (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), and the only way to avoid impasse is to give 
in. Indeed, since anger evoked the complementary emotion fear, people offered more chips 
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in the high-power conditions. Reporting anger in a low-power position, however, backfired 
because it was reciprocated. Because participants did not feel fearful, their own anger led 
them to offer fewer chips. 
Disappointment affected participants in our studies differently. We showed that 
high-power opponents received higher offers when they reported disappointment than 
when they did not report an emotion, and that low-power opponents received higher 
offers when they reported disappointment than when they reported anger. Participants 
offered more to disappointed opponents, because disappointment was emotionally 
complemented. Disappointment evoked guilt, which led opponents to offer more in the 
high-power conditions, but also in the low-power conditions. Little research so far (see 
Lelieveld et al., 2011) has acknowledged the causal relation between disappointment and 
guilt. The current work contributes to the understanding of why reporting disappointment 
may pay in negotiations. 
In the current article, we focused on emotional reactions. As we mentioned in our 
Introduction, we do not wish to claim that affective reactions are not based on inferential 
reasoning. Participants’ emotional reactions may have been direct reactions to the 
reported emotions, but also reactions to inferences they made. For instance, in the case of 
reported anger by a high-power opponent, participants may have felt fearful because they 
inferred that the angry opponent (with high limits) would reject their offer. Also, in the 
case of reported disappointment, participants may have felt guilty because they inferred 
high needs for the disappointed person (see also Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008). In addition, 
it should be acknowledged that participants reported their emotions while making their 
offer. This may have increased the possibility that their reports also reflected their 
informational inferences. Future research could further try to disentangle the inferential 
and direct emotional effects to anger and disappointment. 
Our results thus suggest that it may be better to report disappointment than to 
report anger. Whereas anger only elicits high offers when it is reported by high-power 
bargainers, disappointment elicits high offers when reported by high-, as well as low-
power bargainers. Moreover, although both emotions can elicit generous offers, they do so 
via different processes. Anger elicits higher offers when it evokes fear, whereas 
disappointment elicits higher offers by evoking guilt. We found similar results across 
different types of bargaining settings. In Experiment 2, emotions were reactions to 
participants’ offers. In Experiment 1, emotions might have been attributed more to the 




person instead of their offer. Our findings indicate that the consequences of the emotions 
are identical. Future research could investigate whether this is always the case. 
Anger thus influenced participant’s offers by evoking fear or anger. However, 
there is also evidence that expressions of anger can elicit sympathy or support (Clark & 
Brissette, 2003) and even feelings of guilt (Giner-Sorolla & Espinosa, 2011). These results, 
however, have mainly been found when the two parties are engaged in a close affiliative 
relationship (Yoo, Clark, Lemay, Salovey, & Monin, 2011) or in non-competitive situations 
(Giner-Sorolla & Espinosa, 2011). In these situations, anger may not evoke fear and/or 
anger in others and the effects may not differ from the effects of disappointment. 
Our findings can be seen as an extension of the previous research by Van Kleef and 
Van Lange (2008). They have also compared the interpersonal effects of anger and 
disappointment and identified social value orientation (SVO) as a moderator of the 
interpersonal effects of disappointment. This study focused on the informational value of 
reporting anger and disappointment. By contrast, our two experiments focus on the 
affective reactions to anger and disappointment, their consequences for behavior, and the 
moderating role of power. Nonetheless, future research could investigate whether SVO also 
moderates the affective reactions to anger and disappointment. Our findings corroborate 
the notion that it is essential to distinguish between different types of emotions and to not 
only consider the valence of emotions. It is important to acknowledge that specific 
emotions have differential effects on others (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Tiedens & Linton, 
2001; Van Kleef et al., 2006a, 2010). One should therefore treat each emotion as a distinct 
predictor of behavior in negotiations. 
 
Broader implications and contributions 
The conclusions that stem from our findings resonate with the Emotion as Social 
Information (EASI) model (Van Kleef et al., 2010). This model posits that emotions affect 
others by providing relevant information about the intentions and/or feelings of the 
sender (the inferential path of the model), but also by affecting the emotions of others (the 
affective path of the model). Our study provides some of the first evidence of the role of 
such affective reactions in bargaining. 
According to the EASI model it depends on the cooperative versus competitive 
nature of the situation whether emotions affect others via the inferential or affective path. 
The EASI model posits that affective reactions become more predictive of social decisions 
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to the extent that the situation is perceived as cooperative, whereas strategic inferences 
take precedence when the situation is perceived as competitive. Our findings show that 
even in competitive situations (such as the ultimatum settings in our experiments) 
emotions may affect others’ behavior via the affective path. Therefore our findings can be 
seen as an important contribution to, but also as an extension of the EASI model. Note, 
however, that although the negotiation setting was competitive, participants showed 
increased cooperation (i.e., they offered a high number of chips) when dealing with 
disappointed opponents. Disappointment may have reduced the perceived 
competitiveness of the situation and may have “transformed” the predominantly 
competitive bargaining context into a perceived cooperative situation. Future research 
may investigate how this transforming power of disappointment works and when it 
predicts opponent’s behavior. 
In future research, it may also be interesting to broaden the scope by including 
other determinants of the power-dependency relation between bargainers. In our 
experiments, we manipulated power by varying the consequences of rejection. Our results 
showed that retaliatory offers were only made when participants felt their offer could not 
be fully rejected. Although it is apparent that the power of the recipient is weakened when 
he/she has less control over the outcomes, it is important to investigate whether our 
effects hold up under different power manipulations where there is still an opportunity to 
reject the offer. One could for example manipulate the number or attractiveness of the 
alternatives that bargainers have at their disposal (see Van Kleef et al., 2006b). The more 
attractive alternatives are, and the more alternatives bargainers have, the less dependent 
bargainers are on their opponent (see also Fisher & Ury, 1981; Pinkley, 1995). When 
people have more (attractive) alternatives, it seems likely that reported anger backfires 
(Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Beest, Van Kleef, & Van Dijk, 2008; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007), 
but disappointment may not. 
That said, power may not be the only factor that determines whether people 
reciprocate or complement other’s emotions. We expect that in situations where emotions, 
such as anger and disappointment, are reported unjustly or inappropriately, targets may 
retaliate and reciprocate the emotion (see also Van Kleef and Côté, 2007). Also, when 
serious conflicts arise between the parties in a negotiation and opponents do not care if the 
negotiation ends in impasse, opponents may reciprocate irrespective of their power 
position. Moreover, as stated above, complementary emotions are likely to be evoked 




when people are engaged in a close relationship, with the aim of repairing the relationship. 
Future research could investigate (these) other antecedents of the elicitation of reciprocal 
and/or complementary emotions. 
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Behavioral and neural reactions 








This chapter is based on: Lelieveld, G. -J., Van Dijk, E., Güroğlu, B., Van Beest, I., Van Kleef, 
G. A., Rombouts, S. A. R. B., & Crone, E. A. (in press). Behavioral and neural reactions to 
emotions of others in the distribution of resources. Social Neuroscience.
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Emotions have a significant impact on social interactions (Anderson & Guerrero, 
1998; Frijda, 1986; Shaver, Wu, & Schwartz, 1992). According to social functional analyses 
of emotions (e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Parkinson, 1996; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 
2010), emotions convey crucial information about the sender’s feelings and intentions, 
which can have consequences for the behavior of receivers. Little is known, however, 
about the underlying neural mechanisms associated with the interpersonal effects of 
different emotions. In the current article, we explore which brain regions are associated 
with the interpersonal effects of different emotions. Specifically, we focused on two of the 
most often expressed negative emotions in social interactions, anger and disappointment 
(Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2011; Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & 
Van Kleef, 2012) and compared their effects to the most often expressed positive emotion, 
happiness (Sauter, 2010). 
Previous research has often used economic games, such as the Ultimatum Game 
(Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982), to study the neural mechanisms in social 
interactions. In this game, two players have to decide on how to distribute a certain 
amount of chips. One of the players, the allocator, makes a “take it or leave it” offer to the 
other player, the recipient, by offering a proportion of the chips. If the recipient accepts, 
the money will be distributed accordingly. If the recipient rejects, both players do not 
receive anything. Prior fMRI studies showed receiving unfair proposals is associated with 
increased activation in the insula, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Sanfey, 2007; Rilling & Sanfey, 2011 for reviews). Ruz and 
Tudela (2011) used this paradigm to investigate whether angry and happy facial 
expressions from trustworthy or untrustworthy proposers influenced neural responses in 
recipients. Consistent with the hypothesis that communicated emotions matter, there was 
increased activation in the ACC when participants received offers from untrustworthy 
relative to trustworthy allocators and there was also increased activation in the bilateral 
insula when the untrustworthy allocators expressed anger. Together, these results show 
that recipients show elevated activation in neural regions implicated in processing 
unfairness when interaction partners express negative emotions. 




Studies focusing on neural responses in allocators (instead of recipients) indicate 
that mentalizing about other people’s thoughts and actions results in activation in the 
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), such as when considering whether to trust another 
individual (McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith, & Trouard, 2001). Medial prefrontal cortex 
activation has been associated with strategic bargaining considerations (Rilling & Sanfey, 
2011) and with mentalizing about others’ intentions (Frith & Frith, 2003, 2006). However, 
these studies mainly focused on situations where people do not have any information 
about their interaction partner. To our knowledge, no prior study has examined neural 
effects of communicated emotions on allocators.  
Taken together, expressed emotions may greatly influence neural activation in 
bargaining. Yet, to date studies focused on either communicated emotions on recipients 
(Ruz & Tudela, 2011) or on mentalizing about strategic intentions with unknown others 
(McCabe et al., 2001). No study to date has examined the effects of communicated 
emotions on allocators using fMRI. The goal of this study was to test these effects in 
healthy adults using two conditions: (1) the comparison of negative and positive 
communicated emotions, and (2) the effects of different types of negative emotions (anger 
versus disappointment).  
When comparing the interpersonal effects of negative and positive emotions, 
previous research has shown that negative emotions, such as anger, arouse strong negative 
sentiments in targets, hurt interpersonal relations and often lead to conflict (Clark, Pataki, 
& Carver, 1996; Van Kleef et al., 2010). Since people strive to maintain positive mood 
states, they tend to avoid others who express negative emotions (Clark & Isen, 1982). 
Happiness, in contrast, encourages contact and happy people are seen as highly affiliative 
(Knutson, 1996). Happiness thus leads to more liking, which in turn leads to closeness and 
increased perspective taking (Frantz & Janoff-Bulman, 2000; Fredrickson, 1998). The first 
goal is therefore to test for neural effects of angry and happy communicated emotions on 
allocators.  
Besides the general difference of valence in positive vs. negative affect, research 
has revealed differential effects within the domain of negative emotions (Van Kleef, De 
Dreu, & Manstead, 2006a). The second goal of the current research was to compare neural 
responses following anger and disappointment (Lelieveld et al., 2011, 2012). In negotiation 
settings, anger alerts others to possible negative consequences (e.g., conflict escalation), 
which may lead these others to concede to avoid impasse (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006, 
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Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, b). Disappointment, on the other hand, tends to 
evoke a social responsibility for the other (see Lelieveld et al., 2011, 2012). A key question 
now concerns whether these different behavioral responses to anger and disappointment 
are associated with different neural reactions. 
To explore whether different communicated emotions would have different effects 
on mentalizing and emotional conflict areas (such as the MPFC and ACC), participants were 
allocators in a dictator game (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994). The dictator 
game is similar to the ultimatum game, such that an allocator makes an offer to a recipient. 
However, in the dictator game, recipients cannot reject the offer, but have to accept any 
offer. An advantage of using this game is that it allowed us to investigate the effects of 
specific emotions, without interference of strategic motivations (e.g., participants did not 
need to consider whether a low offer would be rejected). While playing the dictator game, 
participants received written comments from the interaction partners on a prior 







Twenty-six healthy right-handed paid volunteers between ages 18 and 25 (17 
female, 9 male 1; Mage = 21.00, SD = 4.72) participated in the fMRI experiment. None of 
them had any history of neurological or psychiatric disorder and all were medication-free. 
All procedures were approved by the medical ethical committee of the Leiden University 
Medical Center (LUMC). 
 
Procedure 
 Before inviting participants to a scanning session, they first participated in a 
preliminary study. This study was used to create an interpersonal context for the 
emotional reaction they later received. Thirty-one participants read a scenario where they 
                                                 
1 Although there is evidence that suggests that men and women process emotions differently (Lithari et al., 2010; 
Wager et al., 2003), we observed no significant gender effects in the current study. 




negotiated for a company. All participants were told that they would bargain with another 
person over the distribution of 10 chips, which represented money. Participants could 
choose between two predetermined distributions to divide the 10 chips. One option 
represented a 6-4 distribution in favor of the participant and the other option represented 
a 5-5 distribution. We expected most of the participants to choose the 6-4 distribution. 
Only these participants (N=26) were invited to participate in the second phase of our 
experiment, one week later. This was done to ensure the credibility of the angry or 
disappointed reaction towards this decision (see emotion manipulation) 2. 
 A week after the first phase, the remaining twenty-six participants were invited to 
a scanning session. They learned that they were going to play a similar game with new 
anonymous age and gender matched partners. We told participants that their offer (the 6-4 
distribution) was shown to sixty new recipients who had given a reaction upon receiving 
the offer. We emphasized that recipients did not know that this reaction would be sent 
back to the participant. This was done to ensure that participants trusted the emotional 
reactions to be non-strategic (i.e., not aimed to influence the participants; see Van Kleef et 
al., 2004a). In reality, the sixty reactions were pre-programmed (see emotion 
manipulation). On each trial participants read one of the sixty reactions. Subsequently, 
they played a version of the dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1994; Güroğlu, Van den Bos, & 
Crone, 2009), in which participants were allocators and had to divide 10 chips. The 
participants learned that the recipient had to accept any distribution they would make. 
Participants could now choose between a 7-3 distribution (i.e., 7 chips for themselves and 
3 for the other) and a 5-5 distribution. We did not include a 6-4 distribution, to ensure that 
a desire to stick with their first offer did not influence our results. 
In each trial, participants were paired with a different, anonymous player. Each 
trial started with a fixation, after which the participants were presented with the 
                                                 
2 Because we only included participants that chose the 6-4 option and not the 5-5 option, one might wonder 
whether we thereby may have excluded individuals that have a tendency to act prosocially. However, because we 
created a business setting where participants were focused on profits and on maximizing the outcomes for the 
company, even individuals who act prosocially may have chosen the 6-4 option. This is supported by the results 
from a social value orientation measure, which measured whether participants were prosocials (who maximize 
joint outcomes and minimize differences in outcomes for the self and another person) or proselfs (who maximize 
individual outcomes). We assessed participants’ social value orientation with the nine-item version of the 
decomposed games measure (for more information, see Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997) – a 
measure that has been demonstrated to have good internal consistency (Liebrand & Van Run, 1985), test-retest 
reliability (Van Lange & Semin-Goossens, 1998) and construct validity (Parks, 1994). Using the criterion of at 
least six consistent choices, 12 participants were classified as prosocial (46.2%) and 13 as proself (50.0%). One 
participant (3.8%) did not make at least six consistent choices and was therefore unclassifiable. These results 
show that we had an almost equal number of prosocials and proselfs in our experiment. 
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emotional reaction for a period of 3 seconds. Subsequently, they had 6 seconds to make a 
decision between the two distributions (see Figure 3.1).  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Visual display and timing of the events in the scanner task in milliseconds (ms). 
After a jittered fixation cross, a screen displayed the emotional reaction of the recipient 
(here ‘Emotional reaction’) for 3000 ms. We measured activation at the onset of the 
emotional reaction. Subsequently, the screen displayed two offers each containing red and 
blue coins, which indicated the share for the allocator and the recipient, respectively (here 
5-5 vs. 7-3). The left panel displays the name of the allocator in red (here ‘allocator’) and 
the name of the recipient in blue (here ‘recipient’). The decision screen was response 
terminated with a maximum response time of 6000 ms. After the response, the decision 















The 60 trials were divided over two blocks of 5 minutes each. Trials were 
presented in pseudo-random order with a jittered inter-stimulus interval (min = .55 sec, 
max = 4.95 sec, M = 1.54 sec). 




Before the task started participants learned that at the end of the experiment the 
computer would randomly select ten trials. They learned that they would receive the 
earnings of these trials. Participants also learned that the offers were re-delivered to the 
recipients and that their earnings would be contingent on the decisions they made (see 
also Güroğlu, Van den Bos, Rombouts, & Crone, 2010). At the end of the session, 
participant’s pay-off was presented (see also Güroğlu et al., 2009) and participants were 




The emotion statements were pretested in a pilot study involving 21 participants, 
none of whom participated in the main study. We created ninety emotional statements that 
reflected happiness, anger and disappointment. The emotional reactions were adapted 
from previous research on the effects of emotional communication on negotiation behavior 
(e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008; Van Kleef et 
al., 2004a, b, 2006a). We tested thirty statements designed to reflect anger, thirty designed 
to reflect disappointment, and thirty designed to reflect happiness. The order of the 
statements was randomized across participants. For each statement, participants were 
asked to indicate on 7-point scales to what extent they felt it reflected anger, 
disappointment and happiness (1 = not at all, 7 = to a great extent). We then selected the 
statements that had the highest scores on the emotion they were intended to reflect and 
the lowest scores on the emotions that they were not intended to reflect (e.g., the selected 
angry statements had the highest anger scores and at the same time the lowest 
disappointment and happiness scores). We selected twenty statements for each emotion, 
all with different wordings. All selected statements were rated higher on the emotion they 
were supposed to express than on the emotions they were not supposed to express 
according to paired-samples t-tests (4.63 < ts < 36.77, all ps < .001). Examples of emotional 
reactions depicting anger were “I feel really angry after receiving this offer”, “The other 
person really makes me angry”, “This annoying person really pisses me off”, and “I am 
starting to get really furious about now”. Examples of reactions depicting disappointment 
were “This really disappoints me”, “I expected more from the other person”, “The other 
person really disappoints me, he could have given me more”, and “I am really disappointed 
in the other person”. Examples of reactions depicting happiness were “I am really happy 
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with this offer”, “This guy really makes me happy”, “The other person made my day”, and 
“This is perfect, I am really satisfied”. 
 
fMRI data acquisition 
Scanning was performed on a 3.0T Philips Achieva scanner at the LUMC. 
Functional data were acquired using a T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence 
(echo time/TE = 30 ms, repetition time/TR = 2200 ms, slice-matrix = 80 x 80, slice-
thickness = 2.75 mm, slice gap = 0.28mm gap, field of view [FOV] = 220 mm), during two 
fMRI runs with 150 volumes each. A high-resolution T2-weighted high-resolution 
anatomical scan (same slice prescription as EPI) was collected at the end of the scan 
session. Responses were made with the left and right index finger using a response box 
attached to the upper leg. 
 
fMRI Data Analysis 
Data pre-processing and analyses were conducted with SPM5 software 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm5) implemented in MATLAB (Mathworks, 
Sherborn, MA). All functional images were realigned and slice-time corrected using the 
middle slice as reference. Then they were spatially normalized to EPI templates and 
spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (6mm, full-width at half-maximum). The 
maximum amount of motion observed was 1.25 mm. To investigate the interpersonal 
effects of the communicated emotions, we tested a model that investigated the effects of 
the different emotions when participants received the emotional reaction. For this reason, 
a canonical haemodynamic response function (HRF) was convolved at the onset of the 
presentation of the emotional reaction (impulse function: zero duration). The presentation 
of the emotional reaction could communicate one of three emotions: anger, 
disappointment, or happiness. The proposed offer could be of two levels: a 7-3 or a 5-5 
distribution. These conditions resulted in a 3 (emotion: happiness vs. anger vs. 
disappointment) x 2 (distribution: 7-3 vs. 5-5) full factorial design. The analyses were 
carried out using the general linear model in SPM5. Contrast parameter images were 
computed for each individual. The resulting contrast images were submitted to second-
level group analyses. At the group level, whole brain contrasts between conditions were 
computed by performing one-tailed t-tests on these images, treating participants as a 
random effect. Results were considered significant at an FDR corrected threshold p < .01 or 




p < .05, or at an uncorrected threshold p < .001, both with an extent threshold of ten 
continuous voxels. 
Using the MARSBAR toolbox for SPM5 (Brett, Anton, Valabreque, & Poline, 2002), 
we extracted parameter estimates from the regions that were identified in the whole brain 





The dependent variable of interest was the number of times participants chose the 
7-3 option after receiving an angry, disappointed or happy emotional reaction. A repeated-
measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with emotion (anger vs. disappointment vs. 
happiness) as a repeated-measures variable and percentage of 7-3 choice as the dependent 
variable, yielded a main effect of emotion, F(1, 25) = 324.73, p < .001, η2 = .93. Least 
significant difference (LSD) post hoc tests showed that participants more often chose the 
7-3 option when dealing with angry recipients (74.6%, SD = 6.03) than when dealing with 
disappointed (43.7%, SD = 5.96, p < .001) or happy recipients (50.6%, SD = 6.35, p < .05). 
The percentage of 7-3 offers to disappointed or happy recipients did not differ (p = .44). 
Thus, anger elicited lower offers than disappointment or happiness did. 
 
fMRI Results 
Reactions to positive versus negative emotions. The first set of analyses 
investigated regions that showed increased activation when receiving positive relative to 
negative emotional reactions, by testing the happiness > [anger and disappointment] 
contrast (on whole brain level). This analysis revealed increased activation in the bilateral 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (see Table 3.1 
and Figure 3.2A). To examine whether this response was different for the happiness 
relative to the anger or disappointment trials, separate analyses were performed for 
happiness > anger, and happiness > disappointment. These analyses resulted in similar 
patterns of activation. We only found increased activation in the visual cortex for the 
reversed contrast ([anger and disappointment] > happiness). 
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Table 3.1. Brain regions revealed by whole brain contrasts. 
Anatomical Region L/R voxels Z MNI coordinates FDR 
    x y z  
Happiness > [Anger & Disappointment]        
TPJ L 503 4.48 -51 -60 45 ** 
   4.47 -45 -72 45 ** 
   4.39 -54 -45 48 ** 
 R 538 4.38 60 -54 42 ** 
   4.38 54 -69 30 ** 
   4.35 51 -60 45 ** 
DLPFC L 129 4.72 -33 21 48 ** 
   3.82 -24 15 51 * 
   3.43 -21 24 60 * 
 R 259 4.36 39 18 48 ** 
   4.14 21 30 54 * 
   4.13 27 21 54 * 
Precuneus L/R 201 4.04 9 -72 45 * 
   3.90 9 -54 39 * 
   3.82 -9 -55 48 * 
[Anger & Disappointment] > Happiness        
Visual Cortex L/R 1418 5.37 -18 -105 3 ** 
   5.22 -12 -93 -9 ** 
   4.70 -27 -90 -12 ** 
Anger > Disappointment        
Anterior MPFC L/R 105 3.88 6 54 -18  
   3.49 -6 39 -15  
   3.42 -9 57 3  
Anterior Cingulate L 10 3.32 -9 42 9  
 L 26 4.04 -9 18 21  
Posterior Cingulate L 18 3.89 -9 -15 42  
Disappointment > Anger        
Visual Cortex L/R 171 4.65 -18 -105 -3  
    -21 -90 -15  
    -33 -93 -9  
        
MNI coordinates for main effects, peak voxels reported at p < .001 uncorrected, at least 10 
continuous voxels (voxels size was 3.0 x 3.0 x 3.0 mm). 
* Results remained significant with an FDR-corrected threshold p < .05, with an extent 
threshold of ten continuous voxels. 
** Results remained significant with an FDR-corrected threshold p < .01, with an extent 
threshold of ten continuous voxels. 





A: Whole brain results for regions which were active in the happiness > [anger and 
disappointment] contrast (threshold at p < .001, uncorrected). Activation was detected in 
the bilateral TPJ (MNI coordinates: x = -51, y = -60, z = 45 and x = 60, y = -54, z = 42) and in 
the bilateral DLPFC (MNI coordinates: x = -33, y = 21, z = 48 and x = 39, y = 18, z = 48). 
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For illustrational purposes, we displayed ROI patterns (see Figure 3.2B) for 
activation in the right TPJ and right DLPFC. As can be seen in the Figure, r-TPJ and r-DLPFC 
activation was higher for receiving happy reactions than for receiving angry or 
disappointed reactions. Similar patterns of activation were observed for left TPJ and left 
DLPFC. 
Reactions to anger versus disappointment. The second set of analyses examined 
which regions showed increased activation when receiving angry reactions relative to 
receiving disappointed reactions, by testing the anger > disappointment contrast at the 
onset of the emotion expression. This analysis revealed increased activation in the aMPFC 
and several regions in the ACC and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) (see Table 3.1 and 




Figure 3.3. Whole brain results for regions which were active in the anger > 
disappointment contrast (based on recommendations from Lieberman & Cunningham 
[2009], only for illustrational purposes, we chose a threshold at p < .005, uncorrected, with 
a 10 voxel extent threshold), from a sagittal perspective. Activation was detected in the 
aMPFC (MNI coordinates: x = 6, y = 54, z = -18), two regions of the ACC (MNI coordinates: x 
= -9, y = 42, z = 9 and x = -9, y = 18, z = 21) and in the PCC (MNI coordinates: x = -9, y = -15, 











Anger > Disappointment] 





The present study investigated the interpersonal effects of emotions in social 
interactions. Results showed that participants more often chose self-serving offers in the 
dictator game when interaction partners expressed anger than when they expressed 
disappointment or happiness. These findings are consistent with previous studies, which 
have shown that in situations where individuals have more power than their counterpart 
(such as the dictator game used in our study), people offer less to angry than to happy 
recipients (see Van Dijk et al., 2008). Moreover, our findings replicate previous results 
from negotiation studies, which show that people make more generous offers to 
disappointed than to angry bargainers (Lelieveld et al., 2012).  
 
Positive and negative emotions 
Our results showed that happiness activated bilateral TPJ, a region which in prior 
studies was associated with a variety of social cognitive tasks such as perspective-taking 
(Ruby & Decety, 2001), action understanding (Kret, Pichon, Grèzes, & De Gelder, 2011; 
Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004) and empathy (Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 
2007). It is possible that the recipient’s happiness encouraged participants to take the 
perspective of the recipient. This is in line with behavioral research that showed that 
happiness encourages contact (Knutson, 1996), and leads to more closeness and increased 
perspective taking (Frantz & Janoff-Bulman, 2000; Fredrickson, 1998). 
Receiving happy reactions was also associated with activation in the DLPFC, an 
area involved in cognitive control (e.g., Brass, Derrfuss, Forstmann, & Von Cramon, 2005) 
and the regulation of thought and action (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Moreover, in several 
economic games, the DLPFC has been associated with the inhibition of selfish impulses 
(Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006; Rilling et al., 2007). TPJ and DLPFC 
are also active when individuals receive trust in a trust game (Van den Bos, Van Dijk, 
Westenberg, Rombouts, & Crone, 2011). Receiving trust and receiving happy reactions 
possibly activate a similar brain network, but exactly how these regions are associated 
with positive emotions should be tested further in future research. Possibly, expressions of 
happiness elicit similar feelings and responses as a trust cue. Indeed, prior behavioral 
research showed that people displaying happiness are seen as more honest, reliable, and 
trustworthy (Stouten & De Cremer, 2010). 
64    |    Chapter 3 




Anger versus disappointment 
We also investigated the difference in neural reactions to anger and 
disappointment. For receiving angry reactions we found increased activation in the aMPFC 
in comparison to disappointment, which in previous research has been implicated in 
strategic bargaining (i.e., maximizing own outcomes and defecting in a trust game, see Van 
den Bos, Van Dijk, Westenberg, Rombouts, & Crone, 2009, 2011) and making self-relevant 
decisions (Schmitz & Johnson, 2006; for a review see Northoff et al., 2006). This 
interpretation is supported by the behavioral results that show that participants more 
often chose the 7-3 option when the recipient expressed anger than when the recipient 
expressed disappointment. These results are in line with earlier behavioral research by 
Lelieveld et al. (2011, 2012), who show that anger evokes a concern for own outcomes, 
whereas disappointment evokes a concern for the outcomes of others. Although other 
research has also implicated the aMPFC in mentalizing and the attribution of mental states 
to other people (e.g., Amodio & Frith, 2006), the current results and previous behavioral 
results (Lelieveld et al., 2011, 2012) support the importance of the aMPFC in self 
referential thinking and maximizing own outcomes (see also Denny, Kober, Wager, & 
Ochsner, 2012). Future research should investigate the relation between processing 
emotions and mentalizing in economic games (Rilling et al., 2008). 
We also found increased activation in several regions of the ACC after participants 
received angry reactions (relative to disappointed reactions). Especially the rostral ACC, 
which has been implicated in conflict monitoring (Botvinick, 2007) and emotional conflict 
(Egner, Etkin, Gale, & Hirsch, 2008; Ochsner, Hughes, Robertson, Cooper, & Gabrieli, 2009; 
Ruz, & Tudela, 2011), was activated more when recipients expressed anger. Anger may 
have elicited more (emotional) conflict than disappointment. This accords with behavioral 
research that has shown that anger evokes more conflict in others (e.g., Barsade, 2002; 
Friedman et al., 2004; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van 
Kleef & Côté, 2007) than disappointment (Lelieveld et al., 2011). Ruz and Tudela (2011) 
also found that the ACC was involved in observing conflictive emotional displays, which 
provides further support for its role in the interpersonal effects of emotions. 
Note that our results did not reveal brain regions specifically associated with the 
interpersonal effects of disappointment. Although we expected disappointment to activate 
brain regions associated with mentalizing and a concern for others, we did not find such 
effects. Like happiness, disappointment elicited more generous offers, but happiness and 




disappointment did not activate similar brain regions. This is interesting in light of the 
observation that although behavioral responses to these two emotions are similar, the 
behavior might be associated with different neural mechanisms. TPJ activation seems to be 
restricted to receiving positive emotional reactions. Future research should try to identify 
regions that are specifically associated with interpersonal disappointment. 
The current research thus investigated how distinct emotions influenced other 
people in a social interaction. We used the dictator game to examine these interpersonal 
effects of emotions in the fMRI scanner. Whereas previous studies mainly focused on brain 
activation of recipients in ultimatum and dictator games (see Güroğlu et al., 2010; Rilling, 
Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2004; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 
2003), the present study is one of the first that investigated brain regions of allocators. 
Moreover, the (simulated) recipients in the dictator game expressed their emotion 
by means of typed messages. Previous work on the neural mechanisms associated with the 
interpersonal effects of emotions, manipulated the emotions by means of pictures of 
emotional faces (e.g., Ruz & Tudela, 2011). The current study thus not only extends 
previous research by creating an interpersonal setting where emotions are based on 
previous behavior, but also by looking at the interpersonal effects of emotions using a 
different type of emotion manipulation. We do not expect that our results are restricted to 
verbal emotional reactions. Previous behavioral research has used various settings and 
different manipulations to compare effects of communicated emotions. Findings obtained 
with verbal manipulations of emotional expressions (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b) are similar 
to findings obtained with nonverbal manipulations by means of pictures (e.g., Pietroni, Van 
Kleef, De Dreu, & Pagliaro, 2008) and face-to-face interaction (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 
2006). 
The present study demonstrated that people respond differently to discrete 
emotions. By providing a broader and more differentiated view of the behavioral and 
neural reactions to discrete emotions of others, this work may contribute to a better 
understanding of how different emotions affect other people. 
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This chapter is based on: Lelieveld, G. -J., Van Dijk, E., Van Beest, I., Steinel, W., & Van 
Kleef, G. A. (2011). Disappointed in you, angry about your offer: Distinct negative emotions 
induce concessions via different mechanisms. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 
635-641. 
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Negotiation is often a heated and highly emotional process. Research suggests that 
anger and disappointment are two of the most often expressed negative emotions in 
bargaining (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b). According to social-functional analyses of 
emotions (e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Parkinson, 1996; Van Kleef, 2009), such emotional 
expressions convey crucial information about the feelings and intentions of the sender, and 
this in turn has behavioral consequences for receivers. In negotiations, communicated 
emotions may therefore affect opponents’ behavior. We argue that while anger and 
disappointment are both negative emotions, they may have markedly different effects on 
opponents in negotiations. 
Although anger and disappointment may both be reactions to undesirable 
outcomes, research has shown that these emotions have very different appraisal patterns 
(e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989). Anger arises when a person’s goals are 
frustrated and s/he blames someone else for it. It is associated with a tendency to aggress 
against the person (or object) seen as responsible for the goal blockage (Averill, 1982; 
Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010). Disappointment, on the 
other hand, arises when progress towards a goal is below expectations (Carver & Scheier, 
1990; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008) and/or when a desired outcome is not achieved (Bell, 
1985; Frijda, 1986; Van Dijk & Van der Pligt, 1997). Also, Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2002b) 
found that the experience of disappointment is associated with feelings of weakness (i.e., 
disappointed individuals feel like they have little control over the event), more so than the 
experience of anger (see also Frijda et al., 1989).  
Based on these insights, one might expect that in bargaining, anger and 
disappointment influence opponents via different processes. With respect to the 
communication of anger, previous research has shown clear effects on bargaining 
behavior. In particular, anger has been shown to communicate toughness and high limits 
(Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996; Karasawa, 2001; Sinaceur, & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De 
Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, b). People with high limits have high demands and are not 
expected to give in. Anger therefore alerts opponents to possible negative consequences 
(e.g., conflict escalation), which leads them to concede to avoid costly impasse. But does 
communicating anger always elicit concessions? In the present paper, we argue that the 




effects of anger depend on the target of the emotion, that is, whether it is directed at the 
bargainer’s offers or at the bargainer as a person. When anger is directed at the offer, 
participants use the opponent’s emotion to assess his or her limits, and concede more. 
When anger is person-directed and thus not directly connected to the offer, it is less 
informative about one’s limits. As a result, person-directed anger is less seen as being an 
indication of high limits (Van Kleef, 2009). Accordingly, Steinel, Van Kleef, and Harinck 
(2008) found that offer-directed anger induced concessions, but person-directed anger did 
not. People may thus obtain higher outcomes when they communicate offer-directed than 
person-directed anger. 
As noted above, disappointment is, relative to anger, more associated with feelings 
of weakness. Disappointed bargainers may thus not be seen as bargainers with high limits 
and high demands. Based on this, one might be tempted not to communicate 
disappointment. In the current paper, however, we argue that it can be an effective 
bargaining strategy, but primarily when it is person-directed. More specifically, we argue 
that concessions are most likely to emerge in the case of person-directed disappointment 
instead of when it is offer-directed, because this type of disappointment is more likely to 
evoke guilt in others, and thus make them more willing to give in. 
It has been demonstrated that disappointment may evoke guilt. Ferguson, Olthof, 
and Stegge (1997) presented participants with guilt-eliciting scenario’s and showed that 
the victim’s anticipated disappointment was highly (positively) correlated with the 
participant’s feelings of guilt. Importantly, however, disappointment may not always evoke 
guilt. We argue that especially person-directed disappointment is likely to evoke guilt in 
others. 
Our proposition that person-directed disappointment is more likely to evoke guilt 
(and thus to yield positive effects) connects to previous research by Van Dijk and 
Zeelenberg (2002b), who distinguished between two types of disappointment: outcome-
related disappointment and person-related disappointment. The authors found that 
outcome-related disappointment involves feelings and intentions which are more self-
focused (outcomes are lower than expected), whereas feelings and intentions involved 
with person-related disappointment are more other- and relationship focused (the 
undesirable situation is attributed to another person). In contrast to offer-directed 
disappointment, person-directed disappointment thus indicates a transgression that 
threatens the social relationship and makes people feel socially responsible. These are key 
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antecedents of the experience of guilt. That is, people have been shown to feel guiltier 
when they have a concern for the other and feel socially responsible (Baumeister, Stillwell, 
& Heatherton, 1994; Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Mallett & Swim, 2007). The 
communication of person-directed disappointment therefore may evoke more guilt in 
opponents than offer-directed disappointment. Moreover, since guilt motivates people to 
make amends (Baumeister et al., 1994) and concessions (Ketelaar & Au, 2003), we propose 
that person-directed disappointment evokes larger concessions than offer-directed 
disappointment. 
In sum, we argue that the interpersonal effects of negative emotions in 
negotiations depend critically on how they are communicated. Communicated anger elicits 
higher offers when it is offer-directed, because it affects the participant’s appraisals of the 
opponent’s limits. Conversely, communicated disappointment elicits higher offers when it 
is person-directed, because this triggers more guilt than when it is offer-directed. We 
conducted two experiments to investigate these propositions. 
 
Experiment 4.1 
As a first test of our ideas, we presented participants a brief negotiation scenario 
where they were asked how they would perceive an opponent who communicated anger 
or disappointment directed at the offer or at the person. We expected (1) offer-directed 
anger to elicit more concessions than person-directed anger, mediated by the appraisal of 
the opponent’s limits, and (2) person-directed disappointment to elicit more concessions 




Design and participants 
Eighty students from Leiden University (49 females, 31 males, Mage = 21.55, SD = 
2.83) were randomly assigned to a 2 (opponent’s emotion: anger vs. disappointment) × 2 
(target: offer-directed vs. person-directed) between-participants design. 
 
 





Depending on condition, participants read a scenario where they negotiated with 
someone who communicated anger or disappointment, directed at the offer or the person. 
The scenario read as follows (translated from Dutch): 
You are negotiating with another person. During the negotiation this 
person claims to be [angry at/disappointed in] [your offer/you as a person]. 
Even though you have little information about this person, we want to ask 
you some questions about this person and how this person comes across. 
 
Measures 
Participants indicated their agreement with a number of statements on 10-point 
Likert-type scales (1 = very unlikely, 10 = very likely). We assessed participant’s guilt by 
asking how guilty they would feel, and the appraisal of the opponent’s limits by asking how 
much they thought the opponent would give in during the negotiation. Finally, we asked 




Appraisal of the opponent’s limits 
We submitted participants’ appraisals of the opponent’s limits to a 2 (opponent’s 
emotion) × 2 (target) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), which revealed main effects of 
emotion, F(1, 76) = 18.50, p < .001, η2 = .20, and target, F(1, 76) = 10.07, p < .005, η2 = .12. 
These main effects were qualified by an interaction, F(1, 76) = 10.98, p < .005, η2 = .13 (see 
Table 4.1). 
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Table 4. 1. Opponent’s guilt, appraisal of the opponent’s limits and demands as a function of 
emotion and target (Experiment 4.1) 









 M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Appraisal of the 
opponent’s limits 
7.55a 1.64  5.25b .91  4.85b 1.42  4.90b 2.13 
Guilt 4.85a 2.28  5.20a 2.48  4.60a 1.14  7.00b 1.62 
Demands 6.55a 1.70  3.25b 1.97  4.55b 1.15  6.45a 1.67 
Note. Participants could answer on a 10-point scale, higher scores indicate a higher 
likelihood of agreement with the item. Means within rows with different superscripts 
differ significantly (ps < .05, analyzed with simple-effects analyses). 
 
 
Simple-effect analyses revealed that there was no effect of target on the perceived 
limits ratings in the disappointment conditions (p = .92). In the anger conditions there was 
an effect of target, F(1, 76) = 21.04, p < .001, η2 = .22, such that participants in the offer-
directed anger condition judged the limits of opponents to be higher than participants in 
the person-directed condition. Simple-effect analyses showed that participants in the offer-
directed anger condition also perceived their opponent’s limits to be higher than 
participants in the offer- and person-directed disappointment conditions (ps < .001). 
 
Participant’s guilt 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA showed a main effect of target, F(1, 76) = 9.89, p < .005, η2 = .12, 
which was qualified by a significant interaction effect, F(1, 76) = 5.50, p < .05, η2 = .07 (see 
Table 4.1). Simple-effect analyses revealed that there was no effect of target in the anger 
conditions (p = .57). In the disappointment conditions, however, there was a significant 
effect of target, F(1, 76) = 15.07, p < .001, η2 = .17. Participants in the person-directed 
disappointment condition indicated they would feel guiltier than participants in the offer-
directed disappointment condition. Simple-effect analyses revealed that participants in the 




person-directed disappointment condition also felt guiltier than participants in both anger 
conditions (ps < .005). 
 
Demands 
Finally, a 2 × 2 ANOVA on demands yielded the predicted interaction effect, F(1, 
76) = 49.74, p < .001, η2 = .40 (see Table 4.1). Simple-effects analyses revealed that a) offer-
directed anger elicited larger concessions (lower demands) than person-directed anger, 
F(1, 76) = 40.06, p < .001, η2 = .35, and b) offer-directed disappointment elicited smaller 
concessions (higher demands) than person-directed disappointment, F(1, 76) = 13.28, p < 
.001, η2 = .15. 
 
Mediation analyses 
We anticipated the effect of target of the emotion on demands in the anger 
condition to be mediated by participants’ appraisals of their opponent’s limits, and the 
effect in the disappointment condition to be mediated by guilt. To test these predictions, 
we conducted two sets of mediated regression analyses using the procedure described by 
Baron and Kenny (1986). 
In the anger conditions we found a significant effect of target of the emotion on 
demands, β = -.68, p < .001, and a significant effect of target on the appraisals of the 
opponent’s limits, β = -.67, p < .001. Adding appraisals of the other’s limits to the equation 
produced a significant effect of appraisals, β = .76, p < .001, and reduced the formerly 
significant effect of target on demands to non-significance, β = -.17, p = .11. A Sobel test 
revealed that the reduction was significant, Z = -4.40, p < .001. 
In the disappointment conditions we found a significant effect of target on 
demands, β = .56, p < .001, and a significant effect of target on guilt, β = .66, p < .001. 
Adding guilt produced a significant effect of guilt, β = .83, p < .001, and reduced the 
formerly significant effect of target on demands to non-significance, β = .02, p = .89. A Sobel 
test revealed that the reduction was significant, Z = 4.30, p < .001. 
 
Discussion 
In line with our reasoning, participants indicated they would offer more to 
opponents who communicated offer-directed anger and person-directed disappointment, 
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than to opponents who communicated person-directed anger and offer-directed 
disappointment. Anger pays more when it is offer-directed, because then it is more 
informative about one’s limits. Disappointment, on the other hand, pays more when it is 
person-directed, because then it evokes more guilt. 
Experiment 4.1 provided first evidence that the two negative emotions anger and 
disappointment can have opposing effects in bargaining. Although the findings support our 
reasoning, it should be noted that we used a scenario setting in which participants had to 
imagine a negotiation and report on their behavioral intentions. To extend our findings, we 
conducted a second experiment in which participants engaged in a more involving 
negotiation task. This task enabled us to study actual behavior, and to assess additional 
measures that could further substantiate our claims. 
 
Experiment 4.2 
In Experiment 4.2 participants performed a commonly used task to study 
negotiation behavior (e.g., Pietroni, Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Pagliaro, 2008; Steinel et al., 
2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b). In this task participants negotiated as a seller with a 
potential buyer for six rounds. During the negotiation they received emotional reactions 
from their opponent. This task allowed us to study actual behavior in an involving 
negotiation setting and to investigate whether the effects and underlying processes 
uncovered in Experiment 4.1 can be replicated with a behavioral measure. 
In addition to measuring negotiation behavior and the mediating constructs of 
guilt and inferred limits, we also collected measures to see whether the communication of 
anger and disappointment differs in other respects as well. In particular, one might 
wonder whether disappointment may be a less intense form of anger and that that could 
drive our effects. Also, one might wonder whether both emotions differ in terms of 
appropriateness (e.g., whether people maybe feel it is less appropriate to communicate 
anger than disappointment). We therefore assessed the perceived intensity and 











Design and participants 
Ninety-seven students from Leiden University (75 females, 22 males, Mage = 20.75, 
SD = 1.90) who participated in a laboratory study for monetary compensation were 
randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (opponent’s emotion: anger vs. 




Participants were seated in cubicles equipped with a computer that was 
connected through a network. They learned that they would negotiate via the computer 
with another participant. The negotiation task was an adapted version of the one used by 
Van Kleef et al. (2004a, b), which captures the main characteristics of real-life negotiation – 
that is, multiple issues differing in utility to the negotiator, information about one’s own 
payoffs only, and the typical offer-counteroffer sequence. Participants learned that they 
were assigned the role of seller of a consignment of mobile phones and that their objective 
was to negotiate with the buyer about the price, the warranty period, and the duration of 
the service contract. They were then presented with a payoff chart (see Table 4.2) that 
showed which outcomes were most favorable to them, and they learned that their 
objective was to earn as many points as possible.  
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Table 4.2. Participant’s payoff chart (Experiment 4.2) 
Price of Phones Warranty period Service contract  









1 € 150 400  1 120  1 240 
2 € 145 350  2 105  2 210 
3 € 140 300  3 90  3 180 
4 € 135 250  4 75  4 150 
5 € 130 200  5 60  5 120 
6 € 125 150  6 45  6 90 
7 € 120 100  7 30  7 60 
8 € 115 50  8 15  8 30 
9 € 110 0  9 0  9 0 
 
 
To give an example, Level 3 on price, Level 4 on warranty and Level 5 on service, 
yielded a total of 495 points (300 + 75 + 120). The corresponding payoff table of the other 
party was not displayed, and participants were told only that it differed from their own. 
To enhance involvement, we informed participants that points would be 
converted to lottery tickets at the end of the experiment and that the more points earned, 
the more lottery tickets one would obtain and the greater would be one’s chance of 
winning a 30 Euro prize. To emphasize the mixed-motive nature of the negotiation, we told 
participants that only those who reached agreement would participate in the lottery. There 
were thus incentives to earn as many points as possible, but at the same time to reach an 
agreement. 
 Subsequently, the negotiation started, and the buyer (i.e., the computer) made a 
first offer. Over the negotiation rounds the buyer proposed the following levels of 
agreement (for price-warranty-service): 8-7-8 (round 1), 8-7-7 (round 2), 8-6-7 (round 3), 
7-6-7 (round 4), 7-6-6 (round 5), and 6-6-6 (round 6). Past research has shown that this 
preprogrammed strategy has face validity and is seen as intermediate in cooperativeness 
and competitiveness (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995). A demand by the participant was 
accepted if it equaled or exceeded the offer the computer was about to make in the next 
round. If no agreement was reached by the sixth round, the negotiation was interrupted 




(see De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995). Following Tripp and Sondak (1992) and Van Kleef et al. 
(2004a, b), participants who reached agreement before round 6 (N = 17) were excluded 
from the analyses. This allowed us to track participants’ behavior across the entire 
negotiation and to compare participants with a similar history. (Retaining these 
participants yielded a similar pattern of results.) 
 
Emotion manipulation 
After the first, third, and fifth negotiation rounds, participants received 
information about the buyer’s intentions. We stressed that the buyer did not know that 
his/her intentions were revealed to the participant (as in Van Kleef et al., 2004a). The 
intentions contained the manipulation of the opponent’s emotion (anger vs. 
disappointment) and the emotion’s target (offer-directed vs. person-directed). That is, 
after round one the buyer wrote “I think I will offer 8-7-7”, which would indeed be his/her 
offer. This intention information also contained an emotional statement which constituted 
the emotion manipulation. Half of the participants read an emotional reaction that was 
offer-directed and the other half read one directed at the person (see Table 4.3). These and 
similar statements have been successfully used in previous research (e.g., Steinel et al., 
2008; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006a; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008). 
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Reaction after round 1 
Anger This [offer/person] makes me really angry , I think I will offer 
8-7-7 
Disappointment This [offer/person] really disappoints me, I think I will offer 8-7-7 
 Reaction after round 3 
Anger This [behavior/person] is really getting on my nerves, I am going 
to offer 7-6-7 
Disappointment This [behavior/person] is really starting to disappoint me, I am 
going to offer 7-6-7 
 Reaction after round 5 
Anger I am going to offer 6-6-6, ‘cos this [negotiation/guy] pisses me off 
Disappointment I am going to offer 6-6-6, ‘cos this [negotiation/guy] really 
disappoints me 
Note. Translated from Dutch. Words in brackets before the slash were used in the offer-
directed emotion condition. Words in brackets after the slash were used in the person-
directed emotion condition. The opponent’s intended offer corresponded with the actual 




We transformed the participants’ offers on the three issues into an index revealing 
the negotiator’s total level of demand in each round (i.e., the sum of the number of points 
asked for each issue; see Table 4.2), and also averaged the demand levels in the six rounds 
into an index of the negotiator’s average demands (see e.g. De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, & 
Van de Vliert, 1994). 
We asked participants to indicate on a 9-point scale how guilty they felt during the 
negotiation (1 = not guilty at all, 9 = very guilty). Participants’ estimates of the opponent’s 
limits were measured with six items, two for each issue (e.g., “What do you think was the 
buyer’s lowest acceptable level of agreement on [price/warranty/service]?”, see also 
Steinel et al., 2008), and were averaged into a single index (α = .89). In addition, to assess 




the intensity of the emotion and appropriateness of the emotional reaction, we asked 
participants on a 9-point scale (1 = not at all, 9 = very much so) how negative they thought 
the opponent’s reaction was, and to what extent they thought the emotional reaction was 
appropriate in the current situation. 
To check the emotion manipulation, we asked participants to what extent they 
thought their opponent was angry and to what extend he or she was disappointed during 
the negotiation. To check the manipulation of the target of the emotion, we asked 
participants to indicate how much they agreed with two statements, namely “The emotions 
of the buyer were directed at me personally” and “The emotions of the buyer were directed 





We submitted the participants’ ratings of their opponent’s anger and 
disappointment to a 2 × 2 ANOVA. Results on the anger ratings only yielded a main effect of 
emotion, F(1, 76) = 58.38, p < .001, η2 = .43, indicating that participants in the anger 
condition rated their opponent as angrier (M = 7.82, SD = 1.72) than participants in the 
disappointment condition (M = 4.35, SD = 2.26). Results on the disappointment ratings also 
only yielded a main effect of opponent’s emotion, F(1, 76) = 14.84, p < .001, η2 = .16. 
Participants in the disappointment condition judged the opponents as more disappointed 
(M = 7.35, SD = 1.75) than participants in the anger condition (M = 5.52, SD = 2.39). 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the index of person-directedness of the opponent’s emotion 
revealed only a significant main effect of target, F(1, 76) = 23.98, p < .001, η2 = .24, 
indicating that participants in the offer-directed condition reported less person-
directedness (M = 2.99, SD = 1.65) than did participants in the person-directed emotion 
condition (M = 5.31, SD = 2.47). 
 
Demands 
Demands in rounds 1-6 were submitted to a 2 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA, with 
emotion and target as between-participants variables and demands in rounds 1-6 as a 
repeated-measures variable. First of all, the analysis yielded a main effect of round, F(5, 
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380) = 215.15, p < .001, η2 = .74, indicating that participants’ demands declined over time 
(the average demands in round 1 and 6 were 667.00 and 434.50, respectively). 
 Secondly, and most important, we obtained a significant three-way interaction 
between emotion, target and round, F(5, 380) = 3.14, p < .01, η2 = .04, indicating that the 
interactive effect of emotion and round on participant’s demands was moderated by the 
target of the emotion. This three-way interaction is displayed in Figure 4.1. 
 
 























To facilitate mediation analysis (see below) we also analyzed the demand level 
data by calculating the mean demands over the six rounds, as we explained in the method 
section (see dependent measures). A 2 × 2 ANOVA on demands yielded the predicted 
interaction between emotion and target, F(1, 76) = 12.33, p < .001, η2 = .14. Means and 




standard deviations are shown in Table 4.4. Simple-effects analyses revealed that a) offer-
directed anger elicited larger concessions (lower demands) than person-directed anger, 
F(1, 76) = 5.62, p < .05, η2 = .07, and b) offer-directed disappointment elicited smaller 
concessions (higher demands) than person-directed disappointment, F(1, 76) = 6.74, p < 
.05, η2 = .08. 
 
 
Table 4.4. Demands, perceived limits and guilt as a function of the opponent’s emotion and 
the target of the emotion (Experiment 4.2) 
 Anger  Disappointment 
 Offer-directed  Person-
directed 
 Offer-directed  Person-
directed 
 M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Perceived 
Limits 
5.62a 1.34  4.24b .86  4.53b .41  4.44b .52 
Guilt 4.14b 1.46  4.11b 1.63  4.40b 1.14  5.95a 1.91 
Demands 495.23a 72.63  559.39b 47.61  555.54b 114.59  485.38a 91.67 
Note. Means within rows with different superscripts differ significantly (ps < .05, analyzed 
with simple-effects analyses). 
 
 
Appraisal of the opponent’s limits 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA revealed main effects of emotion, F(1, 76) = 5.19, p < .05, η2 = .06, 
and target, F(1, 76) = 14.11, p < .001, η2 = .16. More important for our reasoning, these 
main effects were qualified by an interaction, F(1, 76) = 11.08, p < .005, η2 = .13 (see Table 
4.4). Simple-effect analyses revealed that there was no effect of target of the perceived 
limits ratings in the disappointment conditions (p = .76). However, as predicted, there was 
an effect of target in the anger conditions, F(1, 76) = 25.07, p < .001, η2 = .25. Participants in 
the offer-directed anger condition judged the limits of opponents to be higher than did 
participants in the person-directed condition. Simple-effect analyses showed that 
participants in the offer-directed anger condition also perceived their opponent’s limits to 
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be higher than did participants in the offer- and person-directed disappointment 
conditions (ps < .001).  
 
Participant’s guilt 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the guilt ratings also yielded main effects of emotion, F(1, 76) = 
9.11, p < .005, η2 = .11, and target, F(1, 76) = 4.72, p < .05, η2 = .06. Again, these were 
qualified by an interaction, F(1, 76) = 5.20, p < .05, η2 = .06 (see Table 4.4). Simple-effect 
analyses revealed that there was no effect of target on the guilt ratings in the anger 
conditions (p = .94). However, as predicted, there was an effect of target in the 
disappointment conditions, F(1, 76) = 9.92, p < .005, η2 = .12, such that participants felt 
guiltier towards opponents who were disappointed in them as a person than towards 
opponents who were disappointed in the offer. Simple-effect analyses revealed that 
participants in the person-directed disappointment condition also felt guiltier than did 
participants in the offer- and person-directed anger conditions (ps < .005). 
 
Mediation analyses 
To investigate the mediating role of the appraisal of the opponent’s limits in the 
anger conditions and guilt in the disappointment conditions, we conducted two sets of 
mediated regressions analyses using the procedure described by Baron and Kenny (1986). 
In the anger conditions we found a significant effect of target of the emotion on 
demands, β = .47, p < .005, and a significant effect of target on the appraisals of the 
opponent’s limits, β = -.53, p < .001. Adding appraisals of the other’s limits to the equation 
produced a significant effect of appraisal, β = -.78, p < .001, and reduced the formerly 
significant effect of target on demands to non-significance, β = .06, p = .62. A Sobel test 
revealed that the reduction was significant, Z = 3.35, p < .001. 
In the disappointment conditions we found a significant effect of target on 
demands, β = -.33, p < .05, and a significant effect of target on guilt, β = .45, p < .005. Adding 
guilt produced a significant effect of guilt, β = -.41, p < .05, and reduced the formerly 
significant effect of target on demands to non-significance, β = -.14, p = .39. A Sobel test 
revealed that the reduction was significant, Z = -1.99, p < .05. 
 
 





Emotion intensity. A 2 × 2 ANOVA showed no significant main effects of emotion 
(p = .88) or target (p = .20) and no interaction effect (p = .55; overall M = 6.45, SD = 1.28), 
indicating that the opponent’s emotion was perceived as equally intense in all conditions. 
Appropriateness of the emotion. A 2 × 2 ANOVA showed no significant main 
effects of emotion (p = .68) or target (p = .42) and no interaction effect (p = .73; overall M = 
6.31, SD = 1.43), indicating that the opponent’s emotion was perceived as equally 
appropriate in all conditions. 
 
General Discussion 
In line with a social functional analysis of emotions (e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 1999; 
Van Kleef, 2009), we observe that one should be careful to generalize from one negative 
emotion to another. Although anger and disappointment are both negative emotions, and 
although the communication of both may elicit concessions, they do so under different 
circumstances and for different reasons. Anger elicits concessions when it is offer-directed 
and not when it is person-directed, because offer-directed anger signals high limits. In 
contrast, disappointment elicits concessions when it is person-directed and not when it is 
offer-directed because person-directed disappointment evokes guilt. Put differently, our 
data suggest that people give in to anger because they fear they would otherwise not reach 
an agreement and to disappointment because they would otherwise feel uncomfortable 
with themselves. 
If one would assume that all negative emotions have similar effects on others, one 
might erroneously conclude that disappointment, like anger, communicates high limits and 
anger, like disappointment, evokes guilt. However, as our results show, disappointment did 
not communicate high limits and anger did not evoke high levels of guilt. Disappointment 
is associated with weakness (Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989; Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 
2002b; Van Kleef et al., 2006a), and disappointed bargainers may thus not be seen as very 
ambitious and demanding. Instead, their limits may be judged as low, which may elicit low 
offers when people do not feel guilty (i.e., when it is offer-directed). Anger on the other 
hand is associated more with dominance (Tiedens, 2001) and previous research has 
shown that when people do not take their opponent’s limits into account (e.g., when it is 
person-directed), anger is reciprocated (Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008). 
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This suggests that instead of evoking guilt, anger evokes retaliation, especially when 
directed at the person rather than the offer (see Steinel et al., 2008). Further research may 
investigate how this difference in communicated weakness between anger and 
disappointment influences their effect on opponent’s bargaining behavior. 
The fact that we observed opposing effects fits with the theoretical notion that it is 
essential to not only consider the valence of emotions (i.e., whether emotions are positive 
or negative). It is important to distinguish between different types of emotions, and 
acknowledge that specific emotions convey specific information (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 
2000; Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Van Kleef et al., 2006a, 2010; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 1997). 
One should therefore treat each emotion as a distinct predictor of behavior in negotiations. 
Our findings corroborate this notion, and in addition also highlight that when it comes to 
investigating the interpersonal effects of distinct emotions, it is important to consider the 
target of the emotion. 
As we already noted above, anger is often reciprocated. Our results show that 
disappointment, on the contrary, evokes the complementary emotion guilt in others. The 
difference between these concepts is that emotional reciprocity refers to the process by 
which one individual comes to feel the emotions of another, whereas emotional 
complementarity occurs when one person’s emotions evoke different but corresponding 
emotions in others (Van Kleef, Oveis, Van der Löwe, LuoKogan, Goetz, & Keltner, 2008). In 
this respect, the current findings also add to the literature on emotional contagion 
(Hatfield et al., 1994; see also Anderson, Keltner, & John, 2003; Hess & Blairy, 2001; 
Neumann & Strack, 2000; Wild et al., 2001), since different negative emotions emotionally 
affect others in a different way. 
We found similar results across different types of bargaining settings (a computer-
mediated bargaining setting in Experiment 4.2 and a scenario setting where people did not 
have a specific bargaining setting in mind in Experiment 4.1). One may, however, wonder 
whether similar findings would be obtained in a face-to-face negotiation. As noted before, 
we made an explicit decision to maintain experimental control, to permit a carefully 
controlled manipulation of the opponent’s emotion. We have no reason to suspect that our 
findings are restricted to the domain of computer-mediated interaction. Previous research 
has used various settings to compare effects of communicated emotions. Findings obtained 
with computer-mediated interactions are similar to findings obtained with different 
paradigms, including surveys involving full-time workers (e.g., Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, 




& Manstead, 2006b), nonverbal manipulations of emotional expressions by means of 
pictures (e.g., Pietroni et al., 2008) and face-to-face negotiation (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 
2006). Future research might investigate the generalization of the interpersonal effects of 
the studied emotions across settings. 
In our first study, the emotions may have been interpreted as an attempt to 
strategically influence the opponents. Although this was not possible in our second study 
(because participants knew that their opponents did not know that they would read their 
reaction), it may be interesting to find out if people strategically make use of their 
emotions in negotiations. One could, for instance, investigate whether people actually 
choose to communicate their anger at the offer and their disappointment at the person. By 
providing a broader and more differentiated view of how emotions can affect others, this 
work helps future researchers to shed new light on the conditions under which emotions 
are strategically effective. 
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When communicating disappointment 








This chapter is based on: Lelieveld, G. -J., Van Dijk, E., Van Beest, I., & Van Kleef, G. A. 
(2013). Does communicating disappointment in negotiations help or hurt? Solving an 
apparent inconsistency in the social-functional approach to emotions. Manuscript under 
review.
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Bargaining is often a heated, emotional process (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). 
Research has now established that emotions in bargaining are not always detrimental or 
disruptive forces that interfere with decision-making. Instead, they are considered to be 
social tools that facilitate social decision-making. Social-functional perspectives on 
emotions (e.g., Elfenbein, 2007; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Parkinson, 
1996; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010) converge on the notion that emotions do not 
only influence those who experience them, but also those who observe them. Emotions 
contain valuable information about the feelings and intentions of the sender of the 
emotion, which can have consequences for the behavior of the receiver. However, in some 
cases the social-functional approach gives rise to competing predictions regarding the 
effects of emotional expressions in negotiations. In this respect disappointment is an 
interesting case. Disappointment arises when progress towards a goal is below 
expectations (Carver & Scheier, 1990) and/or when a desired outcome is not achieved 
(Bell, 1985; Frijda, 1986; Van Dijk & Van der Pligt, 1997). Previous research on the social 
functions of disappointment has found that negotiators with disappointed opponents tend 
to infer that the other has received too little (Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008) and was hoping 
for more (Thompson, Valley, & Kramer, 1995). 
Disappointment thus serves a “supplication” function (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & 
Manstead, 2006a). A key characteristic of supplication emotions is that they serve as a call 
for help (Van Kleef et al., 2006a). According to one perspective, this call for help 
communicates dependency (Eisenberg, 2000), which may signal weakness. In line with this 
perspective, research has shown that disappointment is often accompanied by passive 
behavior and a loss of control (Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, Manstead, & Van der Pligt, 1998a), 
and even feelings of weakness (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b), which may in turn be 
communicated to others. If expressions of disappointment indeed signal weakness, this 
may be exploited by others (Markowski, Willer, & Patton, 1988; Molm, 1985), especially in 
competitive situations such as negotiations (Kravitz & Gunto, 1992). 
Interestingly, however, expressions of disappointment do not always elicit a 
tendency amongst targets to act in self-interested ways. According to another perspective, 
the weakness that supplication emotions communicate may elicit prosocial responses from 




targets (Van Kleef et al., 2006a). There is now considerable evidence that emotional calls 
for help may actually be granted (Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996; Timmers, Fischer, & 
Manstead, 1998), even though such calls may communicate a weak bargaining position. 
Targets of expressions of disappointment may help the expresser in an attempt to relieve 
his/her pain, for instance by making concessions (Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008). According 
to this perspective, communicating weakness does not elicit a tendency to act in a self-
interested way, but it actually elicits a prosocial tendency. 
The weakness that disappointment signals may thus have two effects on others in 
bargaining: It may elicit either selfish or prosocial tendencies in others. Research on power 
in negotiations has shown evidence for both possibilities. One line of negotiation studies 
has documented that in general power holders have the tendency to exploit the weak 
person by making more self-serving offers (De Dreu, 1995; Güth & Huck, 1997; Kagel, Kim, 
& Moser, 1996; Lawler, 2002; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; Suleiman, 1996). In contrast, a 
different line of studies has shown that power holders may also act in a socially 
responsible way by cooperating or acting altruistically (Fisher & Nadler, 1974; Frieze & 
Boneva, 2001; Gardner & Seeley, 2001; Greenberg, 1978; Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, 
Wilke, & De Dreu, 2008; Lee & Tiedens, 2001; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991). Handgraaf and 
colleagues (2008) showed that whether bargainers behave in a self-interested or more 
prosocial manner towards low-power opponents depends on the extent to which strategic 
versus social responsibility considerations are triggered. 
Thus, various perspectives within the social-functional approach to emotions 
suggest opposite hypotheses regarding the interpersonal effects of disappointment in 
negotiations. Currently, these perspectives exist separately from each other in the 
literature. In this paper we aim to reconcile these different perspectives on the 
interpersonal effects of disappointment, by exploring contingencies of the interpersonal 
effects of disappointment. 
 
The critical role of guilt 
We propose that a crucial determinant of whether disappointment elicits a 
tendency to act prosocially or a tendency to act in a self-interested way is whether or not it 
evokes guilt in others. Previous research has already established the association between 
disappointment and guilt. Ferguson, Olthof, and Stegge (1997) presented participants with 
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guilt-eliciting scenarios and demonstrated that the victim's anticipated disappointment 
was highly (positively) correlated with the participants’ feelings of guilt. Guilt improves 
relationship quality, reduces competition, and motivates people to make amends 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Leith & Baumeister, 1998). Moreover, in 
negotiation settings guilt stimulates concessions (Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Lelieveld, Van Dijk, 
Van Beest, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2011; Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef, 2012). 
This suggests that disappointment elicits generous offers in negotiations by evoking guilt 
in others. 
A caveat in this prior research is that it only assessed situations in which 
disappointment evokes guilt. In such situations, expressions of disappointment may indeed 
elicit a tendency amongst targets to act prosocially (Lelieveld et al., 2012; Van Kleef et al., 
2006a). We extend this research by noting that expressions of disappointment may not 
always induce guilt. We propose that if disappointment does not evoke guilt, the 
communicated weakness may evoke a tendency amongst targets to act selfishly, which is 
reflected by lower offers. Evoked guilt may thus be a key determinant of whether the 
weakness that is communicated by expressions of disappointment pays off or backfires. 
 
With whom and on behalf of whom 
Guilt is considered to be a social phenomenon and arises from interpersonal 
transactions (Baumeister et al., 1994). Individuals experience higher levels of guilt in close 
relationships and lower levels of guilt when dealing with others they identify less or have 
less in common with (Baumeister et al., 1994; Baumeister, Reis, & Delespaul, 1995). 
Whether disappointment evokes guilt in negotiations or not may thus depend on how 
much one identifies with one’s opponent. In this respect, it is important to investigate the 
effects of an opponent’s group membership. 
Prior research on social identity has shown that group membership is an 
important determinant of interpersonal behavior. Members from the in-group are seen as 
more similar in attitudes and values in comparison to members from the out-group and 
this has been shown to influence responses towards others (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). When dealing with out-group members, people 
tend to be concerned more with their own interests instead of the collective interest 
(Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), which implies that in negotiations, bargainers may 
use more distributive bargaining tactics. Also, research has shown that bargainers adopt a 




more competitive negotiation strategy when they deal with out-group members (Brewer & 
Kramer, 1986; Keenan & Carnevale, 1992; Kramer, 1991; Rothbart & Hallmark, 1988). 
Although a potential role of guilt was not considered in these studies, they do suggest that 
when individuals bargain with out-group members, they may feel less concerned with 
their opponent’s outcomes and experience lower levels of guilt. An opponent’s group 
membership may thus be a crucial determinant of whether disappointment evokes guilt or 
not. 
Besides investigating the effects of an opponent’s group membership, it is also 
important to take the type of negotiation into account. Two important types of negotiations 
can be distinguished: individual negotiations and negotiations where a representative 
negotiates for a constituency (i.e., representative bargaining; e.g., Druckman, 1994). In 
representative negotiations, a bargainer’s constituency can have a significant impact on 
his/her bargaining behavior. Negotiators who negotiate on behalf of (a group of) others 
have a desire to make a positive impression on their constituents (Adelberg & Batson, 
1978; Gruder & Rosen, 1971; Wall, 1975, 1991). Research has found that representatives 
typically adopt a more competitive bargaining strategy and make fewer concessions than 
individual negotiators do (Benton, 1972; Druckman, Solomon, & Zechmeister, 1972, Van 
Kleef, Steinel, Van Knippenberg, Hogg, & Svensson, 2007), suggesting that representatives 
are more concerned with their own outcomes and those of their group, and less so with the 
outcomes of their opponent. Since guilt rests on a concern for other’s outcomes 
(Baumeister et al., 1994; Leith and Baumeister, 1998; Lelieveld et al., 2012; Mallett & 
Swim, 2007), bargainers may experience lower levels of guilt when they negotiate as 
representatives. Whether disappointment evokes guilt or not, may thus be determined by 




We thus suggest that communicating disappointment may be a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, when it evokes guilt, the communicated weakness may pay. On 
the other hand, communicating disappointment may backfire when it does not evoke guilt. 
We investigate the relevance of this for negotiation behavior, by taking into account with 
whom one negotiates, but also on behalf of whom one negotiates. We argue and 
demonstrate that disappointment evokes higher levels of guilt when the opponent 
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expressing disappointment is an in-group member, or when the negotiation is an 
individual negotiation. In these cases, the weakness that disappointment signals elicits 
prosocial behavior in the counterpart, which is reflected in generous offers (see also 
Lelieveld et al, 2012). When bargainers negotiate with an out-group opponent or as 
representatives, they are typically less concerned with the outcomes of their opponent. In 
these situations, disappointment evokes lower levels of guilt, and as a result the 
communicated weakness elicits a tendency to act in a self-interested way, which is 
reflected in lower offers (see also Thompson et al., 1995). 
Although our theoretical analysis is specific to the emotion of disappointment, we 
deemed it important to demonstrate that the effects of disappointment can indeed be 
distinguished from those of another negative emotion. To establish this, we pitted the 
effects of disappointment against another negative emotion that does not communicate 
weakness: anger. Although anger and disappointment are both common reactions to 
undesirable outcomes and have been shown to possess similar levels of intensity and 
appropriateness in bargaining settings similar to ours (Lelieveld et al., 2011, 2012; see also 
Wubben, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2009), research has shown that in contrast to our 
predictions about disappointment, anger does not communicate weakness. This makes 
anger a highly relevant emotion to compare the effects of disappointment with. Anger is an 
emotion that elicits approach tendencies (Harmon-Jones, 2004) and feelings of control 
(Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996). Angry individuals are perceived to be powerful 
(Tiedens, 2001) and in negotiations they are perceived as tough (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 
2006). Research on the communication of anger in negotiations has shown that angry 
bargainers are perceived to have high limits (e.g., Van Kleef, De Dreu, &Manstead, 2004a, 
b). When a bargainer has high limits, this means he/she is not expected to give in. Anger 
may therefore alert others to negative consequences (e.g., conflict escalation), which may 
lead them to concede to avoid impasse. 
In contrast to the communication of disappointment, we suggest that anger may 
not elicit lower offers when it is communicated by an out-group member or in 
representative negotiations. Being associated with toughness and power, communicated 
anger may not suffer from the disadvantages of communicating weakness. Regardless of 
whether it is communicated by an in-group or out-group member, the toughness and high 
limits that anger communicates may lead targets to give in to avoid impasse. Similarly, to 
avoid ending the negotiation in impasse, targets of anger may offer more when negotiating 




for their own outcomes, but also when negotiating as representatives. We thus predict that 
when communicated by an in-group member and in an individual negotiation, anger and 
disappointment may both elicit generous offers. When communicated by an out-group 
member or in a representative negotiation, we predict that anger elicits generous offers, 
but disappointment does not. 
To examine the effects of group membership (in-group vs. out-group, see 
Experiment 5.1) and the type of negotiation (individual vs. representative negotiation, see 
Experiment 5.2 and 5.3), we used the ultimatum bargaining game, a commonly used task to 
study motivated bargaining behavior (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). In this 
game, two players have to decide on how to distribute a certain amount of chips. One of the 
players (the allocator) makes a “take it or leave it” offer to the other player (the recipient) 
by offering a proportion of the chips. If the recipient accepts, the money will be distributed 
accordingly. If the recipient rejects, both receive nothing. Because of its simple structure, in 
which many dynamics of making offers and counteroffers are not present, the ultimatum 
bargaining game is very suited and also often used to examine the effects of emotional 




In Experiment 5.1 we investigated the influence of group membership on the 
effects of communicated disappointment and anger. We manipulated the group 
membership of the opponent communicating the emotion, by either informing the 
participants that their opponent was a student from another or from the same university. 
We expected that communicating disappointment would elicit high offers from 
participants when it is communicated by an in-group member, but low offers when 
communicated by an out-group member. Regardless of the opponent’s group membership, 
disappointment may communicate weakness. When communicated by an out-group 
member, disappointment may evoke lower levels of guilt and the communicated weakness 
may lead bargainers in this situation to make lower offers. When communicated by an in-
group member, disappointment may evoke higher levels of guilt and the communicated 
weakness may lead bargainers to offer more. Being an emotion that does not communicate 
weakness, but actually signals high limits (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b) and toughness 
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(Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006), anger does not come with the disadvantages that 
disappointment has when it is communicated by an out-group member. The high limits 
that anger communicates may lead participants to make higher offers to avoid impasse, 




Design and participants 
The study used a 2 (opponent’s emotion: disappointment vs. anger) × 2 
(opponent’s group membership: in-group vs. out-group) between-participants design. 
Participants were 81 students from Leiden University (61 females, 20 males, Mage = 20.11, 
SD = 1.98). 
 
Procedure 
Upon arrival, participants learned that they would participate in a large 
collaborative study, initiated by researchers at Leiden University and the University of 
Amsterdam, and that they would be paired with another participant. This participant 
would either be a student from their own university (an in-group member), or a student 
from the other university (an out-group member). Subsequently, participants learned that 
the computer randomly determined which of the other participants they were paired with. 
Half of the participants learned they were paired with an in-group member and half 
learned they were paired with an out-group member. Members of each dyad were referred 
to as person X and person Y and participants were assigned the letter X. 
Before they received information about the bargaining situation, participants were 
asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with six general statements about bargaining 
behavior. The answers to these questions were used as the cause of the emotional reaction 
(cf. Lelieveld et al., 2012; Van Dijk et al., 2008). Example statements were “During 
negotiations strategy plays an important role” and “During negotiations my own outcomes 
are important”. After giving their opinion on the bargaining statements, participants 
learned that their ratings were sent to Y. This was explained by pointing out that in reality 
people often have information about their opponent in a negotiation. 




Subsequently, participants received information about the ultimatum bargaining 
situation. All participants learned that they, X, would bargain with Y over the distribution 
of 100 chips. Participants learned that they were assigned the role of allocator and that the 
chips had different values for the allocator and the recipient. One chip was worth 10 
eurocents to them (person X), but only 5 cents to the recipient (person Y). Introducing this 
asymmetry (see also Lelieveld et al., 2012; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000) 
creates some ambiguity about what should be considered a fair allocation, which reduces 
bargainers’ tendency to just propose a 50-50 split of the money (which often happens in 
ultimatum bargaining; see Camerer & Thaler, 1995). Participants learned that they would 
make an offer to Y by indicating how they wanted to allocate the chips. If Y agreed, the 
chips were distributed accordingly. However, if Y turned down the division, both X and Y 
would not receive any money. 
 After explaining the bargaining situation, the manipulation of the recipient’s 
emotion was induced. Participants were led to believe that while they received the 
instructions about the bargaining game, Y had typed a reaction after reading the 
participant’s answers to the bargaining statements. To ensure that participants believed 
that the emotional reaction was not altered for strategic reasons, participants learned that 
Y did not know that the reaction would be sent back to them (see Van Kleef et al., 2004a). 
In the angry opponent condition, participants read: “Now that I’ve read what X typed, it 
makes me quite angry. This is unpleasant. I am really annoyed”. In the disappointment 
conditions participants read “Now that I’ve read what X typed, I feel quite disappointed. 
This is unpleasant. I am really disappointed”. The angry and disappointed emotional 
statements were adapted from previous research on the effects of emotional 
communication in negotiations (e.g., Lelieveld et al., 2011, 2012; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; 
Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b, 2006a). 
Finally, participants made their ultimatum offer. Subsequently, participants 
completed a questionnaire with manipulation checks and items designed to measure the 
perception of the opponent’s weakness, the opponent’s limits, and participants’ guilt. All 
items were answered on 7-point scales. 
To ensure that our manipulations of the communicated emotions were successful, 
participants were asked to indicate how angry and disappointed they thought Y was. To 
check whether participants realized that their opponent was from a different university or 
from the same university, we asked participants which university their opponent attended. 
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To check whether participants identified more with their in-group (students from their 
own university) than with their out-group (students from the other university), we asked 
participants to indicate to what extent they agreed with five statements concerning 
students from their own university (e.g., “I feel a strong connection to other students from 
my university”, “I identify strongly with other students from my university”, and “I feel a 
large resemblance to the values and opinions of other students from my university”). 
These were combined into a single index of identification with the in-group (α = .78). The 
same five statements were used to assess the identification with students from the other 
university (i.e., the out-group). These items were combined into a single index of 
identification with the out-group (α = .81). 
To measure the perceived weakness of the opponent, we asked participants to 
what extent they perceived their opponent to have a weak bargaining position. As a second 
indication of whether the opponent was perceived to be weak, we also measured the 
perception of the opponent’s limits, by asking what they thought the opponent’s lowest 
acceptable number of chips would be. If the lowest acceptable number of chips of the 
opponent is perceived to be high, this means that opponents are not expected to give in 
much and that their limits are perceived to be high. A bargainer’s limits are an indication of 
his/her weakness, such that a weak bargainer is considered to have low limits, whereas a 
tough bargainer is considered to have high limits (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et 
al., 2004a, b). Furthermore, in line with previous research (Lelieveld et al., 2011, 2012), we 
assessed participants’ guilt by asking how guilty they felt during the negotiation.  
It is also relevant to check whether anger and disappointment might differ in 
intensity. To rule out that a difference in intensity is driving our effects, we asked 
participants how negative they thought their opponent was. Also, although previous 
research has shown that in negotiations it is not more or less appropriate to communicate 
disappointment than to communicate anger (Lelieveld et al., 2011, 2012), we also 
measured the perceived appropriateness of the communicated emotions to ensure that 
this did not influence our results. We asked participants to what extent they thought the 
emotional reaction was appropriate in the current situation. At the end participants were 











Opponent’s emotion. A 2 (opponent’s emotion) × 2 (opponent’s group 
membership) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the anger ratings yielded only a main effect 
of opponent’s emotion, F(1, 77) = 225.82, p < .001, η2 = .75, indicating that participants in 
the angry opponent condition rated their opponent as more angry (M = 6.20, SD = .98) than 
did participants in the disappointed opponent condition (M = 3.30, SD = .72). The 2 × 2 
ANOVA on the disappointment ratings also only revealed a main effect of opponent’s 
emotion, F(1, 77) = 66.41, p < .001, η2 = .46, indicating that participants in the disappointed 
opponent condition judged the opponent to be more disappointed (M = 5.92, SD = 1.46) 
than did participants in the angry opponent condition (M = 3.73, SD = .90). 
Opponent’s group membership. All participants correctly answered the question 
about which university their opponent attended. Also, the identification ratings were 
submitted to a 2 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA, with opponent’s group membership and 
opponent’s emotion as between-participants variables and group (identification to 
students from the same university vs. identification to students from the other university) 
as a repeated-measures variable. First of all, the analysis yielded a main effect of group, 
F(1, 77) = 610,37, p < .001, η2 = .89, indicating that participants identified more with 
students from the same university (M = 4.69, SD = .64) than with students from the other 
university (M = 2.30, SD = .48). Secondly, the analysis showed no significant main or 
interaction effects of opponent’s emotion or group membership (ps > .37). 
These findings suggest that the manipulations of opponent’s emotion and 
opponent’s group membership were successful. 
 
Offer 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on participants’ offers yielded main effects of opponent’s emotion, 
F(1, 77) = 6.22, p < .05, η2 = .08, and opponent’s group membership, F(1, 77) = 11.70, p < 
.001, η2 = .13. More importantly, these main effects were qualified by a significant 
interaction, F(1, 77) = 4.35, p < .05, η2 = .05 (see Table 5.1).  
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Table 5.1. Number of chips offered to the opponent as a function of opponent’s emotion 
and opponent’s group membership (Experiment 5.1) 
 Anger  Disappointment 
 M SD  M SD 
Individual negotiation 59.65 a 7.85  59.00 a 5.61 
Representative negotiation 57.52 a 7.18  50.24 b 7.66 




As expected, participants offered fewer chips to out-group members 
communicating disappointment (M = 50.24, SD = 7.66) than to in-group members 
communicating disappointment (M = 59.00, SD = 5.61), F(1, 77) = 14.96, p < .001, η2 = .16. 
Participants’ offers to out-group opponents communicating anger (M = 57.52, SD = 7.18) as 
well as in-group opponents communicating anger (M = 59.65, SD = 7.85) were high and did 
not differ significantly (p = .35). 
Moreover, as Table 5.1 shows, offers to disappointed out-group members were 
significantly lower (M = 50.24, SD = 7.66) than offers to angry in-group members (M = 
59.65, SD = 7.85) or angry out-group members (M = 57.52, SD = 7.18, ps < .005). Finally, 
offers to disappointed in-group members did not differ significantly from offers to angry 
in-group members or angry out-group members, ps > .52. 
 
Perceived weakness 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the perceived weakness ratings only revealed a main effect of 
opponent’s emotion, F(1, 77) = 85.59, p < .001, η2 = .53, indicating that disappointed 
opponents were perceived to be weaker (M = 4.75, SD = .81) than angry opponents (M = 
2.61, SD = 1.20). 
In agreement with the perceived weakness ratings, a 2 × 2 ANOVA on the 
perceived limits ratings yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, F(1, 77) = 11.69, 
p < .001, η2 = .13, indicating that the limits of disappointed opponents were judged to be 
lower (M = 50.00, SD = 9.82) than the limits of angry opponents (M = 57.68, SD = 10.48). 





A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the guilt ratings revealed main effects of emotion, F(1, 77) = 
7.70, p < .01, η2 = .09, and group membership, F(1, 77) = 9.89, p < .005, η2 = .11. More 
importantly, these main effects were qualified by an interaction effect, F(1, 77) = 10.68, p < 
.005, η2 = .12. Simple main effects showed that disappointment evoked higher levels of 
guilt in participants when communicated by an in-group opponent (M = 5.00, SD = 1.05) 
than when disappointment was communicated by an out-group opponent (M = 3.14, SD = 
1.32), F(1, 77) = 20.28, p < .001, η2 = .21. Moreover, disappointment from an in-group 
opponent also evoked more guilt than anger communicated by an in-group (M = 3.25, SD = 
1.33) or out-group opponent (M = 3.29, SD = 1.45, both ps < .001). Levels of guilt did not 
differ across the anger conditions (p = 1.00). 
 
Mediated moderation analysis 
We expected that the interaction effect of opponent’s emotion and opponent’s 
group membership on participant’s offers would be mediated by participant’s guilt. This 
means that we anticipated mediated moderation (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005). We first 
performed a series of regression analyses with the opponent’s emotion × opponent’s group 
membership interaction as the independent variable, offers as the dependent variable, and 
guilt as the mediator (while controlling for the opponent’s emotion and opponent’s group 
membership). These regression analyses showed a significant opponent’s emotion × 
opponent’s group membership interaction effect on offers (β = -.21, p < .05) and a 
significant interaction effect on the mediator (β = -.32, p < .005), consistent with the 
ANOVA results reported above. Furthermore, the mediator significantly predicted 
participant’s offers (β = .49, p < .001). Finally, when the mediator (participant’s guilt) was 
included in the regression analyses, the interaction effect of opponent’s emotion and 
opponent’s group membership on offers became non-significant (β = .08, p = .46). 
100    |    Chapter 5 




To test whether this mediated moderation was significant, we used a bootstrap 
method (Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2008). A bootstrapped mediation analysis uses re-
sampling of raw data to estimate the confidence intervals (CI) of the indirect effects, of 
which the mediation model consists.1 We used bootstrapping to estimate the indirect effect 
of the opponent’s emotion × opponent’s group membership interaction on offers with guilt 
as mediator, while controlling for the opponent’s emotion and opponent’s group 
membership terms. Using 10,000 bootstrap re-samples and bias corrected and accelerated 
intervals (see Preacher & Hayes, 2008), we obtained confidence intervals that did not 
contain zero at the 99% level (i.e., lower CI = -2.47; upper CI = -.19), indicating significant 
mediation. Thus, participant’s guilt mediated the interaction between opponent’s emotion 
and opponent’s group membership on the offer. 
 
Additional measures 
To ensure that our results were not caused by a difference in the intensity or 
appropriateness of the emotions, we measured both the intensity and appropriateness of 
the communicated anger and disappointment. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the intensity ratings 
showed no significant main effects of opponent’s emotion (p = .50) or group membership 
(p = .47) and no interaction effect (p = .11; overall M = 5.42, SD = 1.13), indicating that the 
conditions did not differ with regard to the perceived intensity of the emotion. 
Accordingly, a 2 × 2 ANOVA on the appropriateness ratings showed no significant 
main effects of opponent’s emotion (p = .59) or group membership (p = .91) and no 
interaction effect (p = .13; overall M = 5.32, SD = 1.30), indicating that the conditions also 
did not differ with regard to the perceived appropriateness of the emotion. 
Finally, entering the intensity and appropriateness ratings as covariates in our 
mediation analyses did not change the pattern of findings. 
 
Discussion 
 In line with our expectations, the results from Experiment 5.1 show that in 
negotiations, the interpersonal effects of disappointment and not the effects of anger 
                                                 
1 We used bootstrapping because this method offers a good test of mediation effects with relatively low sample 
sizes (cf. Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2008). Testing for mediation with the procedure described by Baron and Kenny 
(1986) yielded similar findings: When controlling for the mediator guilt, all mediated moderation analyses 
showed a significant reduction of the interaction effect (the opponent’s emotion × opponent’s group membership 
interaction for Experiment 5.1 and the opponent’s emotion × type of negotiation interaction for Experiment 5.2 
and 5.3), as confirmed by Sobel tests (all ps < .05). 




depend highly on the expresser’s group membership. We showed that disappointment 
communicates weakness, which can have two effects: It can evoke a tendency to act self-
interested which is reflected in lower offers to disappointed opponents, or a sense of social 
responsibility which is reflected in higher offers. Our findings showed that whether 
participants felt guilty determined whether participants made higher offers to 
disappointed opponents or not. When disappointment was communicated by an in-group 
member it evoked guilt, which elicited higher offers from participants. However, when 
disappointment was communicated by an out-group member, participants felt less guilty, 
which elicited lower offers from participants.  
 Anger, on the other hand, elicited higher offers from participants regardless of the 
expresser’s group membership. Being an emotion that communicates less weakness, anger 
may not elicit lower offers when it is communicated by an out-group member. In line with 
previous research (Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b), angry bargainers were 
perceived to have high limits and participants offered more, regardless of whether the 
anger was expressed by an in- or out-group member. 
 This is the first experiment that has shown that, besides evoking guilt, 
disappointment also communicates weakness. When disappointment is communicated by 
someone you do not identify with (i.e., when your opponent is an out-group member), 
levels of guilt are low, and communicated weakness may elicit lower offers. When 
disappointment is communicated by an in-group person, the communicated weakness is 
accompanied by guilt, which results in more generous offers. In Experiment 5.2 we 
investigated the effect of the type of negotiation. We investigated whether the weakness 
that disappointment communicates would also elicit lower offers when the target of the 
emotion negotiates as a representative for a constituency. 
 
Experiment 5.2 
 In Experiment 5.2 we investigated the influence of the type of negotiation, by 
comparing the effects of communicated disappointment and anger in individual versus 
representative bargaining. We manipulated the type of negotiation, by either informing the 
participants that they negotiated for the outcomes of a group of three other participants 
(the representative negotiation condition) or for their own outcomes (the individual 
negotiation condition). We expected that disappointment would communicate weakness, 
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regardless of the type of negotiation. This weakness may pay when disappointment evokes 
guilt, but backfire when it does not. We expected that disappointment would evoke guilt in 
participants who negotiated for their own outcomes (see Lelieveld et al., 2011, 2012), 
which would lead participants to offer more. However, in a representative negotiation, we 
expected disappointment to evoke lower levels of guilt because representative negotiators 
tend to exhibit less concern for their negotiation counterparts. In this case, the 
communicated weakness would evoke a tendency to act in a self-interested way by making 
lower offers. Since anger does not communicate weakness, we expected that it would not 




Design and participants 
The study used a 2 (opponent’s emotion: disappointment vs. anger) × 2 (type of 
negotiation: individual vs. representative negotiation) between-participants design. 
Participants were 78 students from a university in the Netherlands (55 females, 23 males, 
Mage = 20.81, SD = 2.13). 
 
Procedure 
The procedure resembled the procedure of Experiment 5.1. However, in the 
current experiment half of the participants learned that they were negotiating for a group 
consisting of three other participants and that these participants were dependent on them 
for their outcomes. Participants themselves did not receive any of the chips, only their 
constituency (the three other participants) received the chips participants bargained for. If 
the participant would end up with 50 chips, for instance, each of the three other 
participants would earn 50 chips. Note that the constituency would only receive the chips 
if the (simulated) opponent would accept the participant’s ultimatum offer and that the 
participants could not communicate with the constituency during the course of the 
negotiation. The other half of the participants did not have a constituency and received the 
same instruction as participants in Experiment 5.1. 
 After explaining the bargaining situation, participants received the emotional 
reactions (angry and disappointed reactions) as in Experiment 5.1 and subsequently made 




their offer. Also, participants completed a similar post-negotiation questionnaire as in 
Experiment 5.1. The negotiation type manipulation was checked by asking participants 
who would receive the chips they negotiated for: the participants themselves, three other 
participants, or nobody. Note that participants in the representative negotiation condition 
did not receive any of the outcomes of the negotiation. One may wonder whether 
participants in this condition would then be less motivated to get a good outcome. 
Although this would not explain any differences between disappointment and anger, we 
asked participants to indicate how motivated they were to get a good outcome, to rule out 





Opponent’s emotion. A 2 (opponent’s emotion) × 2 (type of negotiation) ANOVA 
on the anger ratings yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, F(1, 74) = 79.41, p < 
.001, η2 = .52. Participants in the angry opponent condition rated their opponent as more 
angry (M = 6.24, SD = 1.32) than did participants in the disappointed opponent condition 
(M = 3.67, SD = 1.19). The 2 × 2 ANOVA on the disappointment ratings also only revealed a 
main effect of opponent’s emotion, F(1, 74) = 81.88, p < .001, η2 = .53, indicating that 
participants in the disappointed opponent condition judged the opponent to be more 
disappointed (M = 6.15, SD = .95) than did participants in the angry opponent condition (M 
= 3.79, SD = 1.34). 
Type of negotiation. All participants answered the question about who would 
receive the negotiated chips once the opponent accepted the offer correctly. 
These findings suggest that the manipulations of opponent’s emotion and type of 
negotiation were successful. 
 
Offer 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on offers yielded a main effect of type of negotiation, F(1, 74) = 
9.77, p < .005, η2 = .12. This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 74) = 
4.60, p < .05, η2 = .06 (see Table 5.2). 
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Table 5.2. Number of chips offered to the opponent as a function of opponent’s emotion 
and type of negotiation (Experiment 5.2) 
 Anger  Disappointment 
 M SD  M SD 
Individual negotiation 56.42 a 9.76  59.40 a 8.53 
Representative negotiation 54.42 a 8.98  48.65 b 8.74 




As expected, participants offered fewer chips to disappointed opponents when 
they negotiated as representatives (M = 48.65, SD = 8.74) than when they negotiated for 
themselves (M = 59.40, SD = 8.53), F(1, 74) = 14.25, p < .001, η2 = .16. Offers in the anger 
conditions did not differ significantly (M = 54.42, SD = 8.98; M = 56.42, SD = 9.76, p = .50). 
Moreover, as Table 5.2 also shows, offers from participants in a representative 
negotiation setting who had a disappointed opponent were significantly lower (M = 48.65, 
SD = 8.74) than offers to angry opponents in a representative negotiation (M = 54.42, SD = 
8.98) or an individual negotiation (M = 56.42, SD = 9.76), both ps < .05. Offers from 
participants who negotiated individually and had a disappointed opponent did not differ 
significantly from offers to angry opponents in representative and individual negotiations, 
both ps > .32. 
 
Perceived weakness 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the perceived weakness ratings only revealed a main effect of 
opponent’s emotion, F(1, 74) = 47.30, p < .001, η2 = .39, indicating that participants 
perceived disappointed opponents to be weaker (M = 4.85, SD = 1.19) than anger 
opponents (M = 2.92, SD = 1.26). 
In agreement with these results, a 2 × 2 ANOVA on the perceived limits ratings 
yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, F(1, 74) = 7.94, p < .01, η2 = .10, 
indicating that participants judged the limits of disappointed opponents to be lower (M = 
49.33, SD = 11.80) than the limits of angry opponents (M = 55.92, SD = 8.19). 





A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the guilt ratings revealed main effects of opponent’s emotion, 
F(1, 74) = 10.15, p < .005, η2 = .12, and type of negotiation, F(1, 74) = 7.58, p < .01, η2 = .09. 
More importantly, these were qualified by an interaction effect, F(1, 74) = 11.22, p < .005, 
η2 = .13. Simple main effects showed that participants felt guiltier towards disappointed 
opponents when they negotiated for themselves (M = 5.25, SD = 1.07) than when they 
negotiated as representatives (M = 3.10, SD = 1.41), F(1, 74) = 19.11, p < .001, η2 = .21. 
Moreover, participants with disappointed opponents who were negotiating for their own 
outcomes also felt guiltier than participants with angry opponents who negotiated as 
representatives (M = 3.16, SD = 1.98) or individually (M = 2.95, SD = 1.65, both ps < .001). 
Levels of guilt did not differ significantly across the anger conditions (p = .98). 
 
Mediated moderation analysis 
We expected that the interaction effect of opponent’s emotion and type of 
negotiation on participant’s offers would be mediated by participant’s guilt. As in 
Experiment 5.1, we performed regression analyses, which showed a significant opponent’s 
emotion × type of negotiation interaction effect on offers (β = -.23, p < .05) and a significant 
interaction effect on the mediator (β = -.33, p < .005), in line with the ANOVA results. The 
mediator (participant’s guilt) significantly predicted participant’s offers (β = .48, p < .001). 
Finally, when the mediator was included in the regression analyses, the interaction effect 
of opponent’s emotion and type of negotiation on offers became non-significant (β = .05, p 
= .69). Our bootstrap analysis using 10,000 re-samples showed confidence intervals that 
did not contain zero at the 99% level (i.e., lower CI = -3.26; upper CI = -.14), indicating 
significant mediation. Thus, participant’s guilt mediated the interaction between 
opponent’s emotion and type of negotiation on the offer. 
 
Additional measures 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the intensity ratings showed no significant main effects of 
opponent’s emotion (p = .22) or type of negotiation (p = .64) and no interaction effect (p = 
.25; overall M = 5.47, SD = 1.28). The conditions thus did not differ with regard to the 
perceived intensity of the emotion. 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the appropriateness ratings showed no significant main effects 
of opponent’s emotion (p = .93) or type of negotiation (p = .62) and no interaction effect (p 
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= .34; overall M = 4.46, SD = 1.41), indicating that the conditions did not differ with regard 
to the perceived appropriateness of the emotion. 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the motivation ratings showed no significant main effects of 
opponent’s emotion (p = .82) or type of negotiation (p = .86) and no interaction effect (p = 
.86; overall M = 6.14, SD = .62), indicating that the conditions did not differ with regard to 
participant’s motivation to get a good outcome. 
Entering the intensity, appropriateness, and motivation ratings as covariates in 
our mediation analyses did not change the pattern of findings. 
 
Discussion 
The findings of Experiment 5.2 showed that in negotiations, the interpersonal 
effects of disappointment, but not the effects of anger, depend highly on the type of 
negotiation. We found that when participants negotiated as representatives, they felt less 
guilty toward disappointed opponents than when they negotiated for their own outcomes. 
In line with the results of Experiment 5.1, we found that when the communication of 
disappointment did not evoke guilt, participants made lower offers. When disappointment 
did evoke guilt (when they negotiated for their own outcomes) participants made higher 
offers. Participants were still careful when they negotiated with an angry opponent. These 
opponents were perceived as less weak, to have high limits, and participants offered more 
chips to angry opponents. 
Experiment 5.1 and 5.2 thus showed that whether communicating disappointment 
pays or backfires, depends on whether disappointment evokes guilt or not. When an 
opponent communicated disappointment and it did not evoke guilt in bargainers (i.e., 
when it was communicated by an out-group member or when the bargainer negotiated as 
a representative), the communicated weakness evoked self-interested behavior (i.e., lower 
offers). When disappointment did evoke guilt (i.e., when it was communicated by an in-
group member or when the bargainer negotiated for his/her own outcomes), the 
communicated weakness evoked prosocial behavior. In both experiments our emotion 
manipulation consisted of written messages. To rule out that our effects are restricted to 
verbal emotional reactions, in Experiment 5.3 we used a video of a trained actor who 
expressed either disappointment or anger. This emotion manipulation included facial, 
postural and vocal expressions of both emotions.  








Design and participants 
The study used a 2 (opponent’s emotion: disappointment vs. anger) × 2 (type of 
negotiation: individual vs. representative negotiation) between-participants design. 
Participants were 84 students from a university in the Netherlands (60 females, 24 males, 
Mage = 21.57, SD = 3.65). 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the procedure of Experiment 5.2, except for the 
emotion manipulation. In the current experiment a trained actor spoke exactly the same 
text as in Experiment 5.1 and 5.2 for the angry and disappointed emotional reaction. In the 
angry display condition, he frowned a lot, spoke with an angry and irritable tone of voice, 
and looked stern. In the disappointed display condition, he raised the insides of his 
eyebrows, spoke with a disapproving tone of voice, and shook his head (for similar 
procedures, see Barsade [2002], Bono and Ilies [2006], Lewis [2000], Van Kleef et al. 





Opponent’s emotion. A 2 (opponent’s emotion) × 2 (type of negotiation) ANOVA 
on the anger ratings yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, F(1, 80) = 102.54, p 
< .001, η2 = .56. Participants in the angry opponent condition rated their opponent as more 
angry (M = 6.00, SD = .83) than did participants in the disappointed opponent condition (M 
= 3.12, SD = 1.66). The 2 × 2 ANOVA on the disappointment ratings also only revealed a 
main effect of opponent’s emotion, F(1, 80) = 61.42, p < .001, η2 = .43, indicating that 
participants in the disappointed opponent condition judged the opponent to be more 
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disappointed (M = 6.14, SD = 1.28) than did participants in the angry opponent condition 
(M = 3.98, SD = 1.22). 
Type of negotiation. All participants answered the question about who would 
receive the negotiated chips once the opponent accepted the offer correctly. 
These findings suggest that the manipulations of opponent’s emotion and type of 
negotiation were successful. 
 
Offer 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on offers yielded a main effect of type of negotiation, F(1, 80) = 
9.06, p < .005, η2 = .10. This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 80) = 
6.28, p < .05, η2 = .07 (see Table 5.3). 
 
 
Table 5.3. Number of chips offered to the opponent as a function of opponent’s emotion 
and type of negotiation (Experiment 5.3) 
 Anger  Disappointment 
 M SD  M SD 
Individual negotiation 57.65 a 8.51  59.86 a 5.18 
Representative negotiation 56.73 a 8.09  49.75 b 11.06 




As expected, participants made lower offers to disappointed opponents when they 
negotiated as representatives (M = 49.75, SD = 11.06) than when they negotiated for 
themselves (M = 59.86, SD = 5.18), F(1, 80) = 15.21, p < .001, η2 = .16. Offers in the anger 
conditions did not differ significantly (M = 57.65, SD = 8.51; M = 56.73, SD = 8.09, p = .72). 
Moreover, as Table 5.3 also shows, offers from participants who negotiated as 
representatives and had a disappointed opponent were significantly lower (M = 49.75, SD 
= 11.06) than offers to angry opponents, who negotiated as representatives or individually 
(M = 56.73, SD = 8.09; M = 57.65, SD = 8.51, ps < .01). Offers from participants who 




negotiated individually and had a disappointed opponent did not differ significantly from 
offers to angry opponents who negotiated as representatives or individually, both ps > .60. 
 
Perceived weakness 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the perceived weakness ratings only revealed a main effect of 
opponent’s emotion, F(1, 80) = 32.10, p < .001, η2 = .29, indicating that participants 
perceived disappointed opponents to be weaker (M = 4.60, SD = 1.33) than angry 
opponents (M = 2.88, SD = 1.47). 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the perceived limits ratings also yielded only a main effect of 
opponent’s emotion, F(1, 80) = 5.89, p < .05, η2 = .07, indicating that participants judged the 
limits of disappointed opponents to be lower (M = 50.90, SD = 16.52) than the limits of 
angry participants (M = 58.62, SD = 11.71). 
 
Guilt 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the guilt ratings revealed main effects of emotion, F(1, 80) = 
4.67, p < .05, η2 = .06, and type of negotiation, F(1, 80) = 7.64, p < .01, η2 = .09. More 
importantly, these were qualified by an interaction effect, F(1, 80) = 6.97, p < .01, η2 = .08. 
Simple main effects showed that participants felt guiltier towards disappointed opponents 
when they negotiated individually (M = 5.05, SD = 1.25) than when they negotiated as a 
representative (M = 3.25, SD = 1.41), F(1, 80) = 14.61, p < .001, η2 = .15. Moreover, 
participants who negotiated individually and had a disappointed opponent felt guiltier 
than participants with angry opponents who negotiated individually (M = 3.45, SD = 1.61) 
or as representatives (M = 3.41, SD = 1.76, both ps < .001). Levels of guilt did not differ 
across the anger conditions (p = 1.00). 
 
Mediated moderation analysis 
Like in Experiment 5.2, we performed regression analyses to investigate whether 
the interaction effect of opponent’s emotion and type of negotiation on participant’s offers 
would be mediated by participant’s guilt. These analyses showed a significant opponent’s 
emotion × type of negotiation interaction effect on offers (β = -.26, p < .05) and a significant 
interaction effect on the mediator (β = -.26, p < .01). The mediator (participant’s guilt) 
significantly predicted participant’s offers (β = .48, p < .001). Finally, when the mediator 
was included in the regression analyses, the interaction effect of opponent’s emotion and 
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type of negotiation on offers became non-significant (β = -.04, p = .73). Our bootstrap 
analysis using 10,000 re-samples showed confidence intervals that did not contain zero at 
the 99% level (i.e., lower CI = -2.54; upper CI = -.06), indicating significant mediation. Thus, 
participant’s guilt mediated the interaction between opponent’s emotion and type of 
negotiation on the offer. 
 
Additional measures 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the intensity ratings showed no significant main effects of 
opponent’s emotion (p = .21) or type of negotiation (p = .67) and no interaction effect (p = 
.97; overall M = 5.35, SD = 1.09). The conditions thus did not differ with regard to the 
perceived intensity of the emotion. 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the appropriateness ratings showed no significant main effects 
of opponent’s emotion (p = .80) or type of negotiation (p = .22) and no interaction effect (p 
= .51; overall M = 4.36, SD = 1.07), indicating that the conditions did not differ with regard 
to the perceived appropriateness of the emotion. 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the motivation ratings showed no significant main effects of 
opponent’s emotion (p = .25) or type of negotiation (p = .37) and no interaction effect (p = 
.97; overall M = 6.07, SD = .77), indicating that the conditions did not differ with regard to 
participant’s motivation to get a good outcome. 
Again, entering the intensity, appropriateness, and motivation ratings as 
covariates in our mediation analyses did not change the pattern of findings. 
 
General Discussion 
Social-functional approaches to emotion suggest that expressing disappointment 
in negotiations may be a double-edged sword. Disappointment communicates weakness, 
which on the one hand can evoke a tendency to act in a self-interested way (De Dreu, 1995; 
Güth & Huck, 1997; Kagel et al., 1996; Lawler, 2002; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; Suleiman, 
1996), but on the other hand also a tendency to act in a prosocial way (Fisher & Nadler, 
1974; Frieze & Boneva, 2001; Gardner & Seeley, 2001; Greenberg, 1978; Handgraaf et al., 
2008; Lee & Tiedens, 2001; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991). In negotiations, the first tendency may 
lead others to maximize their own outcomes and make lower offers. The second may lead 
others to help the weak opponent and cooperate more. Our goal was to resolve this 




apparent inconsistency. In three experiments using both written emotion manipulations 
(Experiment 5.1 and 5.2) and filmclips involving facial, postural, and vocal expressions 
(Experiment 5.3) we demonstrated that whether guilt is evoked or not determines 
whether disappointment elicits high or low offers. Communicating disappointment pays 
when it elicits guilt in the target, but backfires when is does not elicit guilt. We pitted the 
interpersonal effects of disappointment (an emotion that communicates weakness) against 
the effects of anger (an emotion that communicates strength) and showed that an 
opponent’s group membership and the type of negotiation (two important moderators of 
motivated bargaining behavior) determine whether communicating disappointment 
results in high outcomes or not. As anticipated, the interpersonal effects of anger were not 
affected. 
We also showed why these factors moderate expressions of disappointment and 
not of anger. In our first experiment we showed that when an in-group member 
communicates disappointment it evokes guilt, but when an out-group member 
communicates disappointment it does not. People generally allocate more rewards to in-
group members and regard in-group members more positively than out-group members 
(Tajfel, 1978). Also, research has shown that people tend to help members of their in-
group more than members of their out-group (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1997; Levine, Prosser, 
Evans, & Reicher, 2005; Omoto & Snyder, 2002). People tend to care less about out-group 
members, and empathic responses towards out-group members are generally dampened 
or even absent (Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010; Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011). 
Whether people feel guilty or not depends highly on a concern for the other 
(Baumeister et al., 1994; Leith and Baumeister, 1998; Lelieveld et al., 2012; Mallett & 
Swim, 2007). Indeed, our results showed that when out-group members communicated 
disappointment it did not evoke guilt, which led participants to offer less. When in-group 
members communicated disappointment it did evoke guilt, and this led participants to 
offer more. Guilt thus determined whether the weakness that disappointment 
communicated evoked a tendency to act in a self-interested way (which was reflected in 
low offers from participants), or a tendency to act prosocially (which was reflected in high 
offers from participants). The effects of expressions of anger, on the other hand, were not 
dependent on the expresser’s group membership. Anger communicated high limits 
regardless of whether it was expressed by an in- or out-group member. In line with 
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previous research (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 
b), we showed that participants made generous offers to these angry opponents. 
In our second en third experiment we showed that not only group membership, 
but also the type of negotiation may influence the effects of disappointment. We showed 
that only when participants negotiated for their own outcomes, disappointment evoked 
guilt. In representative negotiations, however, disappointment evoked less guilt in 
participants. This is in line with research that has indicated that representatives adopt a 
more competitive bargaining strategy and make fewer concessions compared to individual 
negotiators (Benton, 1972; Druckman et al., 1972, Van Kleef et al., 2007). Expressions of 
anger were again not dependent on whether participants negotiated as representatives or 
not. Anger signaled high limits in both cases. Moreover, in line with previous research 
(Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b), we showed that 
participants made generous offers to angry opponents, regardless of the type of 
negotiation. 
Our results contribute to the existing line of research that suggests that emotions 
that communicate power are often more advantageous to express than emotions that 
communicate weakness. Emotions that communicate power, such as anger, signal 
competence (Tiedens, 2001), but also toughness and dominance (Clark et al., 1996; 
Karasawa, 2001; Knutson, 1996; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Beest, Van Kleef, & Van 
Dijk, 2008; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b). This research suggests that, in 
general, people concede more to tough and powerful people than to bargainers who are 
perceived as soft or submissive (e.g., Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Komorita & Brenner, 
1968; Pruitt, 1981; Yukl, 1974). Our findings accord with this reasoning to the extent that 
anger (which communicates power) elicited higher offers than disappointment (which 
communicates weakness) when communicated by an out-group member (Experiment 5.1) 
or in a representative negotiation (Experiment 5.2 and 5.3). However, when the 
communicated weakness evokes a social responsibility in others (when people feel guilty), 
weak emotions such as disappointment may actually induce cooperativeness in others. In 
the latter situation, expressing emotions that communicate weakness may benefit 
bargainers. 
In some situations it has even been shown that expressing emotions that 
communicate weakness in negotiations is superior to expressing emotions that 
communicate power. In a recent study, the interpersonal effects of anger and 




disappointment were examined in a similar ultimatum setting (see Lelieveld et al., 2012). 
In this study, the power of the bargainers expressing the emotions was manipulated. When 
anger and disappointment were communicated by a high power bargainer both emotions 
elicited high offers, but when they were communicated by a low power bargainer, anger 
elicited low offers but disappointment did not. The current research shows that bargainers 
who communicate disappointment do not always obtain higher outcomes than bargainers 
who communicate anger. The effects of disappointment depend highly on whether it 
evokes guilt in others or not. 
In addition to the documented findings that disappointment may elicit a loss of 
control (Zeelenberg et al., 1998) and feelings of weakness (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b) 
in the self, the current findings indicate that it also communicates this weakness to others. 
This suggests that there is a clear link between the intrapersonal effects of disappointment 
(which refer to the effects of emotions on people’s own thoughts, behavior and feelings) 
and the interpersonal effects of disappointment (which refer to the effects of emotions on 
others’ thoughts, behavior and feelings). Research on other emotions has also shown that 
feelings and intentions that are evoked by certain emotions are also communicated to 
others. For instance, people who experience anger not only feel powerful (Roseman et al., 
1996), they are also perceived as powerful and tough (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Tiedens, 
2001; Van Dijk et al., 2008, Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b). Similarly, people who experience 
guilt not only feel that they violated an expectation or norm (Leith & Baumeister, 1998; 
Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002), their guilt also signals this to others (Van Kleef et 
al., 2006a; Wubben et al., 2009). And previous research on disappointment showed that 
people experiencing disappointment not only feel in need of help (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 
2002b), their expressions of disappointment also convey this dependence to others (Van 
Kleef et al., 2006a). We add to this literature by showing that disappointment not only 
elicits feelings of weakness in oneself, but also communicates weakness to others. This 
communicated weakness can pay when guilt is evoked, but backfire when it does not evoke 
guilt. 
 
Directions for future research 
In the current experiments we used the ultimatum bargaining game to investigate 
the interpersonal effects of anger and disappointment. This enabled us to study the effects 
of communicated emotions in a one-shot bargaining setting with a clear outcome. Thanks 
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to this controlled setting, we were able to provide clear findings and conclusions regarding 
the interpersonal effects of emotions and their underlying processes. For future research, 
it may also be interesting to investigate how our findings generalize to other types of 
negotiations. Prior findings regarding the interpersonal effects of emotions obtained in 
ultimatum bargaining settings (e.g., Lelieveld et al., 2012; Van Dijk et al., 2008) have been 
similar tot findings obtained in multi-trial negotiations (e.g., Lelieveld et al., 2011; Van 
Kleef et al., 2004a, b) and even face-to-face negotiations (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). It 
would be interesting to see whether the current findings will also generalize to such 
settings. 
In our studies we focused on anger and disappointment as steady-state emotions. 
However, during negotiations feelings and emotions of bargainers may change profoundly. 
Previous research has shown that these emotional transitions (i.e., the movement between 
emotions states) may lead to different outcomes than corresponding steady-state emotions 
(Filipowicz, Barsade, & Melwani, 2011). These studies compared the communication of 
anger and happiness to displays of becoming angry (i.e., emotional expressions moved 
from happiness to anger) and becoming happy (i.e., emotional expressions moved from 
anger to happiness). Results showed that displays of becoming angry elicited higher offers 
from others than did steady-state anger. Negotiation outcomes for displays of becoming 
happy were not significantly different from displays of steady-state happiness. However, 
opponents did give bargainers who showed displays of becoming happy lower relational 
impression ratings. With regard to the interpersonal effects of anger and disappointment, 
it may also be interesting to investigate the effects of emotional transitions. 
Communicating disappointment backfires when it is communicated by an out-group 
member or in representative negotiations. Starting off with displaying an emotion that 
communicates power (i.e., anger), and moving to an emotion that communicates less 
power (i.e., disappointment), may be a wise alternative to expressing the steady-state 
emotion disappointment. It could be that expressers are then perceived to be less weak 
(because they start off with an emotion that signals strength), but the transition to 
disappointment may still evoke guilt. Future research could investigate how emotional 
transitions between anger and disappointment differ from the steady-state emotions that 
we investigated and which transition would elicit positive negotiation outcomes. 
In future research, it may also be interesting to include other determinants of 
whether bargainers feel guilty or not towards their opponent. We now investigated the 




effects of group membership and of the type of negotiation and showed that bargainers 
feel less guilty when their opponent is an out-group member or when they negotiate as 
representatives. Guilt, however, has also been shown to be linked to perspective taking and 
empathy, such that people feel guiltier towards another person when they want or are able 
to take the perspective of the other and when they empathize more with the other (Leith & 
Baumeister, 1998; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). It would be interesting to investigate if 
manipulating these concepts (e.g., by instructing participants to take the perspective of the 
other person) would produce similar results. 
In Experiment 5.2 and 5.3, we showed that the type of negotiation is a crucial 
determinant of whether disappointment evokes guilt or not. Our findings show that when 
bargainers negotiate as representatives, disappointment evokes less guilt. Participants in 
Experiment 5.2 and 5.3 may have been more concerned with the outcomes of their 
constituency and less with the outcomes of the disappointed opponent, which led 
participants to experience lower levels of guilt. There are several alternative explanations 
for why these participants experienced lower levels of guilt. First, it could be that 
participants assumed that their opponent was negotiating as a representative as well. We 
did not inform participants about whether their opponent was negotiating as a 
representative as well or for own outcomes. Participants may have felt less guilty in the 
representative negotiation, because they believed that they did not directly harm the 
outcomes of their opponent, but only the outcomes of the opponent’s constituency (whom 
they were not directly dealing with). Secondly, participants who negotiated as 
representatives may have perceived their constituency more as in-group members and 
their opponent more as an out-group member. In line with Experiment 5.1, one may then 
conclude that disappointment evoked lower levels of guilt, because it was communicated 
by an out-group member. Finally, participants may have felt less responsible for the 
outcomes of the opponent. Participants in our studies negotiated on the authority of a 
constituency, which may have led participants to feel less responsible for lower outcomes 
of their opponent. As a result, participants may have felt less guilty. Although we feel that 
these explanations may very well be related (e.g., in representative bargaining one may 
feel less responsible for the outcomes of the opponent, because one tends to see him/her 
as an out-group member), it may be interesting for future research to further explore these 
explanations. 
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In our studies, guilt was a crucial determinant of the interpersonal effects of 
disappointment. Anger, on the other hand, did not evoke guilt in our participants. At this 
point, it may be noted that some studies have shown that expressions of anger can also 
elicit sympathy or support (Clark & Brissette, 2003) and even feelings of guilt (Giner-
Sorolla & Espinosa, 2011). However, these findings were obtained in situations in which 
the two parties were engaged in a close affiliative relationship (Yoo, Clark, Lemay, Salovey, 
& Monin, 2011) and in non-competitive situations (Giner-Sorolla & Espinosa, 2011). In our 
studies, the interpersonal effects of disappointment were examined within competitive 
bargaining settings, where the communication of anger may not evoke guilt in others, but 
instead triggers strategic considerations (Van Kleef et al., 2010). Future research could 
investigate the effects of anger and disappointment in close relationships to see whether in 
negotiations, anger can also evoke guilt in others. 
Whether communicating disappointment yields high outcomes seems to depend 
on whether it evokes guilt or not. We do not suggest, however, that guilt is the only factor 
that determines whether communicating weakness pays or not. Factors such as empathy, 
or the closeness of the relationship of the negotiation parties may also determine whether 
communicated weakness evokes a tendency to act prosocially. In this regard, it may also be 
interesting to broaden the scope and investigate other emotions that elicit a need for help. 
Other supplication emotions such as sadness, fear and worry (see Van Kleef et al., 2006a) 
may also communicate weakness. So far, previous literature has not linked guilt to any of 
these other supplication emotions. Future research could investigate when and how these 
emotions evoke a tendency to act prosocially and when and how they evoke a tendency to 
act in a self-interested manner. 
 
Conclusion 
The current studies underscore the idea that specific emotions evoke specific 
affective reactions in others (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2006a, 2010). One should therefore treat 
each emotion as a distinct predictor of behavior in negotiations. We showed that, unlike 
anger, disappointment communicates weakness and thus exerts influence via different 
processes than anger does. In contrast to the common belief that weakness is a liability in 
negotiations, expressing disappointment can be effective under particular circumstances. 
We showed that the positive effects of disappointment depend highly on whether or not it 
evokes guilt. The weakness that disappointment communicates may elicit a sense of social 




responsibility in others when disappointment evokes guilt, but a tendency to act in a self-
interested manner when it does not evoke guilt. These findings help to resolve the 
apparent inconsistency regarding the interpersonal effects of disappointment and extend 
the literature on communicated power/weakness. 
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The aim of this dissertation was to gain knowledge about the interpersonal effects 
of two of the most often expressed emotions: anger and disappointment (Van Dijk & 
Zeelenberg, 2002b). The similarities and differences between the effects of both emotions 
were examined, and the results showed under which conditions and for what reasons 
communicating anger and/or disappointment helps or hurts in negotiations. Over the 
course of several behavioral studies and one neuroimaging study, using different 
negotiation paradigms and different emotion manipulations, the findings presented in this 
dissertation provide insight in the distinct effects of communicating anger and 
disappointment in negotiations. 
In this final chapter, I summarize the results of the four empirical chapters. 
Furthermore, I discuss how the results contribute to existing social functional analyses of 
emotions. Finally, I give suggestions for future research. 
 
Summary of the empirical findings 
In the first empirical chapter (Chapter 2), it was investigated when anger and 
disappointment change bargaining behavior via reciprocal or complementary emotions. As 
expected, power was a key determinant. When a high-power bargainer communicated 
anger, the complementary emotion fear was evoked, which led opponents to make higher 
offers. When it was communicated by a low-power bargainer, anger was reciprocated, 
which led opponents to make lower offers. Communicating disappointment, however, 
always evoked the complementary emotion guilt and increased offers, regardless of the 
bargainer’s power position. Although both emotions elicited generous offers when they 
were communicated by high-power bargainers (but for different reasons), disappointment 
was more advantageous than anger, when communicated by low-power bargainers. 
In Chapter 3, I continued to study how anger and disappointment affect bargaining 
behavior by considering underlying neural mechanisms. Moreover, the effects of the 
communication of these emotions were compared to the effects of the communication of 
the positive emotion happiness. The results showed that bargainers more often made 
lower offers to angry opponents than to happy or disappointed opponents. With regard to 
the underlying neural mechanisms, the results showed increased activation in the 




temporoparietal junction (TPJ) for receiving happy reactions, in comparison to receiving 
angry or disappointed reactions. In prior studies TPJ has been associated with a variety of 
social cognitive tasks such as perspective-taking (Ruby & Decety, 2003), action 
understanding (Kret, Pichon, Grèzes, & De Gelder, 2011; Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino, & 
Humphreys, 2004) and empathy (Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007). It is possible that the 
recipient’s happiness encouraged participants to take the perspective of the recipient. This 
is in line with behavioral research that showed that happiness leads to more closeness and 
increased perspective taking (Frantz & Janoff-Bulman, 2000; Fredrickson, 1998). The 
difference in neural reactions to anger and disappointment was also investigated. 
Compared to disappointment, expressions of anger increased activation in the MPFC. In 
previous research this region has been implicated in strategic bargaining (i.e., maximizing 
own outcomes and defecting in a trust game, see Van den Bos, Van Dijk, Westenberg, 
Rombouts, & Crone, 2009, 2011) and, more broadly, in self-referential thinking. This is in 
line with the behavioral results that showed that bargainers with angry opponents more 
often made self-serving offers and maximized their own outcomes. 
Whereas the first two empirical chapters thus showed that communicating 
disappointment in negotiations is more advantageous than communicating anger, in 
Chapter 4 I addressed the question of whether disappointment would always yield higher 
outcomes than anger. The findings showed that the interpersonal effects of anger and 
disappointment depend critically on the target of the emotion, that is, whether they are 
directed at the person or at the offer. Anger pays when it is directed at the offer, but 
disappointment pays when it is directed at the person. Offer-directed anger elicited higher 
offers than person-directed anger, because people inferred higher limits from opponents 
who communicated offer-directed anger. Person-directed disappointment elicited higher 
offers in others than offer-directed disappointment, because it evoked higher feelings of 
guilt. 
Chapter 5 completes the analyses of anger and disappointment. In this chapter it is 
argued that disappointment communicates a sense of dependency and weakness that is 
less present in anger. I then propose that this weakness has benefits and downsides 
depending on whether disappointment evokes guilt or not. When disappointment evokes 
guilt, the communicated weakness elicits a prosocial tendency. When it does not evoke 
guilt, disappointment elicits a selfish tendency. Key determinants of whether or not 
disappointment evokes guilt are the group membership of the expresser and the type of 
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negotiation. When disappointment is communicated by an out-group member or in a 
representative negotiation, it evokes lower levels of guilt in people, which lead them to 
make lower offers. When disappointment is communicated by an in-group member or in 
an individual negotiation, it evokes higher levels of guilt in people, which lead them to 
make higher offers. 
 
Anger and disappointment: similarities and differences 
The results of the four empirical chapters provide new insights into the 
similarities and differences between the interpersonal effects of anger and 
disappointment. Below, I first discuss these similarities and differences between anger and 
disappointment and then discuss what the implications are for opponents in negotiations. 
 
Similarities between anger and disappointment 
At first sight, anger and disappointment are two very similar emotions. Indeed, 
both emotions are considered to be negative emotions and reactions to undesirable 
outcomes (Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989). With regard to the interpersonal effects of 
anger and disappointment, both emotions communicate an undesirable outcome and a 
desire for behavioral change in the other person. They both signal that a wrong has been 
done by the target of the emotions, to the expresser or to someone else (Wubben, De 
Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2011). Anger and disappointment are also perceived as possessing 
similar levels of intensity and appropriateness in bargaining situations (see also Wubben, 
De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2009). Finally, this dissertation also shows that, compared to 
communications of happiness, there was reduced activation in the TPJ for targets of 
communications of anger and disappointment. As noted above, in prior studies this region 
was associated with perspective-taking (Ruby & Decety, 2003), and empathy (Lamm et al., 
2007). 
These findings seem to be in contrast to the findings of the other chapters in this 
dissertation. Communications of disappointment elicit high offers from others when these 
others feel guilty. As noted in Chapter 5, guilt has been shown to be linked to perspective 
taking and empathy, such that people feel guiltier towards another person when they want 
or are able to take the perspective of the other and when they empathize more with the 
other (Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). So why do the findings of 
Chapter 3 show reduced activation for targets of disappointment in an area associated 




with perspective taking and empathy? Although it is certainly possible that the reduced 
TPJ activation in the participants can be interpreted as reduced perspective taking, I want 
to stress that this need not be the case. fMRI is a relatively new technique and it is still hard 
to interpret what it means if a certain brain region is activated during behavior of 
participants. Regions that are activated may represent a number of different functions and 
it is hard to tell exactly what process is responsible for the behavior that people show in 
the scanner. In Chapter 3 there were no behavioral data to support the claim that the 
reduced TPJ activation represents reduced perspective taking. The TPJ has been implicated 
in other processes as well, which could lead to other interpretations of the TPJ activation. 
The TPJ, for instance, has also been implicated in action understanding (Kret et al., 2011; 
Samson et al., 2004). In Chapter 3 the emotional expressions were reactions to a 6-4 offer 
in favor of the participant (the target of the emotion). Participants thus received happy, 
angry, and disappointed reactions to self-serving offers that they made. It is therefore also 
possible that the reduced activation in the TPJ for communications of anger and 
disappointment, compared to communications of happiness, implies that angry or 
disappointed reactions were less confusing than happy reactions. It could be that it was 
more unclear for targets why people would be happy about receiving less than half of the 
money than why people would be angry or disappointed. Future research could investigate 
how this TPJ activation should be interpreted. 
Based on these insights, one may erroneously conclude that anger and 
disappointment have similar effects on others. However, as the findings of the four 
empirical chapters of this dissertation show, anger and disappointment are two very 
distinct emotions, with different effects on others. 
 
Differences between anger and disappointment 
 The most important difference between the interpersonal effects of anger and 
disappointment is the communicated strength/weakness of the emotions. The findings 
presented in this dissertation, but also in previous work (Tiedens, 2001), have shown that 
anger communicates strength. In negotiations, it communicates toughness and high limits 
(Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, b), which are 
indications of strength. By communicating toughness and high limits, anger forces 
opponents to give in. Anger entails a threat (Sinaceur, Van Kleef, Neale, Adam, & Haag, 
2011; Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008) and, as a result, it can evoke fear in 
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others. Because anger communicates power, it can thus elicit high offers from others in 
negotiations. 
 This dissertation shows that anger can also backfire, such that it elicits low offers 
from opponents. When angry bargainers have low power, opponents do not have to care 
about the communicated anger or implied threat (Van Dijk et al., 2008). In this case anger 
does not elicit high offers. This dissertation also showed that in this situation (i.e., when 
bargainers communicating anger have low power), anger activated regions in the MPFC in 
others, which is associated with self-referential thinking and the maximization of own 
outcomes. Observers of anger are thus more concerned with their own outcomes, and only 
offer more in situations when they have to be careful about the communicated power/high 
limits (i.e., in situations where bargainers who communicate anger have high power). 
Finally, the communication of anger backfires when the information about the power and 
high limits does not come across. In line with previous research (Steinel, Van Kleef, & 
Harinck, 2008), the findings of this dissertation show that when anger is directed at the 
person, it is less informative about one’s limits and is thus less seen as an indication of 
power. As a result, angry bargainers are not perceived to be powerful and communicating 
anger may elicit lower offers. 
 Disappointment does not typically communicate a sense of toughness. It 
communicates dependency (Eisenberg, 2000) and a call for help (Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 
1996; Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead, 1998; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006a), which 
are indications of weakness. This dissertation indeed shows that disappointment 
communicates weakness, which can have benefits and downsides, depending on whether it 
evokes guilt or not. When disappointment evokes guilt, the communicated weakness 
evokes a tendency to act prosocially, which is reflected in higher offers. When 
disappointment does not evoke guilt, the communicated weakness evokes a tendency to 
act in a self-interested manner, which is reflected in lower offers. 
 To conclude, by communicating power and high limits, anger may thus pay, 
because it alerts opponents to negative consequences (e.g., conflict escalation and 
impasse). When opponents do not have to care about these negative consequences (when 
anger is communicated by a low-power bargainer) or when the information about the high 
limits is not communicated in the right way (when it is directed at the person), anger may 
backfire. In contrast, by communicating weakness, disappointment may pay when it 
evokes guilt, because then it can elicit a prosocial reaction. However, when disappointment 




does not evoke guilt, this communicated weakness backfires and elicits a tendency to act in 
a self-interested way. When disappointment is communicated by an out-group member or 
in a representative negotiation, targets do not feel guilty. In these situations, 
disappointment elicit low offers. This dissertation thus not only shows that the 
interpersonal effects of anger and disappointment differ, but also why this is the case and 
under what conditions. 
The most important difference between anger and disappointment is thus that 
whereas anger communicates power, disappointment seems to communicate weakness. In 
the negotiation literature there is a common belief that weakness is a liability in 
negotiations (De Dreu, 1995; Güth & Huck, 1997; Kagel, Kim, & Moser, 1996; Lawler, 2002; 
Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; Suleiman, 1996). Whereas previous findings have indeed 
shown that it is advantageous to express emotions that communicate power (Sinaceur & 
Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b), under particular circumstances it can be (more) 
effective to express emotions that communicate weakness. 
 
General implications 
The present dissertation demonstrates that two of the most often expressed 
emotions in negotiations, anger and disappointment, have distinct social functions and 
affect the behavior, thoughts, beliefs and emotions of others differently. The findings 
presented in this dissertation increase our understanding of the social functions of 
emotions and extend previous social functional accounts of emotions. Below I address the 
implications of the work presented in this dissertation for social functional accounts of 
emotions (specifically for the Emotion as Social Information model), and some of the more 
general contributions. 
 
Correspondence with and extension of social functional accounts of 
emotion 
As explained in Chapter 1, the findings in this dissertation correspond with, but 
also extend social functional accounts of emotion. Below I will first explain how the 
findings presented in this dissertation correspond with social functional analyses and after 
that I will explain how the findings extend current social function analyses of emotion. I 
focus on a dominant social functional account of emotions: the Emotion as Social 
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Information (EASI) model by Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead (2010; see also Van Kleef, 
2009; Van Kleef, Van Doorn, Heerdink, & Koning, 2011). 
 
Correspondence with the EASI model 
According to the EASI model emotions can affect others via inferential as well as 
affective reactions. Emotions contain crucial information about the feelings and intentions 
of the sender of the emotion, which can have consequences for the behavior of receivers of 
the emotion. People may thus infer important information from emotional expressions of 
others (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef, 2009). In addition to providing relevant 
information, emotions can also wield interpersonal influence by eliciting affective 
reactions in others. By evoking affective reactions in others, emotions can influence 
behavior of observers of the emotion. The findings in this dissertation correspond with the 
EASI model, because they focus on inferential as well as affective reactions to emotions of 
others. 
With regard to the inferential effects of anger and disappointment, the findings in 
this dissertation showed that anger communicates information about one’s limits. 
Specifically, anger communicates that one has high limits and does not want to give in 
much during the negotiation. Also, Chapter 5 showed that anger communicates lower 
levels of weakness (which can also be interpreted as higher levels of power). As noted 
above, this can lead opponents to give in themselves, to not let the negotiation end in 
impasse. Disappointment, on the other hand, communicates weakness (see Chapter 5). 
This can elicit a tendency to act prosocially, but also a tendency to act in a self-interested 
way. 
With regard to the affective reactions to anger and disappointment, this 
dissertation showed that in negotiations anger and disappointment can indeed evoke 
emotional reactions in others, which predict subsequent behavior. In negotiations, anger 
can evoke reciprocal and complementary emotions in others (see Chapter 2). When anger 
is communicated by a high-power bargainer it evokes the complementary emotion fear in 
others, which leads others to give in. When anger is communicated by a low-power 
bargainer it evokes the reciprocal emotion anger in others, which leads others to make less 
generous offers. Disappointment can also evoke reciprocal and complementary emotions 
in others. Chapter 2 showed that, compared to communicating no emotion, 
disappointment evoked more reciprocal disappointment. This, however, did not predict 




the behavior of bargainers. Instead, when communicated by high- as well as low-power 
bargainers, disappointment also evoked complementary guilt in others and this predicted 
behavior (i.e., it led others to make generous offers). Chapter 4 also showed that 
disappointment evoked guilt and Chapter 5 even showed that guilt is the key determinant 
of whether communicating disappointment pays or not. When disappointment evokes 
guilt, it seems to elicit a tendency to act prosocially. When it does not evoke guilt, it elicits a 
tendency to act in a self-interested way. In line with the EASI model, this dissertation thus 
shows that anger and disappointment can affect others via inferential as well as affective 
reactions. 
Another way in which the findings presented in this dissertation support the EASI 
model, is that the findings corroborate the notion that it is essential to distinguish between 
different types of emotions and to not only consider the valence of emotions. It is 
important to acknowledge that specific emotions have differential effects (e.g., Lerner & 
Keltner, 2000; Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Van Kleef et al., 2006a, 2010). This dissertation 
indeed shows that anger and disappointment, two negative emotions, have very distinct 
effects on others. As described above, anger and disappointment only have a few 
similarities. Most of the interpersonal effects of anger and disappointment differ and one 
should therefore treat each emotion as a distinct predictor of behavior in negotiations. 
 
Extension of the EASI model 
Besides corresponding with the EASI model, the findings in this dissertation can 
also be seen as an extension of the model. According to the EASI model, emotions may 
influence others via inferential processes or via affective processes. As explained in 
Chapter 1, whether inferential processes or affective reactions take precedence in how 
emotions affect others has been shown to depend on several factors (Van Kleef et al., 2010; 
2011). One important factor is the cooperative versus competitive nature of the situation 
(Van Kleef et al., 2010). The EASI model posits that affective reactions become more 
predictive of social decisions to the extent that the situation is perceived as cooperative, 
whereas strategic inferences become more predictive when the situation is perceived as 
competitive. I agree with the EASI model that in previous research, emotional expressions 
in competitive situations have mainly influenced others via inferential processes. However, 
the findings of this dissertation show that even in competitive situations (such as the 
different bargaining paradigms used in this dissertation), anger and disappointment may 
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affect others via affective reactions. Chapter 2 indeed showed that in a competitive 
bargaining setting, anger can evoke reciprocal (anger) and complementary (fear) emotions 
in others, which predicts subsequent behavior. Similarly, Chapter 2, 4, and 5 showed that 
disappointment affects opponent’s behavior by evoking guilt, which in turn affected their 
offering behavior. This dissertation thus shows that it is not always the case that 
inferential processes are more predictive of behavior in competitive situations than 
affective reactions. 
Another important factor that, according to the EASI model, determines whether 
emotions affect others more via affective processes than via inferential processes, is the 
relative power of the target of the emotion. Whereas high-power individuals have less 
motivation to process the information conveyed by emotions, low-power individuals have 
a higher motivation to do so (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Keltner, 
Van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008). According to the EASI model, high-power individuals are 
thus more influenced by others’ emotions via affective reactions, and low-power 
individuals more via inferential processes. The findings of Chapter 2, however, show that 
low-power bargainers can also be influenced by their (high-power) opponent via affective 
reactions. Individuals felt more fearful when dealing with a high-power angry bargainer 
and guilty when dealing with a high-power disappointed bargainer. These emotional 
reactions to anger and disappointment also predicted subsequent offers. 
These are two examples of findings reported in this dissertation that indicate that 
although the EASI model would predict that anger and disappointment would affect 
opponents primarily via inferential processes, the findings of this dissertation show that 
affective reactions are also predictive of behavior. Of course, and this is also acknowledged 
by the EASI model, it can be true that affective reactions are based on inferences. For 
instance, we can infer from another person’s disappointment that he or she expected more 
from us, and consequently feel guilty. This way, both affective reactions and inferential 
processes play a role in the same situation, and they may even influence each other. 
However, according to the EASI model, inferential processes take precedence (over 
affective reactions) when the situation is perceived to be competitive and when the 
observer is a low-power individual. I agree with the EASI model that previous research has 
mainly showed that in competitive situations and when communicated by high-power 
individuals, emotions affect others via inferential processes. The findings in this 
dissertation, however, extend the EASI model by suggesting that this is not the complete 




story. This dissertation shows that even in competitive situations and in low-power 
situations, affective reactions can affect the behavior of others. 
A second way the findings in this dissertation can serve as an extension of the 
EASI model is by focusing on the underlying neural mechanisms of the interpersonal 
effects of emotions (Chapter 3). According to the EASI model (and other social functional 
analyses of emotions), emotions have social functions such that they influence others’ 
behavior, thoughts, feelings, intentions and perceptions. What these analyses do not take 
into account are the underlying neural mechanisms. This way, researchers can find 
similarities of and differences between distinct emotions that cannot be found or would 
not initially have been thought of based on only investigating behavioral effects. Indeed, 
Chapter 3 shows similarities of and differences between effects of communicated anger 
and disappointment that the other chapters do not show. In comparison to communicated 
happiness, results show decreased activation in regions that have been associated with a 
variety of social cognitive tasks such as perspective-taking, action understanding, and 
empathy. This is a similarity between the interpersonal effects of anger and 
disappointment that does not come up in any of the other chapters. When zooming in on 
the two negative emotions anger and disappointment, results also showed that compared 
to communicated disappointment, communicated anger activated brain regions in others 
associated with self-referential thinking and the maximization of own outcomes. Although 
this is in line with many of the behavioral results of the other chapters, the fact that anger 
evokes a concern for own outcomes has not been made specific by any of the other 
chapters. For this reason, I want to stress that besides focusing on the behavior, intentions 
and emotions that are influenced by others’ emotions, social functional analyses should 
also take into account how others’ emotions can influence one’s brain regions. 
 
Link between intra- and interpersonal effects of emotions 
As explained in Chapter 1, the effects of emotions can be divided into 
intrapersonal effects and interpersonal effects. The intrapersonal effects of emotions refer 
to the effects of emotions on people’s own thoughts, behavior, and feelings. The 
interpersonal effects of emotions refer to the effects of emotions on others’ thoughts, 
behavior, and feelings. Although the work presented in this dissertation focuses mainly on 
the interpersonal effects of emotions, it also suggests that there is a clear link between the 
intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of emotions. The findings showed that feelings and 
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intentions that are evoked by anger and disappointment are also communicated to others. 
For instance, people who experience anger not only feel powerful (Roseman, Antoniou, & 
Jose, 1996), the findings in this dissertation showed that expressions of anger also 
communicate to others that they are powerful and tough (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; 
Tiedens, 2001; Van Dijk et al., 2008, Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b). Similarly, people 
experiencing disappointment not only feel in need of help (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b), 
they also communicate this to others (Van Kleef et al., 2006a; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 
2008). And people experiencing disappointment not only feel weak (Van Dijk & 
Zeelenberg, 2002b), Chapter 5 showed that they also communicate this to others. This 
dissertation thus adds to the literature on communicated emotions by linking the intra- 
and the interpersonal effects of emotions. 
 
Practical implications 
Emotions are regarded by many as disruptive forces that interfere with decision-
making. Often, professional negotiators are advised to show a poker face and not express 
their emotions (Nierenberg, 1968; Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987), because it signals 
weakness and provides information to others that you do not want them to know. The 
findings presented in this dissertation suggest that emotional expressions can also help to 
obtain high outcomes. Anger can elicit generous offers in negotiations, as long as it is not 
communicated in a low power position and/or directed at the person. Disappointment can 
elicit high offers in negotiations, under the condition that it evokes guilt in opponents (i.e., 
when it is not (1) directed at the offer, (2) communicated to an out-group member, and/or 
(3) communicated in a representative negotiation). Also, this dissertation suggests that it is 
not necessarily detrimental to signal weakness. Weakness can lead others to make high 
offers, as long as it elicits a prosocial tendency in others. However, the effects of 
communicating anger and disappointment may also depend on other factors that I have 
not discussed or investigated in this dissertation. In the next section, I consider other 
factors that could influence the interpersonal effects of anger and disappointment when I 
discuss avenues for future research. 
 
Where do we go from here? 
 Over the course of four empirical chapters, using different negotiation paradigms, 
different measures, and different emotion manipulations, this dissertation provided new 




insights into the interpersonal effects of two of the most often communicated negative 
emotions, anger and disappointment. Although this dissertation showed similar results 
across different negotiation paradigms, one may wonder whether similar results would be 
obtained in a face-to-face negotiation. Using computer-mediated negotiation paradigms 
enabled us to permit a carefully controlled manipulation of the emotion. Furthermore, it 
enabled us to study the interpersonal effects of emotions in the fMRI scanner. I have no 
reason to suspect that the findings presented in this dissertation are restricted to 
computer-mediated interactions. Findings obtained with computer-mediated interactions 
such as the ones used in this dissertation are consistent with findings obtained with 
different paradigms, including surveys involving full-time workers (e.g., Van Kleef, De 
Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006b), nonverbal manipulations of emotional expressions by 
means of pictures (e.g., Pietroni et al., 2008) and face-to-face negotiation (e.g., Sinaceur & 
Tiedens, 2006). Moreover, in Experiment 5.3 (see Chapter 5), a video of a person that 
expressed either disappointment or anger was used, that included facial, postural and 
vocal expressions of both emotions. The results of this experiment were similar to the 
results of Experiment 5.2 that used a verbal emotion manipulation where participants 
could not see the person expressing the emotion. Different channels of emotional 
communication are thus functionally equivalent (see also Van Kleef et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, future research could investigate the generalization of the interpersonal 
effects of anger and disappointment across settings. 
A more interesting issue perhaps concerns the cooperative mindset that 
disappointment evoked when it evoked guilt in others. Although the negotiation setting 
was competitive, participants in the experiments reported in this dissertation showed 
increased cooperation (i.e., they made higher offers) to disappointed opponents when 
disappointment evoked guilt. Anger also elicited high offers, not because it evoked a 
prosocial tendency in others, but more so because others did not want to reach impasse. 
Disappointment really seems to elicit a prosocial tendency. It may have reduced the 
perceived competitiveness of the situation and may have “transformed” the predominantly 
competitive bargaining context into a perceived cooperative situation. This can be 
explained by March’s logic of appropriateness (March, 1995; see also Messick, 1999; 
Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). In brief, this theory posits that people make decisions 
in social situations by categorizing the decision situation in terms of appropriateness. The 
question that is asked, implicitly or explicitly, is ‘What kind of situation is this?’ The answer 
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that is given to this question will depend on the cues available about the situation. I argue 
that disappointment is such a cue. It may signal that it is not appropriate to act 
competitively. Disappointment may therefore have reduced the default competitive 
situation of a negotiation and may have transformed it into a perceived cooperative one. 
This is in line with results by Van Doorn, Heerdink, and Van Kleef (2012), which showed 
that expressions of disappointment lead observers to perceive the situation as more 
cooperative. Future research may investigate how this transforming power of 
disappointment works and when it predicts opponent’s behavior. 
 The results presented in this dissertation show how different negative emotions 
affect others. All of this research, however, focused on the behavior of adults. Little 
research has focused on the interpersonal effects of emotions on children and adolescents. 
This is surprising in light of the fact that children and adolescents have been shown to 
respond very differently to behavior of others, also in comparison to adults. There is 
considerable evidence that early in adolescence individuals are more inclined to act and 
think in a self-interested manner (Eisenberg, Carlo, Murphy, & Van Court 1995; Elkind, 
1985), whereas later in adolescence, individuals tend to think more about others and take 
social responsibility (Steinberg, 2009). Also, children’s ability to take the perspective of 
other people increases with age (Eisenberg, Cumberland, Guthrie, Murphy, & Shepard, 
2005). More relevant for this dissertation, children’s ability to distinguish between 
different types of emotions or between real and fake emotions also increases with age 
(Harris, Donnelly, et al., 1986). In addition, research focusing on distinct emotions has 
shown that older children differentiate more between the emotions of anger, sadness, and 
fear than do their younger counterparts (Jenkins & Ball, 2000). These changes across age 
seem to be associated with functional changes in the brain. During adolescence functional 
changes occur in social brain regions (see Blakemore, 2008, for a review). For instance, 
activity in parts of the frontal cortex increases between childhood and adulthood (e.g., 
Crone & Dahl, 2012), whereas activity in parts of the cingulate cortex decreases from 
adolescence into adulthood (Monk et al., 2008). More relevant for this dissertation 
(specifically to the results presented in Chapter 3), research has shown that emotion-
related activity in the prefrontal cortex increases with age during adolescence (Yurgelun-
Todd, & Killgore, 2006). Moreover, activity in the TPJ during social decision-making also 
increases with age (Van den Bos et al., 2009). In Chapter 3, prefrontal cortex activation was 
associated with the interpersonal effects of anger (which elicited low offers) and TPJ 




activation with the interpersonal effects of happiness (which elicited high offers). One may 
then expect that young adolescents are more generous to angry opponents, but less 
generous to happy opponents. Future research could investigate whether children behave 
differently than adults to a communicated emotion, and whether functional changes that 
occur in the brain (specifically in the prefrontal cortex and the TPJ) can explain why this is 
the case. 
The current dissertation focused on the two negative emotions anger and 
disappointment. As noted in Chapter 1, we focused on the interpersonal effects of these 
two negative emotions, because they are two of the most often communicated emotions. 
Moreover, they can be said to have the social function of changing other’s behavior, which 
makes it highly relevant to investigate how they do so. It is, however, also interesting to 
investigate the interpersonal effects of other negative emotions in negotiation settings. Van 
Kleef and colleagues (2006) already investigated the interpersonal effects of other 
negative emotions such as worry, guilt, and regret. The communication of these emotions 
is less common and they do not have the apparent aim of changing the behavior of others. 
Nonetheless, the authors showed that communicating regret and guilt has very different 
effects than communicating worry or disappointment. Communicating regret or guilt 
elicited lower offers, whereas worry or disappointment elicited generous offers. Their 
results showed that not only anger and disappointment differentially affect opponents in 
negotiations, other negative emotions may do so as well. 
Finally, given that different negative emotions have very distinct effects on 
opponents in negotiation, it is worth considering whether one can also find differences in 
the effects of different positive emotions. As far as I know, no research so far has tried to 
compare the interpersonal effects of different positive emotions in negotiations. For 
instance, it seems plausible that positive emotions that communicate power (e.g., pride) 
have different interpersonal effects in negotiations than positive emotions that 
communicate lenience (e.g., happiness). So far, when research focuses on the interpersonal 
effects of positive emotions, they mainly focus on one category of positive affect: happiness 
(Sauter, 2010). A full understanding of the social functions of emotions can be obtained by 
also including other types of positive emotions. 
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As I mentioned at the beginning of this journey, the expression “I am not angry 
with you, I’m just disappointed” is often used to make people feel bad about what they 
have done, in hopes of changing their behavior. Indeed, the first two chapters showed that 
in competitive situations, it is more effective to communicate disappointment than to 
communicate anger. However, this account of the effectiveness of communicating anger 
versus disappointment was qualified along the way. In chapters three and four, results 
showed that the effectiveness of communicating anger versus disappointment depends 
highly on the situation and on the target of the emotion. By taking a close look at how these 
two emotions affect others’ behavior and underlying neural mechanisms, this dissertation 
provided a more in-depth view of the social functions of negative emotions. I hope the 
present findings will inspire researchers in the fascinating field of the social functions of 
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Emoties in onderhandelingen: De rol van 




Emoties spelen een belangrijke rol in het dagelijks leven. Ze werden lang gezien 
als belemmeringen bij het nemen van rationele beslissingen. Recentelijk heeft dit beeld 
over emoties plaatsgemaakt voor een functioneel perspectief op emoties. Het idee is 
ontstaan dat emoties informatie bevatten over je gevoelens en intenties. Ze leveren niet 
alleen informatie aan jezelf, maar ook aan anderen. Ze hebben dus ook een sociale functie. 
De informatie die emoties communiceren naar anderen kan consequenties hebben voor 
het gedrag van de ontvangers (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). 
Emoties zijn dus belangrijk binnen sociale interacties en bij het maken van 
beslissingen. Wanneer mensen beslissingen maken zijn ze vaak afhankelijk van anderen. 
Conflicten die in dit soort situaties ontstaan worden vaak opgelost door onderhandelingen. 
Hoewel inmiddels veel mensen het erover eens zijn dat emoties een cruciale rol spelen in 
onderhandelingen, is het nog onduidelijk wat voor rol. Bij het onderzoeken van de 
interpersoonlijke effecten van emoties (de effecten van emoties op andermans intenties en 
gedrag) binnen onderhandelingen heeft eerder onderzoek zich vooral gericht op het 
vergelijken van boosheid en blijheid. Boze mensen worden vooral gezien als taaie 
onderhandelaars en in vergelijking met blijdschap communiceert boosheid in een 
onderhandeling hogere eisen (bv., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & 
Manstead, 2004a, b). Onderzoek heeft laten zien dat onderhandelaars met boze 
tegenstanders ook meer toegeven dan met blije tegenstanders (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b). 
 Dit eerste onderzoek naar de interpersoonlijke effecten van emoties in 
onderhandelingen liet dus zien dat gecommuniceerde emoties het gedrag van 
tegenstanders in onderhandelingen beïnvloedt. Het is echter belangrijk om niet alleen het 
verschil tussen positieve emoties (blijheid) en negatieve emoties (boosheid) te
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onderzoeken. Aangezien eerder onderzoek heeft laten zien dat specifieke emoties 
specifieke effecten hebben op anderen (zie Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010), is het 
belangrijk om een verschil te maken tussen verschillende typen emoties. Weinig studies 
hebben zich bijvoorbeeld gericht op de verschillen tussen de interpersoonlijke effecten van 
verschillende negatieve emoties. Dit proefschrift heeft zich hierop gericht door twee van 
de meest gecommuniceerde en vaak voorkomende negatieve emoties in onderhandelingen 
met elkaar te vergelijken: boosheid en teleurstelling. 
 Boosheid is een emotie die mensen voelen wanneer het behalen van bepaalde 
doelen worden gedwarsboomd (Berkowitz, 1993; Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Dollard, 
Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939; Lewis, Alessandri, & Sullivan, 1990). Mensen voelen 
boosheid vooral wanneer anderen de oorzaak zijn van het niet behalen van het doel 
(Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996). Teleurstelling, daarentegen, is een emotie die mensen 
voelen wanneer bepaalde uitkomsten lager zijn dan verwacht. Het gaat vaak gepaard met 
gevoelens van machteloosheid. Zowel boosheid als teleurstelling communiceren dat men 
ergens ontevreden over is. Ondanks deze overeenkomst hebben deze emoties specifieke 
effecten op anderen. In dit proefschrift vergelijken we de interpersoonlijke effecten van 
boosheid en teleurstelling in onderhandelingen en laten we zien dat beide emoties 
verschillende effecten hebben op tegenstanders en verschillende onderliggende 
mechanismen hebben. Er wordt niet alleen gekeken naar de verschillende effecten op het 
gedrag van anderen (zie Hoofdstuk 2, 4, en 5), maar ook op de onderliggende 
hersengebieden van anderen (zie Hoofdstuk 3). 
 In Hoofdstuk 2 is onderzocht hoe boosheid en teleurstelling het gedrag van 
tegenstanders in een onderhandeling beïnvloeden. Hoewel eerder onderzoek zich vooral 
heeft gericht op de informatie die boosheid en teleurstelling communiceren (zie Van Kleef 
& Van Lange, 2008), richt Hoofdstuk 2 zich vooral op de emoties die boosheid en 
teleurstelling bij anderen oproepen en hoe dit vervolgens het gedrag van de anderen 
beïnvloedt. Boosheid en teleurstelling kunnen allebei reciproke emoties (een zelfde 
emotie) oproepen. Boosheid roept dan boosheid op bij anderen, en teleurstelling roept 
teleurstelling op. Ze kunnen echter ook complementaire emoties (een tegengestelde 
emotie) oproepen bij anderen (Van Kleef et al., 2008). Een complementaire emotie die 
vaak geassocieerd wordt met boosheid is angst (Dimberg & Öhman, 1996; Van Kleef et al., 
2004a). Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat schuld een complementaire emotie is die in 
onderhandelingen wordt opgeroepen door de communicatie van teleurstelling. 




De bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 2 laten zien dat de relatieve machtspositie van de 
onderhandelingspartijen kan bepalen of een reciproke emotie of een complementaire 
emotie wordt opgeroepen. In Hoofdstuk 2 is de relatieve machtspositie van de persoon die 
boosheid of teleurstelling communiceert gemanipuleerd in een ultimatum spel setting. De 
bevindingen laten zien dat de relatieve machtspositie bepaalt of de communicatie van 
boosheid hoge of lage biedingen oproept. Wanneer een onderhandelaar in een hoge 
machtspositie boosheid communiceert, roept dit de complementaire emotie angst op bij 
anderen, wat vervolgens leidt tot hogere biedingen. Wanneer een onderhandelaar in een 
lage machtspositie boosheid communiceert, roept het de reciproke emotie boosheid op bij 
anderen, wat vervolgens leidt tot lagere biedingen. De effecten van teleurstelling zijn niet 
afhankelijk van de relatieve machtspositie van de onderhandelingspartijen. De 
bevindingen toonden aan dat teleurstelling schuld opriep bij anderen, onafhankelijk van de 
relatieve machtspositie van de onderhandelaars. Dit leidde tot hogere biedingen van 
tegenstanders. Op basis van deze resultaten zou dus geconcludeerd kunnen worden dat 
het effectiever is om teleurstelling te communiceren in onderhandelingen dan om 
boosheid te communiceren. 
In lijn met de resultaten van Hoofdstuk 2, laat ook Hoofdstuk 3 zien dat 
teleurstelling hogere biedingen oproept bij anderen in onderhandelingssituaties dan 
boosheid. In Hoofdstuk 3 worden de neurale mechanismen die betrokken zijn bij de 
interpersoonlijke effecten van boosheid en teleurstelling onderzocht en deze worden 
bovendien vergeleken met de interpersoonlijke effecten van de positieve emotie 
blijdschap. Onze gedragsresultaten lieten zien dat mensen vaker een zelfzuchtig bod deden 
aan boze tegenstanders dan aan teleurgestelde of blije tegenstanders. Met betrekking tot 
de neurale mechanismen, werd allereerst het effect van valentie onderzocht. De resultaten 
lieten zien dat blijheid van de tegenstander geassocieerd was met activiteit in de 
temporoparietale overgang (TPJ). Dit gebied is in eerder onderzoek vooral gerelateerd aan 
het perspectief nemen van anderen. Het is mogelijk dat de blijdschap van de ander de 
deelnemers in onze studie aanspoorden om het perspectief te nemen van de ander. Dit is in 
lijn met eerder gedragsonderzoek dat laat zien dat blijdschap leidt tot affiliatie en een 
toename in het nemen van het perspectief van een ander (Frantz & Janoff-Bulman, 2000; 
Fredrickson, 1998). Wanneer we inzoomden op de effecten van de twee negatieve emoties, 
lieten de bevindingen zien dat boosheid van anderen meer activatie liet zien in de mediale 
prefrontale cortex dan teleurstelling van anderen. Dit gebied is in eerder onderzoek in 
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soortgelijke settings vooral gerelateerd aan het maximaliseren van eigen uitkomsten en, 
wat algemener, zelfgerelateerd denken. Dit is in lijn met de gedragsresultaten die laten 
zien dat deelnemers met boze tegenstanders vaker zelfzuchtige biedingen deden en hun 
uitkomsten dus maximaliseerden. 
Terwijl de eerste twee empirische hoofdstukken lieten zien dat gecommuniceerde 
teleurstelling vaak hogere biedingen oproept bij anderen dan gecommuniceerde boosheid, 
is in Hoofdstuk 4 onderzocht of dit altijd het geval is. De bevindingen laten zien dat de 
effecten van boosheid en teleurstelling afhangen van waarop de emotie gericht is. Meer 
specifiek, het maakt veel uit of de emotie gericht is op de persoon of op het bod in de 
onderhandeling. De resultaten van Hoofdstuk 4 laten zien dat boosheid hogere biedingen 
oproept bij anderen wanneer het gericht is op het bod, terwijl teleurstelling juist hogere 
biedingen oproept bij anderen wanneer het gericht is op de persoon. Bodgerichte boosheid 
roept hogere biedingen op dan persoonsgerichte boosheid, omdat tegenstanders de 
limieten van de boze persoon hoger inschatten wanneer de boosheid op het bod is gericht. 
Persoonsgerichte teleurstelling roept hoger biedingen op dan bodgerichte teleurstelling, 
omdat teleurstelling meer schuld oproept wanneer het gericht is op de persoon. 
In Hoofdstuk 5, ten slotte, wordt de analyse van de interpersoonlijke effecten van 
boosheid en teleurstelling voltooid. In dit hoofdstuk wordt aangetoond dat teleurstelling 
zwakte communiceert, terwijl boosheid juist macht communiceert. De zwakte die gepaard 
is met teleurstelling kan hoge biedingen oproepen bij anderen, maar ook lage biedingen, 
afhankelijk van of teleurstelling schuld oproept of niet. Wanneer teleurstelling schuld 
oproept, wekt de communiceerde zwakte een neiging op bij anderen tot prosociaal gedrag. 
Wanneer het geen schuld oproept, wekt de zwakte een neiging op bij anderen tot 
zelfzuchtig gedrag. Twee belangrijke factoren die bepalen in hoeverre teleurstelling schuld 
oproept zijn het groepslidmaatschap van beide partijen (behoren ze tot dezelfde groep of 
niet) en het type onderhandeling (individuele onderhandelingen vs. onderhandelingen via 
vertegenwoordigers). Wanneer teleurstelling wordt gecommuniceerd door een lid van een 
andere groep of in een onderhandeling met vertegenwoordigers, dan roept teleurstelling 
minder schuld op bij tegenstanders, wat leidt tot lagere biedingen. Wanneer teleurstelling 
wordt gecommuniceerd door een lid van de eigen groep of in een individuele 
onderhandeling, dan roept teleurstelling meer schuld op bij tegenstanders, wat leidt tot 
hogere biedingen. De effectiviteit van de communicatie van boosheid hangt niet af van het 
groepslidmaatschap van beide partijen of van het type onderhandeling. In beide situaties 




communiceert boosheid macht en hoge limieten, waardoor tegenstander toegeven om 
impasse te vermijden. 
Samengevat toont de huidige dissertatie aan dat de twee negatieve emoties 
boosheid en teleurstelling verschillende effecten hebben op het gedrag en de 
hersengebieden van anderen in onderhandelingen. Boosheid is een emotie die macht 
communiceert en tegenstanders geven in onderhandelingen toe om impasse te vermijden. 
Wanneer mensen geen rekening hoeven te houden met de negatieve consequenties van de 
hoge limieten van boosheid (zie Hoofdstuk 2 en 3), of wanneer de informatie over hoge 
limieten niet goed wordt gecommuniceerd (zie Hoofdstuk 4), werkt het communiceren van 
boosheid averechts. Teleurstelling is een emotie die zwakte communiceert. Tegenstanders 
geven toe wanneer die gecommuniceerde zwakte schuld oproept, maar wanneer het geen 
schuld oproept, werkt teleurstelling averechts (zie Hoofdstuk 5). Dit proefschrift laat dus 
niet alleen zien dat de interpersoonlijke effecten van boosheid en teleurstelling verschillen, 
maar beschrijft ook de onderliggende processen die ten grondslag liggen aan deze 
verschillen en de consequenties die deze verschillen hebben voor gedrag. Op deze manier 
draagt dit proefschrift bij aan een meer volledig en specifieker beeld van de sociale 
functies van negatieve emoties. 
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Emotions in negotiations: The role of communicated 




Emotions play an important role in everyday life. Until recently, emotions were 
regarded as detrimental or disruptive forces that interfere with rational decision-making, 
instead of as social tools that facilitate decision-making. Increasingly, however, this 
thought has made way for a functional approach to emotions (Frijda, 1986). This approach 
emphasizes that emotions contain valuable information about one’s feelings and intentions 
(Keltner & Haidt, 1999). They thus also have a social function. The information that 
emotions communicate to others can have consequences for the behavior of others (Van 
Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010). 
When people make decisions they are often dependent on others. Conflicts that 
arise in such situations are often resolved by negotiations. Although most research agrees 
on the assumption that emotions play a crucial role in negotiations, it is still unclear what 
role exactly. Research on the interpersonal effects of emotions (how emotions affect 
others’ feeling, intentions, and behavior) in negotiations has thus far focused mainly on 
comparing the communication of anger and happiness. Angry bargainers are perceived to 
be tough negotiators and, compared to happiness, anger communicates high limits (e.g., 
Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, b). Research has also 
shown that these appraisals of the bargainer’s limits lead opponents to make more 
concessions to angry negotiators, than to happy negotiators (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b). 
This first line of studies thus showed that communicating emotions may affect the 
bargaining behavior of opponents. It is, however, important to consider the effects of 
specific emotions and to not only investigate emotions that differ in valence, such as anger 
and happiness. Few studies have considered the interpersonal effects of different negative 
emotions in negotiations. This dissertation aims to compare different negative emotions, 
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by focusing on two of the most often communicated and experienced emotions in 
negotiations: anger and disappointment. 
Anger arises when a person’s goals are frustrated (Berkowitz, 1993; Carver & 
Harmon-Jones, 2009; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939; Lewis, Alessandri, & 
Sullivan, 1990). It mostly arises when others are blamed for the goal blockage (Roseman, 
Antoniou, & Jose, 1996). Disappointment, on the other hand, arises when progress towards 
a goal is below expectations (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008) and/or 
when a desired outcome is not achieved (Bell, 1985; Frijda, 1986; Van Dijk & Van der Pligt, 
1997). It involves feelings of powerlessness, a tendency to turn away from an event, and 
wanting to do nothing (Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, Manstead, & Van der Pligt, 1998a). Anger and 
disappointment are both emotions that are reactions to undesirable behavior of others, 
and at the same time desire behavioral change of others (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b). 
However, when taking a closer look, both emotions are very different in terms of their 
effects on others. In this dissertation we compare the interpersonal effects of anger and 
disappointment in negotiations and show that both emotions have distinct effects on 
opponents and that they have different underlying mechanisms. We do not only look at the 
effects that they have on the behavior of others (see Chapter 2, 4, and 5), but also on the 
underlying neural mechanisms (see Chapter 3). 
In the first empirical chapter (Chapter 2), it was investigated when anger and 
disappointment change bargaining behavior of others. Whereas previous research has 
mainly focused on the information that anger and disappointment communicate (see Van 
Kleef & Van Lange, 2008), in Chapter 2 I investigated the emotions that anger and 
disappointment evoke in others and how they subsequently influence behavior. Anger and 
disappointment can both evoke reciprocal emotions (anger evokes anger and 
disappointment evokes disappointment). They can, however, also evoke different, but 
corresponding (i.e., complementary) emotions in others (Van Kleef et al., 2008). A 
complementary emotion that is often associated with anger is fear (Dimberg & Öhman, 
1996; Van Kleef et al., 2004a ). Chapter 2 shows that a complementary emotion that 
disappointment evokes in negotiations is guilt. The findings show that power is a key 
determinant of whether reciprocal or complementary emotions are evoked. When a high-
power bargainer communicated anger, the complementary emotion fear was evoked, 
which led opponents to make higher offers. When it was communicated by a low-power 
bargainer, anger was reciprocated, which led opponents to make lower offers. 




Communicating disappointment, however, always evoked the complementary emotion 
guilt and increased offers, regardless of the bargainer’s power position. Although both 
emotions elicited generous offers when they were communicated by high-power 
bargainers (but for different reasons), disappointment was more advantageous than anger, 
when communicated by low-power bargainers. 
In Chapter 3, the study of how anger and disappointment affect bargaining 
behavior is continued by considering underlying neural mechanisms. Moreover, the effects 
of the communication of these emotions were compared to the effects of the 
communication of the positive emotion happiness. The results showed that bargainers 
more often made lower offers to angry opponents than to happy or disappointed 
opponents. With regard to the underlying neural mechanisms, the results showed 
increased activation in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) for receiving happy reactions, in 
comparison to receiving angry or disappointed reactions. In prior studies TPJ has been 
associated with perspective-taking. It is possible that the recipient’s happiness encouraged 
participants to take the perspective of the recipient. This is in line with behavioral research 
that showed that happiness leads to more closeness and increased perspective taking 
(Frantz & Janoff-Bulman, 2000; Fredrickson, 1998). The difference in neural reactions to 
anger and disappointment was also investigated. Compared to disappointment, 
expressions of anger increased activation in the MPFC. In previous research this region has 
been implicated in strategic bargaining (i.e., maximizing own outcomes and defecting in a 
trust game, see Van den Bos, Van Dijk, Westenberg, Rombouts, & Crone, 2009, 2011) and, 
more broadly, in self-referential thinking. This is in line with the behavioral results that 
showed that bargainers with angry opponents more often made self-serving offers and 
maximized their own outcomes. 
Whereas the first two empirical chapters thus showed that communicating 
disappointment in negotiations is more advantageous than communicating anger, in 
Chapter 4 I addressed the question of whether disappointment would always yield higher 
outcomes than anger. The findings showed that the interpersonal effects of anger and 
disappointment depend critically on the target of the emotion, that is, whether they are 
directed at the person or at the offer. Anger pays when it is directed at the offer, but 
disappointment pays when it is directed at the person. Offer-directed anger elicited higher 
offers than person-directed anger, because people inferred higher limits from opponents 
who communicated offer-directed anger. Person-directed disappointment elicited higher 
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offers in others than offer-directed disappointment, because it evoked higher feelings of 
guilt. 
Chapter 5 completes the analyses of anger and disappointment. In this chapter it 
is argued that disappointment communicates a sense of dependency and weakness that is 
less present in anger. I then propose that this weakness has benefits and downsides 
depending on whether disappointment evokes guilt or not. When disappointment evokes 
guilt, the communicated weakness elicits a prosocial tendency. When it does not evoke 
guilt, disappointment elicits a selfish tendency. Key determinants of whether or not 
disappointment evokes guilt are the group membership of the expresser and the type of 
negotiation. When disappointment is communicated by an out-group member or in a 
representative negotiation, it evokes lower levels of guilt in people, which lead them to 
make lower offers. When disappointment is communicated by an in-group member or in 
an individual negotiation, it evokes higher levels of guilt in people, which lead them to 
make higher offers. 
To sum up, the current dissertation shows that the two negative emotions anger 
and disappointment have different effects on the behavior and brain regions of others in 
negotiations. Anger is an emotion that communicates power and opponents in negotiations 
give in to avoid impasse. When opponents do not have to care about these negative 
consequences (when anger is communicated by a low-power bargainer, see Chapter 2 and 
3) or when the information about the high limits is not communicated in the right way 
(when it is directed at the person, see Chapter 4), anger may backfire. Disappointment is 
an emotion that communicates weakness. Opponents give in when this communicated 
weakness evokes guilt, but when it does not evoke guilt, communicating disappointment 
backfires (see Chapter 5). This dissertation thus not only shows that the interpersonal 
effects of anger and disappointment differ, but also what their underlying mechanisms are 
and what the different consequences are for behavior. By taking a close look at how these 
two emotions affect others’ behavior and underlying neural mechanisms, this dissertation 
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